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AbstrAct
 This dissertation finds its exigency in “The 9/11 Commission Report,” and 
specifically its claim that “a failure of imagination” that dismisses possibilities 
relates to the work currently in focus within rhetoric and composition studies as 
it relates to writing (with) new media. My argument relies on the underdeveloped 
concept of ‘imagination’ in composition as a way to argue for an alternate 
theoretical framework for addressing what writing (with) new media entails as 
a growing form of art. As such, I take up Geoff Sirc’s invitation to ‘remake’ his 
English Composition as a Happening with all of its references to avant-garde art 
as conceptualized in Allan Kaprow’s figure of the unartist and Dick Higgins calls 
for intermedia practices. Both of these concepts appear in the unart of comics – an 
‘art’ for artists who have left their ‘homes’ in disciplinary iterations of art (unart) 
and for artists who are more concerned with working between media than they are 
within a specific medium (intermedia). Comics, as I use the term, does not refer 
to a specific medium, but works as a form of thought in the Deleuzian sense: a 
sort of intuition exercised by imagination engaged in the continuous discovery of 
possibilities. 
 Building on ‘post-pedagogical’ theories of invention—Italo Calvino, Byron 
Hawk, Cynthia Haynes, Gregory Ulmer—avant-garde writing and art practices (as 
it relates to new media)—Maurice Blanchot, Andre Breton, Friedrich Kittler, Jean-
iii
Francois Lyotard—and institutional rhetorics—Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, 
Bill Readings, Thomas Rickert—I propose a ‘strange’ manner of writing that 
foregoes the demands of argumentative writing in favor of a playful writing that 
attunes itself to imaginative possibilities of discovery. To write strangely connotes 
an unconventional approach to composition that would offer us the opportunities to 
think about ‘the coming composition’ as we invent new forms and ways of thinking 
according to methods invented for the occasion. In inventing new forms by thinking 
in terms of intermedia, we can realize the goal of Lyotard’s postmodern writer: 
to present (allusions to) the unpresentable. If we are to address the ‘failure of 
imagination’ in institutional practice and in ‘the scene of teaching,’ we need to be 
willing to be nomadic as both artists AND writers. Comics ‘artists,’ or those who 
I refere to as unartists, are adept at demonstrating ways in which this work can 
proceed, especially if we think of comics in terms of Haynes’ slash-technology that 
cuts through the divisions between media. In this dissertation, comics function as 
a form of thought that extends ‘multimodal composition’ and ‘art’ to their limits in 
order to suggest a strangely imaginative composition capable of attending to the 
disast(e)rous ‘failure of imagination.’
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IntroductIon
ImagInIng the comIng composItIon
2Imagining the Coming Composition
imAgining the coming composition
“Give ‘em the boot, the roots, the radicals/
Give ‘em the boot, you know I’m a radical…”
~ Rancid, “Roots Radicals”
“At a time when wise men peered/through glass tubes 
toward the sky/the heavens changed in predictable 
ways/and one man was able to find/that he had 
thought he found the answer/and he was quick to 
write his revelation/but as they were scrutinized/in his 
colleagues eyes/he soon became a mockery/don’t tell 
me about the answer/’cause then another one will come 
along soon/I don’t believe you have the answer/I’ve got 
ideas too/but if you’ve got enough naïveté/and you’ve 
got conviction/then the answer is perfect for you…”
~ Bad Religion, “The Answer”
I would prefer not to write ‘purely.’1  The predictability of such writing holds little interest and even less activity by providing (revelatory) answers with 
conviction, coded as acceptable. As Maurice Blanchot points out in a reading of 
Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener,” ‘pure’ writing “can only be that of 
the copyist (rewriting)” (Writing 145). And yet, it is Bartleby’s refusal to write 
purely that disrupts the unnamed narrator’s refusal to write at all, contented to 
direct other scriveners to write and correct their errors. It is this refusal that I 
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look to affirm – a passive, passionate, patient writing that precedes, and therefore 
exceeds, any criterion of acceptable writing, anything that falls outside of the 
reproduction of essays (pure writing) that we have seen so often. And Bartleby’s 
refusal prompts the unnamed narrator to take up a quill and write for the first 
time, waiving “the biographies of all other scriveners, for a few passages in the life 
of Bartleby, who was a scrivener, the strangest one I ever saw, or heard of. While, 
of other law-copyists, I might write the complete life, of Bartleby nothing of that 
sort can be done” – ‘a few passages’ (aphorisms) that jeopardize his conviction that 
the “easiest way of life is the best” (Melville 39-40). For the unnamed narrator, 
the easiest way of life is to maintain the letter of the law, to write full biographies 
word-for-word, to maintain his conviction toward the ‘easiest way of life is best’ 
and remain a convict of ‘pure writing.’  Even in writing Bartleby’s “little narrative,” 
the narrator continues writing purely, copying what he observes, describing it in 
detail, attempting to give a clear picture of his former scrivener. In concluding, 
the narrator explains his purpose for writing: “if this little narrative has 
sufficiently interested him, to awaken curiosity as to who Bartleby was, making his 
acquaintance, I can only reply, that in such curiosity I fully share, but am wholly 
unable to gratify” (Melville 73). Unable to gratify his curiosity, he writes, in an 
attempt to make sense of Bartleby’s (excessive) refusal.
 David Bartholomae tells us of a similar project in “The Tidy House: Basic 
Writing in the American Curriculum” when he discusses Quentin Pierce’s essay 
for an assignment about Jean-Paul Sartre. As Bartholomae reports, “I knew from 
the first week that I was going to fail them; in fact, I knew I was going to preside 
over a curriculum that spent 14 weeks slowly and inevitably demonstrating their 
failures” (Writing 313). He was not prepared to receive Quentin’s essay, he did 
not know how to respond to it, he could only ignore it even though it was the “only 
memorable paper [he] received from that class” (Writing 314). Like Bartleby’s 
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unnamed narrator (henceforth, Bartleby), Bartholomae’s initial criterion of 
what was acceptable (“normal”) writing had been exceeded. Quentin preferred 
not to write purely, and wrote according this preference, producing an essay 
that left Bartholomae curious and unsure about what he was doing teaching 
basic writing. This is not to say that Bartholomae did not sense that Quentin’s 
essay demonstrated a level of “skillful performance in words” (Writing 314); 
indeed, Bartholomae recognized that the “paper was a written document of some 
considerable skill and force – more skill and force, for example, than I saw in many 
of the ‘normal’ and acceptable papers I read” (Writing 314). While Bartholomae 
deals specifically with ‘basic writing,’ his perspectives apply to general education 
writing courses that attempt to produce writers who can make effective arguments 
and, in effect, normalize students with pedagogical methods that emphasize skills, 
courses that postpone “‘real’ reading and writing” that enforce “the very cultural 
divisions that [stand] as the defining markers of the problem with education 
and its teachers” (Writing 315). And despite current trends toward avant-garde 
writing pedagogies, institutional and disciplinary demands remain focused on 
offering students a set of skills that they will need when they begin ‘real’ reading 
and writing – reading and writing that will begin only after they learn how to 
perpetuate what they learn in university writing courses.2   In other words, a skills-
based pedagogical approach – such as the one detailed by the current Council of 
Writing Program Administrator’s (CWPA), which includes writing multiple drafts, 
focusing on a purpose, and developing effective arguments – churns out copyists 
(scriveners) by seeking to “to regularize what can be expected to be taught in first-
year composition” since helping “students demonstrate these outcomes requires 
expert understanding of how students actually learn to write” (CWPA). Thinking 
that “experts” understand how students “actually learn to write” better than 
students themselves is (actually) to keep students from learning to write in their 
own ways. Its as if teaching these writers to write to the letter of the law could the 
F
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answer to a disaster that has no (single) answer (e.g., an answer to the question 
concerning how to avoid another terrorist attack the likes of which we saw on 
September 11, 2001).3  Pedagogically, regularizing the outcomes for student writing 
implicates pedagogues in the regulation of thought as manifested through writing.
 Commenting on Bartholomae’s essay, Thomas Rickert explains some the 
implications for traditional writing pedagogy: “It is not so much that pedagogy 
fails as that pedagogy is implicated at every turn in the structures that contribute 
to Pierce’s nihilism and daily humiliation. Pierce knows all too well that ‘effective 
communication’ is a trap for him” (Acts 192). But it would be a mistake to see 
Quentin’s work – and Bartleby’s refusal – as something to replace the accepted 
writing (practices) lest the excessive displaces and replaces current assessment 
standards and procedures. Instead, Rickert chooses to see Quentin’s essay as a 
performative (singular) act (moment) that reflects “his ability to cut through [his 
servitude to the institution], to refuse to believe in a fantasy of writing for the 
university as being somehow liberating, empowering, or even meaningful” (Acts 
194). This, however, does not mean that Rickert’s pedagogical manner is devoid 
of meaning; rather, he sees the act of writing as meaning in itself, as an inventive 
moment; or, to stretch Bartholomae’s “Inventing the University,” Quentin invents 
the university by writing strangely with his refusal to write in service to/for the 
university, and “to learn to speak our language” (Writing 60). He doesn’t believe 
that Bartholomae (or the university) has the answers because he has ideas too; he’s 
not naïve, but he asserts his failure by performing in such an excessive manner 
that Bartholomae is left to his own devices to find meaning in Quentin’s essay, as 
if he were looking at an avant-garde artwork. Quentin’s refusal, like Bartleby’s, 
appears in ‘a few passages,’ as aphoristic performances (as in the styles of 
Nietzsche and Benjamin), which Bartholomae then applies to his own pedagogical 
perspective(s). And Rickert also looks at the essay to provide an alternate 
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perspective, one that he recognizes may be misread: “[H]e sets out the possibility 
for a writing that would be otherwise, that would not display in each grammatically 
correct line, in each thesis proved and supported, in each ending skillfully reached 
and concluded, the utter slavishness and impoverishment of what counts as ‘good’ 
writing in the academy” (Acts 195). Bartholomae and Rickert share a common 
perspective on what Quentin’s essay presents: that institutional and disciplinary 
demands have become so fixed that the dominant pedagogical methods currently in 
play have turned writing into basic writing, demanding that students write purely 
(re/produce writing) according institutionally defined standards.4
 Unlike Bartholomae, Rickert suggests a pedagogy imbued with risk, one 
that he finds within Geoffrey Sirc’s DIY (do-it-yourself) ‘punk pedagogy. Punk, as a 
state of mind, does not merely refuse the answer(s) that a writing discipline offers 
its disciples, but thrusts off any answers that have been proceduralized. Instead, 
like Quentin, a punk pedagogy pays no heed to the authorized forms of writing 
– in favor of standard or against those standards – proposed by institutionalized 
or academic standards, but attempts to exceed those demands to present the 
unpresentable (Lyotard). Sirc recognizes this element of Quentin’s essay when he 
writes: “Quentin, then, is the excess that our pedagogy cannot process, the poison 
in our human machine. But Quentin is also the flower in our dustbin, one whose 
seed lay not-so-dormant (the only memorable paper) for eighteen years until it 
blossomed in ‘The Tidy House’” (English 261). And Rickert notes “Sirc’s pun on 
‘process’ as a statement on the limits of process pedagogy” (Acts 192). A pedagogy 
that risks would extend the limits of what we can process by allowing students to 
develop ever-changing processes in their writing. What Quentin produced was more 
than a mere refusal of the institution; it was also a commentary on the limitations 
of a Modernist (generalizable) pedagogy, which Sirc describes as being “all about 
limits” and suggests that these “may be limits we no longer want to define our 
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composition” (English 36). Quentin, in exceeding the limits of institutional 
acceptability, refuses “to enable the ritual” of ‘pure’ writing any “further” (Sirc, 
English 260), and he becomes Lyotard’s postmodern writer:
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the texts he 
writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished 
rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgment, by 
applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and 
categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and writer, 
then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will 
have been done. Hence the fact that work and text have the characters of 
an event: hence also, they always come too late for their author, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, their being put into work, their realization (mise 
en oeuvre) always begin too soon. Post modern would have to be understood 
according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo). (Lyotard, 
Postmodern Condition 81)
Indeed, as Bartholomae writes, he was not prepared for Quentin’s essay; it had 
come too soon, too soon for not only his ability to manage the essay and too soon 
for what pedagogy was prepared to address.  By the time that he wrote “The Tidy 
House,” Bartholomae was already recognizing some of the faults in disciplinary 
perspectives of ‘basic writing’ programs, particularly that “a provisional position 
has become fixed, naturalized” (Writing 325) – what Blanchot calls pure writing. 
 Sirc’s conceptualization of English Composition as a Happening and ‘punk 
pedagogy’ provides a way out of the fixed position with his preference not to allow 
composition to be defined by those limits. Moreover, Quentin’s essay risks failure 
according to a determining judgment, but that risk positions him as a postmodern 
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writer, a risk that Bartholomae, Rickert and Sirc bear witness to as a common 
obstruction of English Composition, and one where students serve institutions 
and their (ir)respective practices (cf. CWPA). Like Sirc, I would prefer to allow 
inhabitants of writing “a sense of the sublime” and “offer compelling environments 
in which to inhabit situations of writing instruction” (English 1-2). However, what 
follows is not a mere reiteration of Sirc’s work – that would be to write purely. 
Instead, I receive4  his “salute” for “the next remake of English Composition as 
a Happening” (English 294) and write (of) the disaster6  – simultaneously the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and composition’s continued focus on skills-
based pedagogy – and write strangely.7  Indeed, this imaginative manner of writing 
promotes “writing Acts that shift control of the dominant loci of contention from 
teacher to student […] that refuses to mirror the society of control with a pedagogy 
of control” (Rickert, Acts 163). Such a radically passive writing (pedagogy) does 
not propose “an effort to construct a ‘new’ ethic” or “to produce any ‘new’ values,” 
but to allow “another ethic” to “enter our conversations” (Haynes, “The Ethico-
Political Agon” 304). In other words, Rickert suggests a postpedagogy that does not 
attempt “a reversal of valuation (as in a binary reversal or negative deconstruction) 
achieved through oppositional strategies, but [as] a transvaluation (in the 
Nietzschean sense8) achieved through production” (Acts 173). 
 Versus its mis/re/presentation by folks suspicious of postmodernist critiques, 
postpedagogy does not resist meaning per se, but espouses a proliferation of 
meanings.  In this sense, postpedagogy does not suggest that pedagogy is at its end; 
rather, it recognizes recognition that we are always already in a pedagogical state 
of being, that we are never finished learning. Postpedagogy, then, aims to exceed 
the Modernist limits that Sirc finds have defined institutionally appropriate writing 
in order to ‘formulate the rules of what will have been done’ through a productive 
imagination.9  Byron Hawk explains that the “problem with excluding this larger 
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role of the imagination is that it reduces thinking to generic inventional strategies 
that are then plugged into a linear and acontextual model of the composing process” 
and that the appeal of the imagination is that it does not “determine the path of 
inquiry,” but “continually sets that inquiry in motion” (Counterhistory 102), similar 
to Gregory Ulmer’s concepts of conduction and heuretics.10
 Hawk’s view echoes what William A. Covino suggests in Magic Rhetoric, and 
Literacy: “What human imagination can maintain, perhaps, is an appreciation for 
‘absolute refusal’ that is our only hope” (108). Again, Bartleby’s refusal rears its 
head – to refuse to write purely is to refuse, as Quentin does, the answer in favor 
of inventing the composition(s) to come. As Lyotard explains in The Postmodern 
Condition, the imagination “allows one either to make a new move or to change 
the rules of the game” (52) – the same rules that would ‘slowly and inevitably’ 
work to demonstrate ‘Quentin’s failure.’ Quentin’s refusal to write purely, as well 
as Bartleby’s, is perhaps the production of the coming composition11 that invents 
new rules for writing as it acts out the practices of writing. If current trends are 
any sign, writing will take form as both image and text: comics.12 However, before 
continuing with a discussion of comics, I want to focus on what is at stake in this 
call for revitalizing the imagination for rhetoric and composition. 
“A fAilure of imAginAtion”
These are the words of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, reported by the 9/11 
Commission; it was, they write, “a mind-set that dismissed possibilities” (National 
Commission 336). This is precisely the sort of mindset that Hawk challenges 
in his discussion of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s secondary imagination, and 
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that postpedagogical manners13 offer. “Such a view of creative invention and 
proliferation,” Hawk tells us, “not only opens method to the moment but also 
means that method is not something that pre-exists and then mediates subject 
and object as a third term [the excessive]” (Counterhistory 109). In part, the 
failure that Wolfowitz describes is one that ignores the third (excessive) term 
Hawk finds absent in current writing pedagogy, and one that can have disastrous 
consequences. Chapter 11 of the Commissions report (“Foresight—And Hindsight”) 
explains:
In composing this narrative, we have tried to remember that we write with 
the benefit and handicap of hindsight. Hindsight can sometimes see the past 
clearly—with 20/20 vision. But the path of what happened is so brightly lit 
that it places everything else more deeply into shadow. Commenting on Pearl 
Harbor, Roberta Wohlstetter found it “much easier after the event to sort out 
the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is 
always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the 
disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with 
conflicting meanings” (National Commission 339)
people then could reasonably have known or done” (National Commission 339) 
The lack of foresight, the (in)ability to imagine possibilities. 
What the Commission acknowledges here in the handicap 
of hindsight, what ‘this narrative’ indicates, is not the need 
to learn from the past, but to bear witness to what the 
imagination offers (‘free play’), and to work without (a pre-
determined) criteria (which is not to say “no criteria”) to 
formulate what will have been since “the limits of what
1
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lacked the sufficient foresight. Even more telling is the Commission’s use of the 
“reasonable,” for what constitutes reason failed to defer the disaster. Likewise, 
reason, and reasonable writing, being able to focus on a purpose in order to 
develop effective arguments, contains no risk (and therefore, the utmost risk14) and 
dismisses the possibilities of writing otherwise.
 Again, Blanchot aphorizes: 
Fragmentary writing is risk, it would seem: risk itself. It is not based on 
any theory, nor does it introduce a practice one could define as interruption. 
Interrupted, it goes on. Interrogating itself, it does not co-opt the question 
but suspends it (without maintaining it) as nonresponse. Thus, if it claims 
that its time comes only when the whole—at least ideally—is realized, this 
is because that time is never sure, but is the absence of time, absence in a 
nonnegative sense, time anterior to all past-present, as well as posterior to 
every possibility of a present yet to come. (Writing 59-60)
Blanchot performs the risk of aphorism, but a risk with the power of the refusals 
that Bartleby and Quentin pose – a ‘nonresponse’ – and in doing so becomes 
the postmodern writer (a refugee from reason) that Lyotard adopts. The risk 
of refusal to write reasonably, as Covino suggests, may be the hope of an 
imaginative approach the 9/11 Commission finds necessary. And yet, even as the 
Commission’s report critiques institutional bureaucracy for a lack of imagination, 
they also propose the paradoxical solution of finding “a way of routinizing, even 
bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination” (National Commission 344), which 
would merely position imagination in the service of institutional standards and, 
therefore, lose its risk. 
E
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 The imagination cannot be applied in any tradition/al way – which would 
be a form a critique15 – but may be produced without a pre-established valuation 
system. In his discussion of the Berlin Wall and of the ‘Gulf situation’ in1990, 
Lyotard explains that critique develops “in the empty interior space that the 
system maintains and protects within itself”; yet, even within those systems “some 
‘blanks’ always remain in the ‘text,’ whatever text it is” (Political Writings 120). 
For the 9/11 Commission, these blanks are “the resource[s] of critique” (Lyotard, 
Political Writings 120) that they recognize in Wolfowitz’s phrase: “a failure of 
imagination.”  But the failure was not of imagination, but the lack of imagination, 
an approach that focuses more on critique and assessment than on potentialities 
of writing (i.e., a capacity for coming into being through writing),16  perhaps as a 
method to protect itself. Still, if there is one lesson that can be garnered from the 
report and the events of 9/11, it is that the system’s methods do not suffice. The 
same ‘blanks’ that institutions use as a “resource of critique” allow for “something 
besides critique: imagination” (Lyotard, Political Writings 120), a productive and 
provocative imagination. Integrating the imagination into the political, which the 
Commission suggests is necessary, only positions it as a part of the letter of the law 
that ‘dismissed possibilities.’
 Instead, Lyotard’s postmodern writer, in his ability to work without pre-
established rules, works beyond the limits of what is acceptable in order to affirm 
alternate possibilities. As a “philosopher,” the postmodern writer takes up Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s demand to “take his stand beyond good and evil and leave the illusion of 
moral judgment beneath himself. This demand follows from an insight which I was 
first to formulate: that there are altogether no moral facts” (Portable 501). Even in 
its desire to integrate the imagination in the service of institutional practices, the 
Commission positions itself against what it recognizes as ‘evil’ – terrorism – but the 
imagination occupies no place within this distinction, it takes no-thing for granted. 
1
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Nietzsche explains: “Moral judgments […] belong to a stage of ignorance at which 
the very concept of the real and the distinction between what is real and imaginary, 
are still lacking; thus ‘truth,’ at this stage, designates all sorts of things which 
we today call ‘imaginings’ (Portable 501).17  At this point, the postmodern writer’s 
desire to write what will have been, writing to invent or discover the rules of 
additional potentialities of writing, exceeds the values of institutional practices in 
order to invent valuations for what functions beyond institutional practices, which 
is precisely what the Commission recommends despite their call to appropriate the 
imagination as a part of the system: 
The men and women of the World War II generation rose to the challenges 
of the 1940s and 1950s. They restructured the government so that it could 
protect the country. That is now the job of the generation that experienced 
9/11. Those attacks showed, emphatically, that ways of doing business rooted 
in a different era are not just good enough. Americans should not settle for 
incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a 
world that no longer exists. (National Commission 399)
This sounds remarkably like a call for a post-modern politics, in the Lyotardian 
sense. The presented, the presentable, has not worked to defer the disaster and 
the disaster is always approaching, and the fixed letter of the law has not gone far 
enough. Adjustments to a system rooted in the rhetorical practices, thinking and 
assessment appear to have been stripped of their power, laid bare by Lyotard’s 
ephemeral skin – the excessive potential of the figural (image).18 And, “it is 
necessary that we strengthen our imagination, our palpative potential [puissance] 
until – rather than to think, we are not thinkers – until a producer-body, 
determines it; the idea of a passage over nothing, which produces, its passage” 
(Lyotard, Libidinal 16). Put simply, the imagination does not think (itself), but cuts 
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through oppositional forces with “ephemeral explosions or libidinal intensities” 
(Lyotard, Libidinal 18) not to record, but to write other/wise.19
towArD A (post)peDAgogicAl writing
So, what has this to do with composition (pedagogy)? Everything! The pedagogical imperative to provide students with what they need to succeed in the university 
and postponing the ‘real’ writing that they will be required to complete later 
still remains a way of enforcing “the very cultural divisions that [stand] as the 
defining markers of the problem with education and its teachers” (Bartholomae, 
Writing 315), the same problems that the 9/11 Commission acknowledges as a 
‘failure of imagination.’20 As pedagogues, we occupy a political position, one, if 
current pedagogical theory is any sign, that remains grounded within institutional 
perspectives of being able to provide students with the necessary skills to succeed in 
the perpetuation of institutional practices. Diane Davis explains as much when she 
writes, “[James] Berlin’s article [“Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class”] exposed 
the extent to which politics is always driving any/every rhetoric of composition and 
its corresponding pedagogy, the extent to which power/knowledge in the classroom 
is ideologically saturated” (Breaking 209; cf. Berlin, Rhetoric 189). Davis continues: 
“Even the teaching of composition, as Berlin suggests, is the teaching of a world view: 
it assumes and then propagates a particular relationship among the writer, the reader, 
language, and ‘reality,’ and from there it peddles assumptions about what is, what 
ought to be, and what can be changed. This is a seriously political business” (Breaking 
209-10; original emphasis). A post (future) writing would leave these assumptions at 
the center of (current) traditional composition pedagogy and move to the wayside, the 
gutter21 where thought can open up possibilities of “thinking the unthought” (Davis, 
Breaking 208). 
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 The gutter here is a direct reference to the space between panels in comics, 
the space where Scott McCloud observes that readers and writers insert themselves 
to make links between panels. It is no coincidence that comics seem to fit the 
postmodern writer so well since they incorporate both word and image (hybrid 
works), as I alluded to earlier. As McCloud observes, “in the limbo of the gutter, 
human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a 
single idea” (Understanding 66). ‘Limbo’ seems a fitting word in the current setting, 
indicating a state of uncertainty, a third position that Hawk and Davis offer writing. 
Moreover, the transformation that McCloud imagines takes place in the excluded 
excess (an abyss? perhaps an abysmal space?22), that which has yet to be thought. 
Unknowingly, McCloud taps into the necessity to link that Lyotard describes in The 
Differend23 (can you see the linkages here?). But the ‘imagination’ that McCloud 
points to is not governed by an ‘ought,’ but a necessity – Lyotard cautions us to not 
“confuse necessity with obligation. If there is a must (Il faut), it is not a You ought to 
(Vous devez)” (Differend 80). These linkages, then, become imaginatively inventive, 
exploring potentialities that have yet to be thought or written, through unexpected 
arrangements. The preference not to write purely opens up what would otherwise be 
dismissed possibilities given that linking “is necessary,” but not “a particular linkage” 
(Lyotard, Differend 134; cf. Vitanza, “Three Countertheses”), and to which McCloud 
makes no claim. Even an inspectional reading of Understanding Comics suggests 
that McCloud sees his analysis of, and the medium of, comics as contingent: “It’s only 
through wandering that any of us ever get a solid sense of where we want to go. And 
no matter how many worthwhile destinations have been visited by earlier generations 
-- there’s always a chance that yours doesn’t exist on any map yet, because it has 
yet to be discovered” (Understanding 238; original emphasis). However, what comics 
offer rhetoric and composition extends beyond the gutter, an ‘idiom’ that has so often 
been addressed; rather, comics engages the available means of production that Lyotard 
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associates with postmodern writing: discourse (word) AND figure (image) – each of 
which have found their ways into the composition classroom as ‘multimodal’ writing. 
 Still, approaches to multimodal writing remain focused on critique or 
argumentation, which offers a set of possible (worthwhile) directions, but does not 
take into account the chances of finding unthought possibilities that fall outside 
(between) that set. Sid Jacobson and Ernie Colón provide an example of the former 
with their ‘graphic adaptation’ of the 9/11 Commission Report. The adaptation,  as
to the findings, recommendation, spirit, and tone of the original Commission 
Report” (ix). Here, the opportunities that multimodal writing affords writers takes 
a back seat to representing a  truncated version of the original report, closely 
adhering to institutional recommendations even while the report implores readers 
to think the unthought, and to allow a free play of the imagination to take alternate 
routes.24 For Walter Ong, comics present an avant-garde approach to writing, 
one that “is often genuinely avant-garde—representing (with understandable 
inaccuracy and exaggeration) the sensibilities everybody  is on the way to 
developing, only well ahead of the mass of people” (Heer 100). In Ong’s estimation 
of comics, the adaptation of the 9/11 Commission report does little to foresee the 
possibilities of multimodal writing in its contentment to directly represent the 
original. Indeed, Ong sees the potential of comics to write strangely and with 
inaccuracy to see what may arise out of the imagination. Ong continues:
There is no 
arT here.
Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton 
write in the foreword, affords the 9/11 
Commission “the opportunity to bring 
the work of the 9/11 Commission to the 
attention of a new set of readers. We 
commend the talented graphic artists 
of this edition for their close adherence
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For the back of the hostility which, in many semi-educated circles, still 
cripples an intelligent approach to the problems of the modern artist, lies the 
supposition (in part an heritage from Rousseau, who may be followed in face 
where he is disowned in principle) that the common man is always right in 
his attitudes and instincts and that it is high time effete “modern” artists and 
writers returned to him and his point of view, whatever that is. But there 
seems to be signs that the common man, in his own instinctive way, has 
perhaps vague symptoms of the disease supposed to be the prerogative of the 
decadent intellectual. Popular art—and if there was ever popular art, it is the 
comic strip—is like the thing most opposed to. (Heer 101)
If we are to believe Ong, comics present themselves as a way to popularize a 
postmodern writing that takes into account that which has led to the ‘decay’ of 
dialogue, from “the art of discourse to the art of reason” as he details in Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason. 
Whether ‘decadent intellectuals’ recognize the current effects of Ramism on how 
institutions function, there exists a focus, a rootedness, on what ‘students’ need 
as institutionally mandated by the pre-established criteria and curricula that 
handicaps the ability of imagination to wander, explore, and experiment at, within, 
and across excluded possibilities. 
 In a reading of Ong’s Ramus, Haynes explains that the problem for composition 
lies at the heart of pedagogy where “reason is perfected in pedagogy, for pedagogy, by 
pedagogues” (“Writing Offshore” 673), which locates writing in (the service of) institutions. 
One suggestion that Haynes proposes is akin to the 9/11 Commission’s desire to be more 
imaginative: “We must be (t)reasonous. We must be intensive and hospitable; we must 
be without way” (711). However, while the Commission seeks an imaginative method in 
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the service of institutional stability, imagination pays no heed to (any single) method or 
service, but plays in an ungrounded sliver (perhaps a slash). Moreover, an imaginative 
postpedagogy would discard “whys” in favor of intensive performances that may be 
productively (t)reasonous, “as a site where strange explorations are appreciated, where 
aesthetic criteria still come into play, but criteria not merely cribbed off an endless, 
formalist tape-loop” (Sirc, English 32; qtd. in Haynes, “Writing Offshore” 710). Building on 
Vitanza’s “Three Counterthesis,” Haynes suggests that we turn to writing nomadically, 
an ungrounded (non)position that detaches itself from institutionally accepted practices 
as a way to wander through writing, “testing contradictions” instead of “taking a 
position” (“Writing Offshore” 715). Such is the “art consciousness to daily life” that Sirc 
proposes in “Box Logic,” an approach geared toward “attempts to use technology to infuse 
contemporary composition instruction with a spirit of the neo-avant-garde” (146). Such is 
Marshall McLuhan’s perspective that “comics provide a useful approach to understanding 
the TV image [digital media]” (Understanding 164) that may remind “us of all the life and 
faculty that we have omitted from our daily lives” (Understanding 167). Such is Allan 
Kaprow’s unartist, “who is engaged in changing jobs” (Understanding 102). Such is the task 
of Lyotard’s philosopher – a postmodern writer and artist exceeding pre-established criteria 
in order to continually formulate the rules of what will have been. And perhaps, such a 
pedagogical manner would have us uncomposition ourselves from institutional demands 
to write purely so that we may explore what other possibilities present themselves in Acts 
of writing. Comics provide such a way to begin thinking about writing as postmoderns. 
McCloud’s six steps – (1) Idea, (2) Form, (3) Idiom, (4) Structure, (5) Craft, (6) Surface – 
of creating such work gestures toward such a writing, including the progression of this 
dissertation.
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six steps on the wAy to writing 
the coming (rhetoricAl) composition
While I use McCloud’s six steps as a framework for this dissertation, the manifestations of the chapters do not (always) directly correlate to 
the descriptions that he provides for each step. The six steps, or chapters, are 
subdivided through three parts: knowing, doing, and making. The first three 
chapters constitute the ‘knowing,’ while the last two chapters comprise the ‘doing,’ 
and the ‘making’ consists of the design, writing, and production of this dissertation. 
To explain how I use McCloud’s six steps, the following chapter descriptions offer 
a brief introduction into how I am using comics in this dissertation. Put simply, 
I do not mean to use comics as such to discuss rhetoric and composition’s current 
move toward digital technology; instead, comics suggest something else, and what 
they suggest is similar to why Duchamp interests Sirc: “showing how alternative 
technologies and strategies can change fundamental compositional questions” 
(English 35). 
 
 In addition, I will also be designing the 
dissertation in such a way to perform the work 
that I propose. As you’ve probably already noticed, 
the ‘tabs’ on the side of each page will indicate a 
color associated with each chapter. The rationale 
for this color scheme comes from  the Department 
of Homeland Security’s advisory system: (1) Red 
(step 1), (2) Orange (step 2), (3) Yellow (step 3), (4) 
Blue (step 4), and (5) Green (steps 5 and 6). For 
the purpose of this dissertation, I had to add an 
additional color (violet) in order to be able to offer Homeland Security Advisory System: 
Color-coded Threat Level
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 In Chapter I – idea (concept behind the idea): “There’s a Stranger in 
My Composition” – I work through a survey, a sort of literature review, of 
what has already been said in relation to postpedagogies, highlighting ways 
in which composition theorists have discussed comics with specific examples 
of how these theory-heads have thought of postmodern writing. These current 
theoretical approaches to rhetoric and composition have begun to do away with 
the prerogatives of what Ong calls ‘decadent intellectuals’ in attempts to affirm 
students’ own ways of knowing. The link between how these theorists explain 
postpedagogy enters the mix through Italo Calvino’s personal tale of how he began 
writing stories through the images in comics. Lyotard emerges as one key figure 
in discussing how a postmodern writer addresses the problems posed by the rise of 
technologies that enforce a proceduralized system of thinking, and how this strange 
writing allows for an imaginative pro-duction that has significant implications for 
writing in the 21st century, including the relationship both see between the work of 
(another kind of) art (unart) and politics. 
 Chapter II – form (shape of the work): “In the Shadow of Image/Text” – takes 
its task as addressing three of the major conversations addressing comics as a 
medium – defining the media, comparing comics to other media – particularly 
cinema – and how comics begin to enact the sort of teaching that postpedagogy 
proposes we take on. Since McCloud’s Understanding Comics was released, various 
critics have attempted to dismantle his project in order to develop a more precise 
definition that would account for other iterations. In part, these critics, specifically 
Thierry Groensteen, have attempted to solidify a system that would be able to 
integrate the various combinations of image and text that they see as the essence 
of a comics medium. Art Spiegelman’s In the Shadow of No Towers brings an 
alternate perspective to the work of comics that fraternizes with avant-garde ‘art’ 
a color for each chapter. 
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outlooks. His keynote talk at the 2006 Thomas R. Watson Conference in Louisville, 
KY works as a conceptual starting point for a view of comics as a form well-suited 
for thinking of the ways in which digital technologies afford us opportunities to 
think with the logics of electronic media (Ulmer’s conductive logic) rather than 
attempting to directly translate print logics into electronic environments.  
 Chapter III – idiom (‘school’ of art): “Art Interrupted” – attempts to break 
away from what, in current trends toward multimodal composition, has been 
generally discussed in terms of ‘mixed media.’ Two major concepts inform this 
chapter: (1) intermedia and (2) unart. “Intermedia” shares Lyotard’s view that 
image and text are not separate but always already interrelated, superimposed on 
one another. The shape of the work, of the elements involved in producing comics, 
extends beyond traditional forms of art even though they begin with those forms. 
For McCloud, “form” includes a variety of different elements – ink, paint, speech, 
etc. – and methods. In this chapter, I begin to tackle the generally unrecognized 
significance of comics for rhetoric and composition, and specifically that rhetorical 
approaches to art are more akin to comics than to Art proper; that is, to what 
Kaprow calls unart. The term unart was coined in order to indicate a move away 
from the more generalizable, more easily recognizable forms of Art that have been 
situated under specified categories. As Kaprow explains, unart has more to do 
with intermedia, combining media in a way that cannot be divided or assessed as 
separate, than with ‘mixed media,’ where each medium has been used on its own 
terms. To expose how comics provide such an approach, I discuss Spiegelman’s 
surrealist project The Narrative Corpse throughout as an example of the different 
forms, perspectives, and methods that comics offer. 
 Chapter IV – structure (nuts-and-bolts): “Uncomposing (Visual) Rhetorics” – 
turns to a discussion of what it would mean for us to begin uncomposing ourselves. 
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The title of this chapter, simultaneously the title of this dissertation, implies a 
variety of meanings taken up as the focus of this chapter. Taking my cue from Allan 
Kaprow’s term unart, I suggest that what we find in the figural – what rhetoricians 
generally refer to as ‘visual rhetorics’ – exceeds the desire for persuasion. As such, 
the figural offers itself as an interruption of Aristotelian rhetoric, of the ‘art(s) of 
persuasion.’ This interruption of rhetoric as persuasion would exact a refusal, in 
Bartleby’s and Quentin’s senses, to recode, or invert, power relations (Readings, 
University 163). Building on Chapter 3, if comics can be thought of as a stranger 
surrealist project – which Blanchot sees as the experience of experience of thought 
itself – then, we can better recognize comics in terms of Bill Readings’ view of 
thought as an in(ter)vention that does “not resolve arguments; it does not provide a 
metalanguage that can translate all other idioms into its own so that their dispute 
can be settled, their claims arranged and evaluated on a homogenous scale”; rather, 
comics would throw “those who participate in pedagogy back into a reflection upon 
the ungroundedness of their situation: their obligation to each other and to a name 
that hails them as addressees, before they can think about it” (Readings, University 
161). If we think of this in terms of criteria – and Lyotard’s desire to work without 
criteria – this would mean to allow writing to be thought of in terms of exploration 
without intent, without assuming a single standard of evaluation that would hinder 
a strangely imaginative writing.
 Chapter V – craft (skills of producing the work) and sureface (finishing 
touches): “Traitorous Hospitality: An Aphoristic (Composition) Pedagogy” – returns 
to Haynes’ concept of ‘hospitality’ in “Writing Offshore” as it relates to comics’ 
relationship to art, and with how it offers us a way to think about how we might 
begin to uncomposition ourselves. As most of the comics ‘artists’ cited in this 
dissertation began in art and became disaffected by the inability to produce work 
that related more to life than to Art, rhetoric and composition has yet to learn 
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the lessons it has seemed to support from the avant-garde: breaking away from 
categories of acceptability in favor of new, innovative, and imaginative work. 
Having left home – the discipline of art – comics ‘artists’ become witnesses to the 
disaster (of art); “the witness,” according to Lyotard, “is a traitor” (Inhuman 204). 
The traitor to art and composition here becomes open to occasions for writing 
and thinking that fall beyond even their own beliefs and values by testing those 
contradictions. Put briefly, the traitorous writer is hospitable to even the most 
monstorous of thoughts.
 This chapter concludes this dissertation with a Nietzschean turn toward 
fragmentary writing. In this chapter, I build on Chris Ware’s view of comics 
production to suggest we update Nietzsche’s ambition of writing and ‘art.’ In an 
interview, as we will see, Ware explains that his ‘drawing’ is more like typography 
than ‘real drawing.’ If we take Ware’s approach to writing and compare it to 
the fragmentary writing currently taking place in electronic (digital/online) 
environments – specifically on Twitter – we find that Nietzsche’s aphorisms provide 
us with a way of understanding how art and writing may develop in the 21st 
century. To clarify: my ambition is not to “say in ten sentences what everyone else 
says in a book – what everyone else does not say in a book” (Nietzsche, Potable 
556). No! My ambition is to say in 140-characters what Nietzsche would say in ‘ten 
sentences,’ to be a 140-Artist, to be a 140-unartist. The singularity of such writing 
offers us the ability to speak of life as the artist speaks of and to Art. 
 Ah, writing! Ah, humanity!25 I present this dissertation as an act of love (in 
the Nietzschean sense).26
chapter 1
there’s a stranger In my composItIon
2
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there’s A strAnger in my composition
“The suppliant and the stranger are one; both are cut off 
from the whole, being deprived of the right that founds all 
others and alone establishes one’s belonging to the home.”
~ Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation
It’s no secret: in the past decade technology and the visual have transformed the teaching of composition. To understand how and why they have radicalized 
composition instruction and moved the figural into the forefront of writing, this 
chapter provides a stasis (theory) for today’s composition pedagogy in the avant-
garde ambit of transformation. Why and how this move is occurring requires that 
I work through a string of examples to mark how ‘new media’  (from video/games 
to cinema to music, etc.) has opened the fields of rhetoric and composition to new 
modes of thought and creation. In essence, this chapter consolidates what scholars 
and practitioners have said on the subjects of new media and postpedagogy in order 
to situate how I see the future of composition studies developing in the wake of 
these new theories, methods, and instructional practices. 
 To that end, I use the figure of the ‘Stranger,’ and specifically, the Plato/nic 
Stranger, as described in The Sophist. In the course of my research, however, Maurice 
Blanchot’s work has become a significant influence in how I have come to think 
about why the Stranger appeals to me, and how Blanchot’s writings on the 
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stranger have altered and clarified the importance of the Strange(r) in the way I 
think of composition pedagogy and rhetorical practice. An endnote in The Infinite 
Conversation, more than any other reflection, has brought the Stranger’s (non)
purpose  together for me:
…a stranger to the strangeness of the Castle, a stranger to the strangeness 
of the village, and a stranger to himself [Franz Kafka’s ‘foreigner’ in The 
Castle] since, in an incomprehensible manner, he decides to break with his 
own familiarity, as though pulled ahead toward these sites nonetheless 
without allure by an exigency he is unable to account for. (463)
Like this ‘stranger,’ I’m not sure that I can account for the exigency of this project, 
but I can say that the ‘Castle’ Blanchot refers to here appears to correlate to the 
unbuilt hacienda Geoff Sirc continues working on (Sirc, English 1-32). 
 There are other references in Blanchot’s passage that relate to other areas of 
interest. For example, ‘the strangeness of the village’ relates, at least through an 
aleatory (chance) logic, to McLuhan’s ‘global village’ – approaches to ‘new media’ 
that ‘make[s] the world smaller,’ but that continue to separate us from our own 
ways of being in the world. The Stranger, at least in this sense, is meant to indicate 
a figure that can put us closer to our own ways of being, including our own ways 
of being with language, writing, and ‘art’ in a world that continues – indirectly – 
trying to distance us from our own ways of knowing. As we will see, the Stranger 
in Plato’s Sophist is not strange enough to address how we may be in the world 
according to our own devices. In rhetoric and composition, a good deal of how we 
address new media has little, if anything, to do with how we may be in a world 
where new media has been working our thinking and writing over in new ways. 
That is, if there is any way to provide an exigency for this project, it is to say that 
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we have yet to find ways in which writing and art can take place (happen/ings) 
with new media. If we remain content to merely translate the ‘literacy,’ or writing 
processes, or what have you, from the time of print to the time of new media, we 
exclude ways of thinking that offer us (imaginative) in/sights into our own being. 
 As I’ve tried to explain in the introduction, I am drawn toward comics in an 
‘incomprehensible manner.’ In part because I have been reading comics for the 
better part of a decade now, and I continue to be surprised, I continue to ‘break 
with my own familiarity’ with not only the form, but with the ways in which comics 
imply another way of writing and creating art. If I must provide a reason, an 
exigency, for this project, it would have to be that what I see in comics exceeds how 
Scott McCloud and Will Eisner, among other practitioners and scholars that have 
discussed Comics, have attempted to describe and define 
the form as a medium. In my estimation, comics offer the 
strange(rs) with/in us a way to write and create art in 
a variety of ways that link with current perspectives on 
composition pedagogy, and offer us a way to begin thinking 
about what ‘the coming composition’ might look like, what 
forms our unbuilt haciendas may take with the coming 
generation of pedagogues well-versed in using ‘new media’ 
to write and create art. The exigency for writing (with) new 
media would remains ‘incomprehensible,’ ‘unaccountable,’ 
and strange(ly) imaginative since we have yet to grasp how 
the call for writing with/in new media has yet to be fully 
realized on their own terms.1 If we don’t begin allowing the 
strangers with/in us to teach us how to be imaginative, we 
will not only lose our ability to be effective pedagogues, but 
we will also remain part of the ‘old guard’ instead of an
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(inventive) avant-garde – the coming composition (postpedagogy). 
 When I speak of ‘the coming composition,’ what I am referring to is 
analogous to Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community – a community that 
we have yet to experience and that we are constantly trying to achieve. This 
is not the sort of community that has appeared in composition pedagogy, the 
sort that seeks to create an enclosed community within a classroom, and that 
hope to create communal knowledge. Rather, ‘the coming composition’ is the 
composition of the Stranger(s) with/in us, that which we exclude because we have 
no way of communicating our (ways of) thinking. ‘The coming composition,’ like 
Agamben’s view of ‘the coming community,’ is a composition of singularities that 
“communicate[s] online the empty space of the example, without being tied by 
any common property, by any identity” (Agamben, Coming 11). The Stranger does 
not work as a ‘model’ for this sort of composition, but like “[t]ricksters or fakes, 
assistants or ‘toons” (Agamben, Coming 11), the Stranger is an exemplar of the 
coming composition. 
While Agamben does not directly make this 
claim, the Stranger who brings about the 
coming community will appear as Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra: “...at last a change came over 
his heart, and one morning he rose with the 
dawn, stepped before the sun...” (Portable 
121).  The Stranger teaches us the ubermench--
the overman; the “overman,” who would then 
occupy an empty space of  the coming community, 
would be that being for whom Being is of  
utmost concern, and would have us move 
beyond the criteria of  “good” and “bad.” 
Wanderer above the Sea of  Fog by Caspar David Friedrich
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the strAnge(rs) with/in us
“How did reason come into the world? As is fitting, in an irrational 
manner, by accident. One will have to guess at it as at a riddle.”
~ Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn
The Stranger in Plato’s Sophist is appointed by Socrates to be a guest lecturer on the subject of sophistry with a student of his [the Stranger’s] choosing: 
Theaetetus. Another colleague, Theodorus, explains that this Stranger “is more 
reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation” (267), which is 
emphasized when the Stranger tells Theaetetus to “follow your own devices […] 
as the discussion proceeds” (271) on “the art of imitation” (275). Using Socrates’ 
method of division and definition, the Stranger separates imitation into likeness-
making and appearance-making (also called ‘phantastic art’). According to our 
Stranger, likeness-making (the first sophist/ic) “produces the imitation by following 
the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, 
the appropriate colours to each part” (333). In a word: copies.2  Institutional 
practices geared toward producing students who can succeed in professional 
contexts are in the habit of working to produce these sorts of likenesses. 
 After exploring likeness-making, the Stranger turns to appearance-making, 
dividing it in two once again. The first of this new division (the second sophist/
ic) concerns “easily [taking] advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter 
attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning” (347) in order to deceive – this 
“is an art of deception” that attempts to mislead others to “hold a false opinion” 
(351). This form of appearance-making correlates to Geoff Sirc’s view of traditional 
composition where we 
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…erect temples to language, in which we relive the rites of text-production for 
the nth time, despite the sad truth that the gods have fled so long ago that no 
one is even sure that they were ever there in the first place (in Composition, 
the gods are called, variously, power, authentic voice, discourse, critical 
consciousness, versatility, style, disciplinarity, purpose, etc.). (English 2) 
To make the link clear, Sirc’s view of composition does not mean that we are in 
the habit of teaching students how to twist words in order to deceive, at least 
not explicitly, but that teaching through the defined structures of what it means 
to write keeps students at a distance from their own ways of knowing, of writing 
with their own devices. When Sirc questions whether the ‘gods’ were ever there 
in the first place, the connection becomes clear that we have been teaching in 
such a way that we have been deceiving ourselves by thinking that we have the 
answers to show students how to write, and that through our teaching we can 
provide students with the power to assert their own needs.
 The first sophist/ic addresses the possible, while the second sophist/
ic constructs limits by detailing the impossible, creating a “binary of possible/
impossible” (Vitanza, Negation 245). The second form of appearance-making (the 
third sophist/ic), however, discards this binary in order to work at slashing through 
it, cutting through the divisions that separate writers/artists from their ‘own 
devices,’ “by employing [one’s] own person as [an] instrument” (453) – ‘instrument’ 
does not mean a ‘tool’ in the Heideggerian sense. However, the Stranger was so 
exhausted after working through the first two forms of sophistry that he beseeched 
Theaetetus to “be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to 
unify and name appropriately” (453).3 
 It wasn’t until Murray Bundy’s 1922 article “Plato’s View of the Imagination” 
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that the second form of appearance-making (the third sophist/ic) was ‘named 
appropriately.’ Bundy finds that this second form of appearance-making has to do 
with ‘the imagination,’ which traces through Plato’s corpus of writings, including 
The Sophist, in order to illustrate Plato’s thinking on art and aesthetics. Bundy 
associates Plato’s view of art with one’s own (productive) imagination, in similar 
fashion to how the Stranger describes the third sophist/ic as the work made of 
an individual’s own body and mind, including public speech and performance. 
For Bundy, the second order of appearance-making relates to the abstraction that 
arises out of one’s own imaginative capabilities, which suggests “that the highest 
human creation involves an act of ‘imagination’” (386). As Bundy explains, the 
imagination is concerned with “the connecting link between the real and the ideal, 
between the realm of ideas and that of material objects” (386; emphasis added). 
Or to use Lyotard’s terms about “the condition of knowledge in the most highly 
developed societies” (Postmodern xxiii), abstraction/imagination attempts to 
link the presentable and the unpresentable through creative acts that “impart a 
stronger sense of the unpresentable” (Postmodern 81). The continued calls for an 
avant-garde pedagogy ask that we move beyond likeness-making (the first sophist/
ic) and the first form of appearance-making (the second sophist/ic) in order to 
affirm students’ own ways of knowing (read: using their own devices). 
 Similarly, Cynthia Haynes questions the need for argumentative writing in 
“Writing Offshore” before calling for a pedagogy of abstraction encouraging students 
to direct their own education in order to “enact the necessary detachment (abstractus) 
that would unhinge the link between reason and pedagogy, and dissemble the 
assembly line model of education in whose grip we have been since Ramus so cleanly 
paired discourse and logic” (“Writing” 673). Rather than asking students to use 
previous works as models of acceptable writing, a pedagogy of abstraction would not 
require students to take a stance, but would allow students write without purpose or 
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intention and discover their own ways of writing and art-ing. In order to clarify the 
need for such a pedagogy, I will briefly survey current concerns about multimodal 
composition before examining rhetoric and composition’s move to the figural in the age 
of new media and some ways in which this move has begun to alter pedagogical goals 
within the university. In order to frame why there is a need to offer students ways 
to address their own needs and knowledge, we turn to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed and its relation to rhetoric and composition.
the (curiously) strAnge cAse of (new meDiA) peDAgogy
“Still, as in those photographs from which the distant but 
excessively close face of a stranger stares out at us, something 
in this infamy demands [esige] its proper name, testifying to 
itself beyond any expression and beyond any memory.”
~ Giorgio Agamben, Profanations
Freire’s goal in Pedagogy of the Oppressed was not to liberate the “peasant workers” of Brazil, but to teach them how to write with the most accessible 
medium of the time – printed text – so that they could address their own political 
and personal needs and concerns – not to teach them what he thought they needed. 
It is in this sense that Friere describes a pedagogy of the oppressed, and not a 
pedagogy for the oppressed. In Marxist fashion, Freire saw that these workers were 
being treated as cogs in the wheels of industry, workers that could be replaced 
at will and had no recourse to assert their own human needs; this production, 
however, was “a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human” 
(Pedagogy 44). In attempting to teach them the dominant mode of discourse – 
reading and writing – Friere presented them with a way assert their own needs. 
He was teaching them how print media worked to convey meaning, but not how to 
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use the medium for a specific intent/purpose. He was teaching them the available 
means of “striving so that these hands – whether of individuals or entire peoples – 
need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become 
human hands which work and, working, transform the world” (Pedagogy 45).4  
Freire clearly explains that the desire is not to teach these workers, simultaneously 
students, what to think, but to have the ability to engage in the dominant discourse 
so that they may transform their world. Indeed, the political struggles that rhetoric 
and composition have attempted to address since the late 60s have not yet begun on 
“a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals 
or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity,” especially when 
considering that pedagogical practices (or ‘best practices’) remain focused on ‘what 
students need’ instead of looking to develop a pedagogy that “will be made and 
remade” (Pedagogy 48) – the work of postpedagogies, including the ‘salute’ from Sirc 
out of which this project develops.
 A decade later, Lyotard took on a similar project directed at highly developed, 
industrialized countries – minus Freire’s Marxist perspectives – with his treatise 
on scientific/technological thinking in The Postmodern Condition. In this report 
to the Conseil of Universitiés in Quebec, Lyotard makes an effort to analyze 
and transform education from what he calls ‘grand narratives’ (generalizations) 
into ‘little narratives’ (singularities) as “the quintessential form of imaginative 
invention,” where writers and artists allude to the unknown/unpresentable 
(Postmodern 60; 78). For Lyotard, grand narratives correlate to scientific 
knowledge that seeks to define the bounds of accepted/acceptable knowledge (or 
argumentation and Reason) that implies a duty to verification.5 However, Lyotard 
problematizes the scientific and technological approach to knowledge as reductive 
due to its systematized approach that privileges its “own interests and point of 
view” (Postmodern 16). With the rise of technology, Lyotard fears that education 
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and thought would be weakened by technological thinking that reduces the limits 
of knowledge to only what is presentable and excludes what does not fit within the 
system. One of Lyotard’s contemporaries, Gilles Deleuze, explains that this process 
will move us from Michel Foucault’s disciplinary societies to the new societies of 
control whose function is to “keep people employed until the installation of the new 
forces knocking at the door” (“Postscript” 4) will inevitably deliver “the school over 
to the corporation” (“Postscript” 5) – which is precisely what Freire was attempting 
to subvert with a pedagogy of the oppressed.
 Put differently, technological – code(d) – thinking/writing/arting restricts 
what can be known by discarding what does not have a place in that system – what 
can be exchanged within the market structures that corporations perpetuate in 
their own interests. This is not to say that technology6 itself restricts the ability 
to address the unpresentable, but that systematizing how we go about addressing 
knowledge may exclude other ways of knowing,7  and in doing so, contributes 
to the perpetuation of ‘societies of control.’ For Lyotard, little narratives – the 
writings of the ‘illiterate’ workers in Freire’s Brazil, as well as the knowledge that 
students in ‘the most advanced societies’ can bring to institutions and institutional 
practices – work to break apart systematized ways of knowing, doing, and making 
that (indirectly) support corporate-schools with alternate, excluded practices and 
methods. 
 Lyotard saw how this move would position knowledge in educational 
institutions and worldwide:
Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to 
productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major – perhaps the 
major – stake in worldwide competition for power. It is conceivable that the 
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nation-states will one day fight for control of information, just as they battled 
in the past for control over territory, and afterwards for control of access to 
and exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor. (Postmodern 5)
Lawrence Lessig gives credence to Lyotard’s observation when he explains that 
the current state of technology is leading us toward systematized thought and 
regulated, owned meaning. In Free Culture, Lessig addresses what he calls our 
“information society” and current trends toward a feudal society where such power 
is the “power of control [over] the uses of culture” (Free 28), instead of a free culture 
that “supports and protects creators […] to guarantee that follow-on creators 
and innovators remain as free as possible from the control of the past” (Free xiv). 
One such example is Apple iTunes and its coding model that limits individuals’ 
ability to distribute and re-purpose (i.e., remix) information by commodifying 
and centralizing power over cultural artifacts and their uses. In Remix, Lessig 
differentiates this control, which he names Read-Only (RO) culture, with a Read-
Write (RW) culture that allows “citizens” to “create and re-create the culture 
around them” by “using the same tools the professional uses” and those “given to 
them by nature” (Remix 28), analogous to the second order of appearance-making. 
 A RW culture might look like Jacques Derrida’s ‘analysis’ of Philippe Sollers’ 
novels at the end of Dissemination – Derrida uses the Sollers’ Numbers to “critique” 
the work itself, using the techniques of collage and montage to re-arrange the 
work in a new way.8 Translating such a method into digital culture, including 
multimodal composition, has proven much more difficult since the code exercises 
much more control over works and the corporation-/institutional friendly laws 
that fight for control over information, which, in so doing, restrict the production 
of imaginative and transformative works. In this sense, Lessig’s view of remix 
correlates to current perspectives of writing across media since it “is just the 
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same sort of stuff that we’ve always done with words,” which succeed “when they 
show others something new; they fail when they are trite or derivative. […] It is 
great writing without words. It is creativity supported by a new technology,” at 
least “until the law effectively blocks it” (Remix 82-83) – effectively blocking the 
imaginative, transformative work they call “fellow citizens to study, reflect—and 
act” upon (National Commission xviii).
A strAnge(r’s) writing
“Still, the postmodern condition is as much a stranger to 
disenchantment as it is to the blind positivity of delegitimation.”
~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition
Alexander Galloway traces the development of code in relation to the move beyond centralized control over meaning in his book Protocol: How Control 
Exists After Decentralization, taking his cue from Deleuze’s article on societies 
of control – related to the feudal control of writing that Lessig fears will restrict 
writers and artists from producing new work. Throughout the book, Galloway 
describes the protocological essence of technology: code, which is “the only 
executable language” that “does what it says” (Protocol 165-66). Programming code 
may be thought of analogously to the art style of “caricature” (see my chapter 2) 
in that it is infused with predetermined meaning with little, if any, wiggle room. 
Building on Friedrich Kittler’s work on media technologies, Galloway’s project 
seeks to explain how the language of computers and computer networks function, 
which he claims are at the base of understanding contemporary culture – a 
perspective that excludes possibilities in favor of standardization. For our purposes, 
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this claim signifies a change in traditional writing and in writing (with) new 
media, including how our ways of writing and thinking are altered by code. The 
goal of composition pedagogy, if it takes on the political need for a third sophist/
ic imaginative approach, would necessitate a way of working with new media as 
the avant-garde artists we continually refer to (e.g., Duchamp) worked – without 
intention or purpose. But this would not be the sort of ‘art practice’ that Galloway 
espouses, it would not refer “to any type of artistic practice within the global 
Internet, be it the World Wide Web, email, telnet, or any other such protocological 
technology” (Protocol 211). To (only) work with the protocols already coded into 
these technologies would do nothing to help us better understand our ways of being 
with language, writing and art in the age of new media. The “tactical” definition of 
the “Internet art” that Galloway proposes serves, in his own words, “an aesthetic 
defined by its oppositional position vis-à-vis previous, often inadequate, forms 
of cultural production” (212). Being ‘oppositional,’ Galloway’s form of a ‘tactical 
Internet art’ positions itself as a part of the second sophist/ic meant to deceive us 
of how protocols (codes) keep us at an arms-length from our own ways of imagining 
alternate ways of writing/art-ing (with) new media, of conducting (in the Ulmerian 
sense of the word conduction9) our/selves as Strangers.
 Ian Bogost provides further explanation in his book Persuasive Games 
when he coins the term procedural rhetoric to “define the way things work: 
the methods, techniques, and logics that drive the operations of systems, from 
mechanical systems like engines to organizational systems” (Persuasive 3). In 
part, the procedure becomes a method of making arguments with computers and 
the coded software, “persuading through processes in general and computational 
processes in particular” (Persuasive 3) – the particular, however, remains a 
function (in a computational sense) of the generalized process (cf. my earlier 
discussion of Lyotard’s ‘grand narratives’). While Bogost perceives this (rhetorical) 
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method as productive for “making arguments with computational systems and 
for unpacking computational arguments others have created” (Persuasive 3), 
Galloway remains skeptical10 about encouraging procedures and protocols, and 
calls us to become viral, to infect these systems with unexpected methods, even 
though his “viral” methods remain a part of the protocols he critiques. For example, 
when he addresses (video)games in his book Gaming, Galloway defines his goal 
as “hinder[ing] gameplay, not advanc[ing] it” (Gaming 125). While it may not 
be his intention, such a perspective supports the argumentative structures that 
he finds in protocols and games. While they come to technology from different 
perspectives, both Bogost’s procedural rhetoric(s) and Galloway’s “going viral” and 
countergaming methods do little to offer us a way to give voice to the Strangers 
with/in us since they – perhaps unintentionally – maintain binary (both 010101 
and 1/2) approaches to writing (with) new media.
 Rather than attempting to focus on working to hinder this brand of control, 
Martin Heidegger offers us a way to think about technology apart from protocols 
and procedures. In an attempt to ascertain the essence of technology in “The 
Question Concerning Technology” – written before the digital technology that 
we know today – Heidegger explains that this essence “is by no means anything 
technological” (Basic Writings 311), but “is a way of revealing” (Basic Writings 318) 
by “unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about” (Basic 
Writings 322); or, in contemporary cultural terms, remixing. However, Heidegger 
shares Lessig’s fear that technological/protocological thinking may become the  
mode of understanding and making sense of the world while closing out other 
potentialities – capacities for coming into being – of knowing. If writing is only 
done mechanically, as Galloway and Bogost suggest, writing unfolds as a restricted 
practice, similar to Freire’s critique of the banking method that perpetuates the 
exclusion of other ways of knowing and to the programming codes that Lessig 
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fears will lead to a feudal culture. For Heidegger, technological thinking becomes 
a means to an end – equivalent to students’ pleas for instructors to tell them 
how to fix their writing so that they may ‘write to the test’ (here, the test is, dis/
respectfully, the vague criteria of ‘excellence’11). In addition, he also warns of 
seeing technology as a neutral tool. As an alternative, Heidegger suggests that 
we approach technology by returning to the Greek word techne from which the 
terms “technology” and “art” derive; he claims that “reflection upon technology and 
decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin 
to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it” – 
“such a realm is art” (Basic Writings 340). The kind of art that Heidegger refers to 
here, however, is not the kind of art that takes place in ‘the discipline of art,’ but 
unfolds through one’s own devices.
 This unfolding,12 however, suggests an additional manner exceeding 
deduction (conclusion), induction (rule), and abduction (precondition) that comics 
artist Chris Ware  calls pro-duction13 – this form of production shares Derrida’s 
view that “Productive force is also called imagination” (Archeology 76) –  which he 
finds, in part, in the techniques of collage/montage that avant-garde artists en-
act in producing experiment-al work.14 Here, pro-duction derives from the Latin 
producere, simultaneously meaning to ‘bring forth’ (pro: forth; ducere: to bring, 
lead) and ‘bring into being,’ in the sense of performance(s) (such as a theatrical 
performance; cf. Artaud). Taking our cue from Antonin Artaud, this unfolding 
realizes itself “by a return to the primitive Myths” and “giving them their 
immediacy” in such a manner that they are “sensed and experienced directly by 
the mind” (Theater and Its Double 123-24). The immediacy of these experiences, as 
well as the productions that they give rise to, obscure the distinctions between “the 
reality of imagination and dreams” so that they “appear there on equal footing with 
life” (Artaud, Theater and Its Double 123). In this manner, a proliferation of mixes 
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would come about since the original mix only presents one mix among a variety of 
other possible mixes. While Heidegger’s claim that ‘art’ can provide us a way out 
of procedural thinking/writing that has come about in the 21st century, this claim 
rests on seeing art as a form of being rather than as category or discipline. 
 In contrast to the banking method of instruction that defines an aggregate of 
linkages, this pro-ductive, experiment-al manner offers students what Sirc claims is 
an easy entré into composition, a compelling medium and genre in which 
to re-arrange textual materials – both original and appropriated – in 
order to have those materials speak the student’s own voice and concerns, 
allowing them to come up with something obscure, perhaps, yet promising 
illumination. (“Box-Logic” 113; emphasis added)
Re-arrangement here approaches a manner of invention that unfolds through 
alternate mixes – or, to use the colloquial term, to re-mix – which George Kennedy 
finds analogous to Aristotle’s approach to invention.15 By focusing on invention, 
post-pedagogy does not advocate for any single process, but supports a perpetual 
invention of methods appropriate for the ‘scene of writing.’16 Such an approach 
would de-center the educational process by keeping “the question of meaning open 
as a locus of debate” (Readings, University 165). This does not mean that meaning 
has no place in education, but that it lingers, that meaning remains contingent and 
singular rather than generalizable.
 Similarly, Sirc looks to move beyond the view that students cannot produce 
significant work unless given models of ‘good’ writing on which to base their own 
work. In English Composition as a Happening, he outlines what a do-it-yourself 
(DIY) pedagogy might look like in the composition classroom based in Kaprow’s 
4
1
Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
work on Happenings art – a term referring to the avant-garde art movement during 
the 1960s where artists and spectators were involved in creating performance 
art that could not be duplicated (English 63). For those teachers fearful of what 
this means for instructional practices, there’s no need to panic about what your 
roles will consist of in the classroom; all that a DIY, happenings pedagogy asks of 
you is that you take part in what you teach, to practice what you teach. Following 
Kaprow’s lead, Sirc proposes an approach to the composition classroom centered 
on blurring the divisions between new media, art, composition and life that avoids 
seeing instructors as the bearers of knowledge so that we may affirm students’ 
experiences with writing, art and technology in hopes of making composition 
more relevant for them. For Kaprow, as for Sirc, Happenings are performative, 
unrehearsed, and require an active engagement with the world, intervening in, 
rather than merely reflecting on, ‘reality.’17 Instead of following a strict curriculum, 
composition would become a way of producing something new rather than a 
reproduction. 
 In other words, art (practices) have entered composition in order to 
intervene in the technological/protocological/procedural thinking that has turned 
classrooms into assembly lines that offer students a place to develop their own 
forms of knowledge. But, even as ‘Art’ has entered pedagogical discussion of just 
education(s), the way in which Art has been discussed leaves much to be desired. 
It is here that Kaprow’s unart, as “play without intention” (Essays 113) intersects 
with current pedagogical theories of writing that ‘err on the side of life’ rather than 
on bureaucratic demands for ‘correctness.’18
Here comes another blank sequel cause words are not working, they are not equal
And baby, isn’t it boring to always talk in the same old clichés
Right now can’t be bothered with thinking cause rational reasons, they keep us sinking
And you know that no syllable will make us feel more real...
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we Are the strAnge(rs)
“The artist’s imagination is a world of potentialities that no work 
will succeed in realizing. What we experience by living another 
world, answering to other forms of order and disorder.”
~ Italo Calvino, Six Memos for the Next Millennium
As Sirc tells us, postpedagogy does not require students to become artists, which would only have us teach another iteration of the ‘banking’ method, 
but works to bring an “art consciousness to daily life” (“Box-Logic” 117), to think 
apart from the structures that demand we follow protocols and procedures. 
Postpedagogy acknowledges the avant-garde as a starting point that invites 
students to intervene in accepted models of writing as a way to think of their 
own ways of knowing, offering them “what they want: an invitation to become” 
(Sirc, English 294; emphasis added). In addition, such a manner would take on 
the task of popularizing education19 already under way in the digital technologies 
students use every day – the difference would be that we shift from perceiving 
these technologies as mere tools for the production of written texts in the service of 
the institutions that dictate what students need instead of letting them discover it 
through producing their devices. Sirc uses the example of rap to ask students to see 
their writing 
as strange-d, made curious, something interesting to consider, an object 
of intellectual fascination as much as emotional possession. It’s the writer 
not only as collector, but as a dissatisfied collector, one impatiently seeking 
pleasure […] composition as a craving; teaching students to feel desire and 
lack. (“Box-Logic” 117; emphasis added)
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In (un)common parlance, composition becomes the presence of an absence that 
we are unequipped to quell for our students, making our work into the playful 
collection of art-ifacts that we share with students to “offer them new possibilities 
for” writing with an “associational logic of linkages” that “foster a personal 
aesthetic among our students” (Sirc, “Box-Logic” 123). 
 One of the artists most often cited in the avant-garde movement has been 
Marcel Duchamp for his critique of Art at the turn of the 20th century. In “The 
Euretics of Alice’s Valise,” Ulmer adopts Duchamp’s method of creating something 
new from a set of ‘readymade’ objects that students collect by unpacking items 
from a valise and re-arranging them at random (Sirc’s box-logic proposes a 
similar method). As Ulmer describes this process, the method of re-arranging 
items in unexpected ways produces “results that surprise the instructors as 
much as the students” (3), and he calls this moment of surprise an instance of 
discovery, a eureka moment “synonymous with thinking as a discovery rather 
than as interpretation” (4) – invention rather than critique: “a cognitive practice 
coming into formation as an alternative to (not opposed to, but supplementing) 
hermeneutics and critique” (4) – as a way to generate new pedagogical and 
art practices.20 This method is not meant to indicate that postpedagogy is an 
‘anything goes’ approach to composing, but to begin students on their own paths 
to intervening in the world around them, or as Ulmer writes in an earlier essay, 
“not to reflect but to change reality” (“Object of Post-Criticism” 86). Approaches like 
the one that Sirc and Ulmer suggest are meant to offer us opportunities to drift 
like nomads in our writing and art, letting the imaginative linkages that arise at 
any given moment direct our ways of composing.21 The invention of these alternate 
arrangements – remixes perhaps – are products of bringing an art consciousness 
to daily life, of forging new linkages at the time of creation, creating links by 
drifting in the scene of writing, and perpetually re-inventing performances with our 
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audiences – spectators and students become co-creators of a new style of writing 
and producing art.22
 In these post-pedagogical approaches, the preferred outcomes in other 
pedagogies – teaching students how to write by copying the style and structure of 
established texts – give way to new and unexpected outcomes from the students’ 
creative practices invented for the moment. Italo Calvino refers to this as “some 
possible pedagogy of the imagination […] that we can only exercise upon ourselves, 
according to the methods invented for the occasion and with unpredictable results” 
that heads off “the danger we run in losing a basic human faculty: the power of 
bringing visions into focus with our eyes shut, of bringing forth forms and colors 
‘little narratives’), beginning with images “that have made an impact” (Six Memos 
94) and spurring pro-ductive variants.
 Calvino provides an example of this sort of imaginative pro-duction (reading 
and writing) through comics. As a child, before he learned to read, he directed his 
attention toward comics, spending “hours following the cartoons of each series from 
one issue to another, while in [his] mind [he] told [himself] stories, interpreting the 
scenes in different ways” (Six Memos 93)24 – making linkages from what he was 
Banksy
from the lines of black letters on a white page, and in fact of 
thinking in terms of images” (Six Memos 92). Rather than teaching 
what he calls the icastic, self-sufficient form, Calvino conceives 
of “phantasmic and oneiric transfigurations, the figurative world 
as it is transmitted by a culture at its various levels, and a 
process of abstraction, condensation, and interiorization of sense 
experience, a matter of prime importance to both the visualization 
and verbalization of thought” (Six Memos 95).23 In this manner of 
writing (and teaching), we write to tell our own stories (Lyotard’s 
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presented with, similar to the concepts of remix, collage, and montage that have 
popularized experiment-al approaches to education. Even after he had learned to read, 
Calvino explains, “the advantage [he] gained was minimal. […] it was evident that 
the rhymster had no idea of what might have been in the balloons of the original,” 
preferring “to ignore the written lines and to continue with [his] favorite occupation of 
daydreaming within the pictures and their sequence” (Six Memos 93-94). For Calvino, 
there is no one correct way to reason through the sequences, but a variety of possible 
linkages. Beginning his own stories in this way, Calvino treated the comics images 
as readymade that could be seen in a way not dictated by the writers. Taken a step 
further, Calvino could have cut out the comics panels to reorder them as way to create 
further presentations and possible readings. While altering the arrangement of the 
panels in those comics he was reading, as he did with his alternate readings, Calvino 
would be experimenting with the possibility of additional mini-narratives. We can 
see examples of these phantasmic transfigurations in Roland Barthes’ experimental 
writings about (and with) photography and film.
 Throughout “The Third Meaning” Barthes speaks of Eisenstein’s Battleship 
Potemkin and the filmic still image that “forces itself upon me” (Image 56) even 
though he does not know why they attract him. The meaning of these images, 
the obtuse meaning, occupies a third space between its presentation and its 
description, suspended between meanings that do “not copy anything” and exists 
outside of articulated language – “what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is 
metalanguage (criticism)” (Image 61). In The Rhetoric of Cool, Jeff Rice finds that 
the use of images in current composition courses does not allow for the inarticulate 
meaning that Barthes describes – an attempt to domesticate images rather than 
looking at the unpresentable meanings they open up. Instead, writing means that 
“[s]tudents write about images, but not with image. Students ‘see’ images but 
don’t use them for generating new experience. Students observe images but are 
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not asked to find correlations between an image-based experience and their own” 
(Rice, Cool 140) despite popular (culture) evidence that this is already underway, 
and in “the age of new media” excluding these alternate writing practices would 
mean that pedagogy “remain insular” (Cool 145), ensuring its own irrelevance. 
Requiring that students appropriate the dominant discourse provided them in our 
classrooms means to validate the ‘metalanguage’ that Barthes speak of, to become 
critics rather than producers. However, as Barthes describes it, the obtuse meaning 
requires a “diegetic horizon” that allows for alternative combinations – it is not 
present in a stand-alone image whether photographic or painted (Image 66). 
 Throughout Camera Lucida, Barthes begins to sketch out how an additional 
third meaning arises out of stand-alone images that are not placed within a 
narrative arc, exploring ways in which images can engender thought. In his own 
terms, his concern is not with the studium – “a kind of education (knowledge and 
civility, ‘politeness’) which allows me to discover the Operator, to experience the 
intentions which establish and animate his practices, but to experience them 
‘in reverse,’ according to my will as a Spectator” (Camera 28) – but with the 
punctum – an “accident which pricks me” (Camera 27), showing “no preference for 
morality or good taste: the punctum can be ill-bred” (Camera 43) with “a power 
of expansion” (Camera 45). Still, the studium is not separate from the punctum; 
where the punctum appears, the studium is also present. The punctum, “whether 
or not it is triggered, is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and what 
is nonetheless already there” (Camera 55). A pedagogy of imagination would take 
Bathes’ punctum to its productive limit, bringing forth an addition(al) from one’s 
own devices.
 Adding Lyotard, we can say that Barthes creates little narratives through 
the third meanings he finds in both film and photography through a process of 
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imaginative linking. What postpedagogy finds in the figural, as Barthes does, is not 
a customary one-size-fits-all pedagogical model, but a way to encourage students 
to think abstractly and imaginatively. An avant-garde approach of finding new 
methods of making art that de-stabilizes fixed meaning provides a way to begin 
the work of thinking in abstractions. Haynes brings this move to rhetoric and 
composition in “Writing Offshore,” explaining it as one that places learning in 
students’ hands and one that requires a move from argumentation to abstraction. 
Such a pedagogical method would be infused with an element of play that does 
not dictate meaning, but allows students to assert their own ways to knowing, 
doing and making, and that do not always correspond to established methods. As a 
pedagogical method, postpedagogy seeks to avoid the totalization of meaning that 
requires one to take a stance in place of finding alternate ways of understanding, 
thinking, and writing. Lyotard, like Haynes, Sirc and Ulmer after him, refers to 
Duchamp’s readymades as an example of the writing to come, of looking again to 
see other possible linkages with a method found in the practice of an imaginative 
writing unconcerned with an imposed criterion. The playful methods of  avant-
garde artists, methods that comics artists adapted to their own work, provide us 
with the opportunity to enact the abstract pedagogy that Haynes calls for, one in 
which we open up our pedagogical spaces so that we can learn as much, if not more, 
from our students as they learn from us. 
 In “The Creative Act,” Duchamp speaks to this method of creation from 
an artist’s perspective, claiming that in creating a work of art, artists go “from 
intention to realization through a chain of totally subjective reactions” as a “series 
of efforts, pains, satisfactions, refusals, decisions, which also cannot and must not 
be fully self-conscious, at least on the esthetic plane” (Duchamp’s Writings 139). 
Here, we can see a gap between the artist’s intention and his ability to realize it; 
Duchamp’s manner of describing art offers a way of thinking about the task of 
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Lyotard’s postmodern artist/writer: to present (allusions to) the unpresentable. 
However, this pro-ductive manner only presents a fraction of the creative act that 
grows exponentially when a “spectator brings the work in contact with the external 
world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his 
contribution to the creative act” (Duchamp’s Writings 140). Lyotard tells us as 
much when he discusses the presentable and the unpresentable, where the role 
of art is to find that some things cannot be made visible, and the artist presents 
this inability to understand.25 To do this, he implies, we need what the avant-
gardes provide: abstraction – to make us see by making it impossible to see. This 
is what Haynes’ asks of us when she calls for a pedagogy of abstraction: not to 
create meaning for students, but to break with the logic that holds students apart 
from their own creative acts with a refusal “to examine the rules of art” in order to 
“pursue successful careers in mass conformism by communicating, by means of the 
‘correct rules,’ the endemic desire for reality with objects and situations capable 
of gratifying it” (Lyotard, Postmodern Condition 75). For those “who question the 
rules of plastic and narrative arts,” Lyotard writes, “they are destined to have little 
credibility in the eyes of those concerned with ‘reality’ and ‘identity’: they have no 
guarantee of an audience” (Postmodern Condition 75). We, the strange, take this as 
our manner, not to argue, but to detach ourselves from the dialogue that requires 
us to take a (reason-able) stance.26
 The future of composition studies in the wake of post-pedagogical methods 
of invention is currently moving toward a role similar to the avant-garde artists 
(or better yet, of Kaprow’s unartists) as a way to avoid keeping students separated 
from their ways of being active in their own learning. Rickert tells us that 
postpedagogy makes an effort to interrupt the accepted methods of writing, just as 
avant-garde artists do for Art when a ‘school of art’ begins to stabilize – a problem 
that comics artists have tended to avoid since they are constantly looking for new 
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ways of writing and art-ing. Comics offer us a way to think about this ‘playfulness’ 
since they work by way of linkages, enacting a practice that tries to rewrite its 
environment, rather than write purely. More importantly, comics artists, like the 
avant-garde artists of the 60s and 70s, show us a (singular) way to think about the 
playful use of art and art techniques for writing across media in such a way that we 
“err on the side of life” (“Box-Logic” 113) rather than on the side of the university. 
The integration of the figural, as a form of abstraction, infuses a sense of how to 
live in a technological age that attempts to proceduralize the available means of 
writing (with) new media. Unlike the other ‘arts’ mentioned in this chapter, comics 
have a (still continuing) history of being an un-credited ‘art,’ an ‘art’ that remains 
beyond the margins of art (history/disciplines/movements) despite all the well-
meaning attempts at normalization – the province of chapter 2.
 For rhetoric and composition, the figural fills a similar gap, asking us (and 
students) to be cautious of standardized writing practices – composition as a service 
course, institutionally defined and institutionalizing students to accepted modes of 
writing. But the similar problems exist in writing (with) new media if the methods 
used in this process are merely technological and/or protocological. For Kaprow, the 
playful use of technology favors continuous inventive practices, experimentations 
that can lead to surprising results. 
chapter 2
In the shadow of Image/text
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in the s h A D o w ( s )  of imAge/text
“…my mind kept wandering. I found no solace in [poetry or] 
music of any kind […] it seemed too obscenely exquisite. The 
only cultural artifacts that could get past my defenses to 
flood my eyes and brain with something other than images 
of burning towers were old comic strips; vital, unpretentious 
ephemera from the optimistic dawn of the twentieth century.”
~ Art Spiegelman, In The Shadow of No Towers
 
                     It was            the strangest 
            moment of my               life, sitting in my first 
         college course (composition),       still adjusting to being away 
from home and to college-life, when         the instructor came in and turned 
the television on to show the burning      North tower. Looking around the 
classroom, the students were in shock,     trying to make sense of what was 
happening just a few hours drive away     in New York – some of us had family 
living in the surrounding areas. After     a few minutes, the instructor turned 
the television off to start us on our own    composition work. As we went over 
the syllabus, the assignments and the     grading procedures/criteria, I could 
not help but think about the burning    tower. Up to this point, writing was 
an exercise I practiced on my own; to    distill my thoughts throughout the 
semester I would ask myself how the    material in this course would allow 
us to drift through writing to make sense    of the event that would mark my 
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time as an undergraduate student. As the debris was cleared over the next few 
months and the victims of the attacks were tallied, the event would lead to personal 
accounts – someone we knew was in one of the towers or in the surrounding 
areas, and tales of where we were when it happened. In my own account: no one 
I knew was in either tower or in the immediate surrounding areas. However, 
throughout the semester, the work we were assigned in this first-year composition 
course did not allow us [students] to explore our own ways of making sense of the 
event; rather, it required us to take a stance and write the same stale standard 
academic argumentative essays we’ve always been assigned as a part of a standard 
curriculum. Something was missing from this sort of writing, something that we 
[the students in this FYC course] desperately needed in order to make sense of the 
devastation.
     During the October 2006 
          Thomas R. Watson Conference in 
      Louisville, KY, I  f inally found   
       what was              missing during Art Spiegelman’s keynote 
talk on his then-recent publication, In The Shadow of No Towers – a comic
a comic book about the repercussions of the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks. 
     Spiegelman          was living (and still does live) in New York
         city when the planes hit the two towers.
           He tells readers of his experience – 
     while not generally good at
coping with high-stress situations he explains that he was very cogent in the 
aftermath. As soon as the first tower was hit, Spiegelman and his wife ran into the 
streets to find their daughter who was also at her first day of (elementary) school 
when they first heard and felt the thundering explosion of the North tower. The 
initial explosion brought memories of his father’s stories of Auschwitz1 and the 
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advice he received from his father to always keep a bag packed in case such malice 
ever happened again: Spiegelman considered leaving the city as quickly as possible 
to get away from the mayhem. A narrative analysis of the book might suggest that 
Spiegelman’s experience during the attacks represented one generalized example 
of what others (may have) experienced, both directly and indirectly affected. 
‘Spiegelman lends his voice and art,’ they might say, ‘to the millions of people still 
reeling from the aftershocks.’ However, Spiegelman asks that the audience consider 
the book an attempt to make sense of his own (initial) reactions, not an expression 
of a stable understanding.
 Lately, what has been happening in discussions of comics and the interplay 
between image and text tends to ignore alternate readings that take into account 
Spiegelman’s use of comics as a form of writing abstractly, thinking through 
writing and the figural. Reading and visualizing the work in comics tends to ignore 
the thinking that produced the work itself and the thinking that it calls us to 
perform as a part of the creative act Marcel Duchamp so effectively uncovers in 
“The Creative Act.” That is, what we lose by positioning writing and art as “skills” 
used for a given purpose, is the way in which both change the ways in which we 
think and see the world around us. The importance of this work correlates to 
Spiegelman’s attempt to make sense of his reactions to the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks on the WTC with an imaginative comics approach; I’ll also 
be referring to what others have been doing to expand the use of comics as an 
abstract form of writing. While the ‘definitional’ and ‘cinematic’ approaches have 
revitalized the medium in popular culture and have brought comics into academic 
conversations, they have yet to explore the potential of the form for theoretical and 
pedagogical thought. In other words, I see in comics a way of reading and writing that 
Lyotard describes as postmodern and that Byron Hawk refers to as hyperrhetorical2 – 
which sets out to discover a method of invention while inventing it.3
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 At first, being able to define the field of study creates a niche, a legitimized 
position from which to argue for the integration and use of a specific idea. Thierry 
Groensteen’s oft-anthologized essay “Why Are Comics Still in Search of Cultural 
Legitimization?” sets up the perceived problem for the medium of comics when he 
claims that they “suffer from a considerable lack of legitimacy” and “it is curious 
that the legitimizing authorities (universities, museums, the media) still regularly 
charge it with being infantile, vulgar, or insignificant” (“Why” 3). However, while 
Groensteen sees this lack of legitimization as a problem, it may be more of a benefit 
for comics than he recognizes, and it is one well suited to a postmodern writer/
artist since it works across various media.4 To begin setting out on this project, 
three anchors must be retracted: 
         (1) 
        the 
       first 
             attempts 
           to fix comics 
        as a medium, 
          (2) the second attempts 
      to legitimize comics through       
           comparisons to film, specifically 
            addressing why comics are 
        primordial to the various 
 cinematic          arts, and (3) the third      attempts 
      to make comics              into       a teachable 
         discipline –   it is in        this section 
     that I begin to work at finding some of the 
      ways that we might think of 
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a comics form (not medium) rhetorically. For example, when a comic book (or 
graphic novel) attracts wide public attention, the medium is not always the 
primary factor, but its new take on a topic or how it approaches (or remediates) 
thinking and writing in unique ways (e.g. Alan Moore’s graphic novel Watchmen). 
While Groensteen celebrates this (non)legitimization by challenging the modernist 
“ideology of purification that has led contemporary art to a dead end” (“Why” 9), he 
does so by developing an alternate system that “defines an ideal” (System 20). In 
a postmodern age weary of notions of ‘purity’ and ‘ideals,’ the absence of an ‘ideal’ 
form of comics offers us an easy entre to say that they are well suited to explore 
ideas of other ways of practicing writing/art excluded from institutional ways of 
knowing (definition), doing (cinematic), and making (producing).
 Groensteen’s larger project – defining the system of comics – has deeper 
issues at play that rely on narrative elements of the medium. In The System of 
Comics, he goes on to discuss a complex network that compels an associative logic 
that can be extended to current work in new media and art criticism scholarship, 
such as a post-hermeneutic method that extends beyond interpretation alone.5 
Groensteen explains in his introduction that he is setting out to develop “a 
conceptual frame in which all of the actualizations of the ‘ninth art’ can find 
their place and be thought of in relation to each other, taking into account 
their differences and their commonalities within the same medium” in order 
to advance “the fundamental concept of solidarity” (System 20). However well-
intentioned, this objective begins to exclude those forms of comics that fall outside 
of his classifications, a criticism that he has also pinned on Scott McCloud. Such 
categorizations that can lead to an us/them relationship of conflict6 centered on 
guarding accepted manifestations as if there were some semblance of control over 
the development of the medium (and its compositions) – projects like Frank Miller’s 
300, Chris Ware’s Jimmy Corrigan: The Smartest Kid on Earth, or Andrei Molotui’s 
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Abstract Comics would continue fall beyond the scope of Groensteen’s system. In 
order to sketch out how comics present postmodern writers/artists with an instance 
of writing imaginatively, we need to move beyond notions of comics as inherently 
sequential and as a dominantly print medium so that we may see how they may 
function in ‘the arts’ and in rhetoric/composition; this requires that we first turn to 
the ‘definitional project’ in order to offer a (non)definition of comics as a form.
 
slAshing through imAge/text: 
the DefinitionAl project
“One way to perceive the disjunction is to view the slash as a 
technology. In other words, the difference between rhetoric and 
composition is in how they each define and employ techné.”
~Cynthia Haynes, “Rhetoric/Slash/Composition”
Groensteen’s definitional project correlates to current concerns in writing instruction and the various problematics of legitimized knowledge and writing 
practices – or what I have called ‘pure’ writing. While well-informed, defining 
parameters in terms of formal categories, such as the “spatio-topical” system 
Groensteen describes, reduces image/text relationships gives one mediation preference 
over the other, creating a hierarchy meant to move toward legitimization. In contrast 
to Groensteen’s view of comics as medium – designating the limits of this ‘art’ form 
by providing a stance, or what in rhetorical terms is called stasis theory – Kenneth 
Burke’s ‘”paradox of substance” offers a better approximation of the comics form. As 
Burk writes, “though used to designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, 
[substance] etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it,” it 
would be “something that the thing is not” (Grammar 23).7  For comics, this sub-stance 
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lies outside formal/systematic conceptualizations and, has a context beyond traditional 
form(ulation)s (sequentiality).8
               As such,
                 most attempts 
             at defining comics 
               as a medium are 
         unnecessary and 
             generally unproductive, 
                  perhaps even self-serving 
                     to the point of ignoring 
                       the larger context of 
                         comics – as intermedial 
                     form (for more on 
                       intermedia, see 
          chapter 3). A more 
               productive approach 
        appears in a method 
                 Greg Ulmer and Hawk 
     call hyperrhetoric – 
       which inserts ‘art’ 
   directly into rhetoric 
       and composition. 
  What I suggest is 
that current perspectives on comics (art) would be better achieved through a (non)
category than with a formal/istic classifications. Here I take my cue from Cynthia 
Haynes’ “Rhetoric/Slash/Composition,” Lisa Trahair’s reading of Lyotard’s Discours, 
figure in The Comedy of Philosophy and James Kochalka’s suggestion that art 
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is a way of understanding and condensing life’s experiences (Cute Manifesto). 
To put it briefly, as I hope to show, because comics are a form associated with 
both image and text, because they exist at the intersections between media, they 
would be better thought of as a technology in the sense that Haynes uses the 
term slash between rhetoric and composition. If “the and between computers and 
writing [is] already utterly unnecessary” (“Rhetoric/Slash/Composition”; emphasis 
added), per Haynes’ rhetorical question, it isn’t a far stretch to say that writing 
in the form of comics – as image and text – would need little discussion to dismiss 
another unnecessary and between ‘computers and [comics]. As we’ll see, from both 
Groensteen and Lyotard, writing always already involves both image and text.
 Groensteen reminds us that the Greeks used “a single word, graphien” 
to refer to writing and painting, which, when “our alphabetical culture quickly 
became logocentrism,” subordinated “visual forms of expression to language” since 
“philosophers continually repeat that the image tricks and troubles us, acting on 
our senses and exciting our emotions, and that reason is on the side of the word” 
(“Why” 8; emphasis added). Building on Michel Foucault’s
                      This is Not 
  a Pipe, Groensteen                  attempts to  
 expose the opposition           between image and 
text,  claiming that the                         opposition between 
  looking and reading has                      been long fought 
  and continues to value the                 written text over the 
     visual.  This conversation is nothing new to 
          those  o f  us  involved in  rhetor ic  and 
         composition’s current focus 
      on  ‘mult imedia ,  but 
   what I want to 
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point to here has to do with Groensteen’s attempts to position comics as an art 
that leans more toward the visual than the textual. The problem with the way 
that he frames comics here, and in the way he discusses text, is that he does 
not give the written word the (ambiguous) credit it de-serves – “reason is on the 
side of the word” – despite a history of postmodern scholarship to the contrary; 
here I am specifically thinking of Derrida’s work on language and writing in Of 
Grammatology. In other words, Groensteen fails to realize that the interplay of 
image and text lays bare the ambiguities of each and that both are always already 
presented together. 
 To elucidate this claim more fully, we turn to Trahair’s reading of Lyotard. 
Through a reading of Lyotards’ Discourse, figure, Trahair suggests that each mode 
(discourse, figure) is not an order of knowing separated from the other, but that 
both realms “inhabit [each] other,” that both image and text are always already 
given together (Comedy 171). Evaluating these two modes of expression as Trahair 
explains provides current multimodal composing processes in popular culture 
(remix) with some alternate ways of thinking about what it means to write in an 
age of new media. Where remix tends to work with a logic of association in the form 
of collage/montage,9 the thought-practices that Lyotard proposes brings us back to 
the Greek word graphien, not as a separation, but as the superimposition of image 
and text, each occupying the same space, just as stills in a film occupy the space 
on a screen. This superimposition blurs the distinction between image and text 
by breaking with the perspective that in “some instances of ‘textual production,’ 
discourse will dominate; in others, the figure takes hold of the text” (Trahair, 
Comedy 171).10 Reading and writing in this way presents a logic of invention that 
returns “texts” to conceptual starting places (tropes) that exceed methods of reading 
and writing categorically (topos).
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 As it relates to traditional views of comics, topoi (commonplaces) can be misused 
if the goal is to illustrate some known idea or represent some preconceived knowledge, 
such as caricature(s). In response to one of the most outrageous (‘causing outrage’) 
examples of this misuse, the 2005 Danish political cartoons of the Muslim prophet 
Mohammed, Spiegelman echoes the problems that rhetoric and composition have 
been addressing over the last thirty years – specifically, the desire to control meaning, 
language, writing and the teaching of rhetoric and composition. For Spiegelman, 
these caricatures symbolize a symptom, not the cause of a larger problem: the desire 
to canonize or curate. “Caricature,” Spiegelman writes, “is by definition a charged or 
loaded image: its wit lies in the visual concision of using a few deft strokes to make its 
point” by “deploying a handful of visual symbols and clichés” that use “the discredited 
pseudo-scientific principles of physiognomy to portray character through a few physical 
attributes and facial expressions” (“Drawing Blood” 45). As a representational form 
(mimesis) of thought, caricature plays on accepted icons already present in the public 
consciousness. When Sirc details how composition builds classrooms as 
            “peculiar 
                sorts of cultural 
         temples in which students 
      are ‘invited’ in to sample 
           the best that has been thought 
 and expressed in our language and maybe even, like the art students 
 we see poised in art galleries with their sketchbooks and charcoals, 
 to learn to produce the master’s craft” (English 2), the issue lies with  
 caricature – we ‘invite’         students into classrooms in 
 order that they can        create caricatures of our 
 language with tasks         geared toward making 
 them write purely, to         reproduce the models of 
 ‘the best that has been         thought and expressed.’ 
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What comics offer us goes beyond caricature – a form that allows writers and 
artists to compose without the requirement of a model or master copies hanging 
over their heads. 
 Scott McCloud’s Understanding Comics offers an alternate perspective that 
begins to blur the division between theory and practice – a blurring not too distant 
from Haynes’ virgule, the slash (/), between rhetoric and composition (“Rhetoric/
Slash/Composition”) or the hesitating comma in Lyotard’s Discours, figure. While 
McCloud has been widely criticized for his attempt to define the medium of comics 
– either it is too limiting (Meskin) or too broad (Cohn) depending on the critic – his 
performative exploration of comics suggests an intersection between Duchamp’s 
creative act in art and craft, a place of invention – and “object” that goes beyond 
criticism and actually performs the work that it discusses, or what Ulmer would 
call an “object of post-criticism.” McCloud’s content aside, the book acts out the sort 
of practices that comics offer rhetoric/ composition pedagogy, a field continually 
concerned with verbal language and visual inscriptions. That is, comics present a 
hesitating intervention, which is precisely what McCloud attempts to accomplish 
with Understanding Comics: he hesitates to fix a definition of comics while 
examining the current state of the medium, even claiming that the definition is 
only a way to set out on the work he does throughout the rest of the book.  As far as 
the content is concerned, he bookends the entire project with two claims: (1) “[O]ur 
attempts to define comics are an on-going process which won’t end anytime soon” 
(Understanding 23), and (2) “I’ve learned a lot about comics since beginning this 
project and I know I have a lot left to learn. I hope you’ll all consider exploring—or 
continuing to explore—comics on your own” (Understanding 215). McCloud has no 
illusions of creating a fixed definition, and he welcomes an inventive approach to 
comics that falls outside of his own project’s purview. 
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 If we learn to look at comics as McCloud does, we have the terrain to think 
of comics as a technology, as techné, that defines and employs images and text 
in different ways, ways that welcome experimental arrangements. Here we see 
comics’ connection to the current move in multimodal composition pedagogy away 
from interpretation and toward stimulating thought to create something new 
through generative practices that alters how we think and write how we experience 
‘reality’.11 The purpose of such an experimental approach is not to engage in 
cultural criticism, but to become productive writers, and to tackle the “insecurity 
over our status as a valid academic field [that] led us to entrench ourselves firmly 
in professionalism” (Sirc, English 6) in such a way that ‘our profession’ has less 
to do with institutions (and institutional demands) and more to do with how we 
experience the world.
 Still, some of the concepts that he introduces through the book are 
problematic if read as the only application and approach that writers/artists 
take toward the comics. Most notably, the initial definition he provides – 
“juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey 
information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer” (McCloud, 
Understanding 7-9) – relies on a linearity that implies a grammatical structure, 
like the one that Kress and Van Leeuwen propose in Readings Images: The 
Grammar of Visual Design. This is where the Lyotardian superimposition 
turns up – instead of arranging image/text, image/image, text/image, text/text 
sequentially, conceptualizing this division as an already interrelated and inter-
active employment of technè presents a way of breaking up the division between 
the textual, allowing how we think of the figural to become a hyperrhetorical 
manner of invention. In addition to avoiding the concern of “amplification through 
simplification” (McCloud, Understanding 30) present in the concept of caricature, 
thinking of this combination as method of superimposition allows us to think 
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about how comics create complex networks of meaning by looking at how various 
media combine (more on the combination of media in chapter 3) to elicit a singular 
aesthetic response rather than a general/ized response. If we take our cue from 
Lyotard, the interaction of image and text would take shape as a Moebius strip 
where there are no longer two separate sides, and the aesthetic response arising 
out of these combinations “is not at all closed in the sense of a volume, it is infinite, 
and contrary to the representative cube, intensities run in it without meeting a 
terminus, without ever crashing into the wall of an absence, into a limit which 
would be the mark of a lack,” but “[i]t invests without condition,” without “rule and 
knowledge” (Libidinal 4). 
 The problems with ‘understanding’ comics as a language, rather than as an 
alternate form of thought, appears in Neil Cohn’s work on visual language in the 
field of linguistics. In “Un-Defining ‘Comics,’” Cohn tries to develop a theoretical   
  model of comics that       focuses on a grammar 
        of visual images comparable         to the Frankfurt School’s 
       view of aesthetics, which           parallels the grammar 
      he sees at the center of   acquisition – what in
           rhetorical studies may        fall under the canon of 
        style. Cohn’s visual language model, though, 
    relies on a constructionist method of 
           reading that does not take into account the 
   aleatory/associative       procedures found in 
       theoretical and           philosophical work 
   over the last century,        beginning as early as 
     Marcel Duchamp. In               his own words, Cohn 
      claims that comics          “can only be understood  
  as sociological, literary,        and cultural artifacts,
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independent from the internal structures comprising them,” and he proposes 
that a more productive approach would study its “visual language” and “visual 
linguistics” (with all of its grammatical and syntactical connotations), which would 
be akin to taking “x-rays of it to understand how it works” (“Un-Defining” 246). 
While he claims that language “places no restrictions on how it is utilized” and 
could lead to “a boom of diverse content” (“Un-Defining” 247), he seems to suggest 
that ‘understanding’ the logic of a comics language can help us better grasp how 
to handle the form in order to give voice to what other fields of study have already 
been working on developing. If this is the case, the importance of comics would 
become diminished as just another way of saying what has already been said in 
another domain.
 Aaron Meskin’s “Defining Comics?” suggests that Cohn’s project is misdirected when 
he questions any (and all) attempts at defining comics: “we are typically most interested 
in features whose absence tends to preclude a work from falling into a category, not ones 
that are required for category membership” (“Defining” 376). Here, Meskin acknowledges 
that any standardized features of comics are inherently limiting and unnecessary for any 
art, and it would seem “improbable that a definition of comics – even if it were forthcoming 
– would be of much help in giving us critical and interpretive guidance” (“Defining” 376). 
In essence, Meskin finds that the definitional project is misguided since any definition 
excludes more than it incorporates; an alternative would be to think of comics tropologically 
– not as a medium (category) in itself, but as the superimposition of media that allows, even 
invites, the proliferation of meaning beyond representation/reproduction (mimesis) in the 
formulation of new, perhaps unexpected, linkages. As it happens,12 the relevance of comics 
has to do with how they address the ordinary, the everyday where “random chronology 
overcomes logic, and the idea of causality gives way to the contingency and arbitrariness of 
everyday life” (Schneider, “Comics and Everyday Life” 41), where the Strange(r) writes and 
thinks without regard for categorical memberships.
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A hesitAting in(ter)vention: the cinemAtic (Arts) project
“…it ought to be obvious that I accept completely the notion that 
there is a prescriptive function to the idea of paganism. I believe 
that one should move in the direction that it proposes. But I am 
struck by the fact that prescriptives, taken seriously, are never 
grounded: one can never reach the just by a conclusion.”
~ Lyotard, Just Gaming 
                       I f  we begin to          think of comics as an art on 
        its own merits, as Meskin suggests, 
        instead of systematically, as Cohn 
            and Groensteen seem to propose, 
                 some headway can be made 
        in seeing comics as 
            a hyperrhetorical 
              form of writing 
             and thinking. 
           To consider 
       comics as a  
        form that links 
                   art to the everyday, 
               some of the 
           concerns 
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             that Groensteen 
           raises in “Why Are Comics Still 
    In Search Of Cultural Legitimization?” 
        need to be addressed. As a genre of art, 
     Groensteen claims        that comics endure a 
   s u b o r d i n a t e      position to other arts, 
         including cinema,         due to its hybridity 
         (combining image           and text), its (erroneous) 
          association with            an  infer ior  art 
                (caricature), and 
              its position as a 
         medium lacking 
           any link to serious 
       work (9-11) – although 
            I’m not sure what could 
        be more serious than 
               how we think about 
             our everyday lives, 
            the “‘home of the 
           bizarre and mysterious’, 
            the place where the 
         exceptional 
             and marvelous reside” 
           (Schneider, “Comics and 
         Everyday Life” 43). 
         W h e n 
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Groensteen places comics and cinema in conversation in The System of Comics, he 
asserts that for “its part, film has other assets, and comics have theirs also, a fact 
that is demonstrated by its [comics] continuing popularity after a century and a 
half of existence, despite the competition of cinema and of all the new things born 
of what Regis Debreay calls the ‘videosphere’” (8). However, Groensteen relies on 
scholarship within cinematic studies that does not reflect the differences in media, 
but that equates cinema and comics – a problematic link for various reasons. 
The most prominent example he uses is Roland Barthes’ obtuse meaning, which 
he  by unquestioningly associates with comics even though Barthes identified the 
obtuse as a cinema-specific meaning that produces an abstract examination of a 
film.13 While Barthes mentions that comics may offer “a new signifier,” it would 
be one “related to the obtuse meaning” since it contains a narrative that allows 
for counter-narratives (“The Third Meaning” 66). By applying a term to comics 
that Barthes assigns to film, even as he attempts to differentiate comics from 
film, Groensteen stumbles upon some of the ambiguous differences between both 
and how comics present an alternate form of thinking and writing: in fragments 
(aphorisms – see my chapter 6) where we explore and invent with a rigor beyond a 
unified system that closes upon itself.14
 Toward the end of his assessment of the ‘system,’ he seems to have discovered 
the difference: while film tends to work with logics of the cut (montage/collage), 
traditional comics15 produce networks that stimulate logics of association un/cut from 
how they appear in random, contingent and arbitrary chronologies. While Groensteen’s 
project has been a welcome addition to comics scholarship, his study parallels that 
of McCloud’s Understanding Comics16 and tends to position comics in opposition to 
cinema, rather than exploring the ways in which comics present a form of technè that 
can be thought of as a technology (in Haynes’ sense of the word). For example, he 
“objects to” the term “editing (montage)” since this sort of “operation […] consists of 
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an intervention on a material that has already been elaborated” (System 101) even 
while he supports the juxtapositions that montage produces throughout his ‘spatio-
topical’ system.17 But the intervention that comics provide needs to be elaborated as an 
intervention in traditional understandings of comics that breaks apart discussions that 
continue to persist speaking at cross-purposes.
 The underlying concern for Groensteen remains prominent for comics: that 
comics are considered a secondhand version of cinema. Yet, discarding terms due 
to their relationship with film can limit the development and potentialities of what 
comics present: a manner of thinking and writing in an age of new media denoting 
“the presence of an active and playful imagination trying to rewrite and redress its 
own environment and process” (Ellis, Do Anything 15). Alan Moore, one of the most 
prominent critics of film from within comics, acknowledges that cinematic techniques 
“can advance the standards of comic art and writing,” but if they rely on cinematic 
techniques for innovative practices, comics will restrict emselves from the possibilities 
of artistic works not available to ‘other cinematic arts’ (Writing 3). David Carrier agrees 
with Moore and expresses a common observation from a comics perspective: when 
watching a film, the motion arises out of a projector, whereas the motion in comics 
takes place when “the successive images are connected” by the reader (Aesthetics 56), 
which correlates to McCloud’s discussion of the gutter between panels in a conventional 
comic book. All of this to say that comics and cinema are already interrelated, but 
that the ways in which the two have been discussed along side each other leaves a lot 
to be desired. So while Groensteen dismisses montage as a technique for comics, his 
perspective does not reflect that of how ‘artists’ working with comics write and think – 
trans-disciplinarily; that is, with techniques and methods that extend beyond merely 
joining images and text to say in another way what has already been said in a different 
form, like Jacobson and Colón did with their graphic adaptation of the “National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.”
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          The most commonly 
       discussed connection between comics 
          and film has to do with how they employ 
     narrative structures;   if this remains the 
   most significant      f a c t o r  o f 
       differentiating       these two forms 
   of thought, comics    will continue to 
     get the short end of      the stick. For example, 
        Hans-Christian Christiansen investigates 
      the differences between comics and 
     cinema in his article “Comics and 
       Film,” where he claims that “the systems    common to both 
         media and the systems      unique to each medium”           can help us “to
     understand the           meaning of the signs         in each text” (107). 
    Where this systematic         approach falters is in     its dual reliance 
 on systematic methods              and its need to differentiate both the 
 two as distinct media         in order to construct a specific 
  field of study that            would allow us to better 
    understand how the           meanings in each are erected. 
          Let me state the obvious first: what such approaches ignore has to do with the 
     current cultural and media theories of remix that       work at breaking apart 
    these systematized narratives in order to    say something else. 
   If taken to their (tempered)           extreme, the 
methods used to break apart cinematic narratives necessitate turning films into 
what could, for all intents and purposes, be called traditional comics – a sequence 
of still images that forms a narrative. And if we see remix as merely an alternative 
mix of the mixes we have been presented, cinema and comics become modes of 
thinking that suggest, as Ulmer writes of video, “an alternative means of gathering 
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information into sets, for the purpose not of proving or testing an idea, but of a 
having a thought, of inventing both in the rhetorical sense of finding something to 
say and in the creative sense of innovation” (“One Video Theory” 268). 
 Hawk’s method of remotivating the figural into a new context (through 
the rhetorical canons of memory and arrangement) presents such an alternative 
approach called hyperrhetoric, which comics scholars/hip has yet to adopt. 
Hyperrhetoric, as Hawk explains while working out of Ulmer, runs antithetical to a 
“method of controlling something in advance (or producing a generalization 
        that can 
           then control something in advance” that 
            “is a part of the ideology of science (induction and 
  deduction)” (“Hyperrhetoric” 77); in its place, hyperrhetoric 
      is “no longer shackled to   the seriousness of the literate text,” 
 but “is free to roam nomadically            through the world of words and images  
        and let style be the engine of        hir18 delivery” (“Hyperrhetoric” 88; 
     emphasis added).19 This method     helps us to make headway in 
    breaking apart the customary             linear panel-to-panel reading 
    comics – a process that has been             represented as a mechanism 
     for effective reading, including         the common reversion 
     of thinking about how ‘readers’           fill in the gaps between panels. 
       Integrating hyperrhetoric into    the ways we think and write (about) 
 comics provides a way to     reverse the narrative association 
    with cinema that also       emphasizes traditional definitions 
  of comics. The example     I started with, Spiegelman’s In The 
        Shadow of No Towers, presents what such a method 
         offers: a moment of emergence during the 
            play of hyper/mediated 
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inventive practices (to hyper/mediate here means to employ various media to 
invent allusions to the imaginable that remains inaccessible to a single medium). 
My use of cinematic theories of invention is not meant to suggest that comics are 
subordinate to other cinematic arts; the main reason I rely on theories coming out 
of cinema has to do with the dearth of work on how a comics form of thinking and 
writing can acclimate us to imaginative approaches to writing (with) new media. 
 While the playful work that comics have engaged in over the past two 
decades provides such approaches, how these approaches have been addressed 
remains entrenched in ‘the literate text,’ even though the figural provokes 
us to think abstractly. Victor Burgin’s The Remembered Film disrupts the 
differentiations between comics and cinema that continues to be a source of 
conflict. In particular, when Burgin writes that the “film we saw is never the film I 
remember” (110), we find a corresponding example in Spiegelman’s In the Shadow 
of No Towers when he presents one way of ‘making sense’ of his experiences during 
the WTC attacks, and even the way he remembers those experiences are unfixed. 
Spiegelman’s approach to this work puts into practice that inventive method that 
relies on what Hawk practices with the film The Fifth Element: unbinding the 
linear narrative to produce a conceptual starting place. As Spiegelman writes, what 
he was looking for was a way “to sort out the fragments of what [he’d] experienced 
from the media images that threatened to engulf what [he] actually saw, and the 
collagelike nature of a newspaper page encourages [his] impulse to juxtapose [his] 
fragmentary thoughts in different styles” (Shadow iv). The way Spiegelman frames 
this project underscores how we can think of comics as a technology that provides 
us with a way of thinking in fragments and creating collages through a process 
of linking those fragments into new assemblages. Instead of relying on formal, 
narrative analysis, this approach to thinking and writing would have us insert a 
slash between comics and cinema – comics/cinema – to consider how practices of 
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creating and viewing change across media.20  Both are technologies of the slash, 
and the importance of each is not the differences between them, but in how they 
each define and employ techné. 
 Asbjørn Grønstad has already proposed a similar concept for film studies 
that he calls theory film, which “provides us with a metadiscursive concept that 
condenses a host of inter-related ideas that all seem to converge in the perception 
that aesthetic texts themselves may be constitutive of theoretical thought” (14). 
From within comics, Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean visualize what such a 
process might consist of in Signal to Noise. In the narrative, a (fictive) prominent 
director has only months to live, but feels compelled to write his last project about 
the end of the world, to be completed posthumously. He begins to imagine the 
film, assembling the sets, actors, and shots, but not writing any of it. There is no 
purpose, he tells himself. It will not be completed, the world is ending for him, but 
eventually something pierces him about this project and he is compelled to write. 
There is a world of potentialities building in his mind, “where the real films are” 
(Signal 3), what Burgin might refer to as ‘internal memory,’ manifested as an 
arrangement from “fragments [that] go adrift and enter into new combinations, 
more or less transitory” (Burgin, Remembered 68), until he puts “them out of 
their misery” (Gaiman, Signal 3) by writing. In his final moments, the director 
finds what he sees as an appropriate title for this transitory work: apocatastases, 
meaning a “return to a previous condition” (Gaiman, Signal 50), which could be 
explained as a place where writers and artists work without (predetermined) 
criteria for a playful inventiveness that works with collected fragments, and 
produces a collagelike work in different styles (or media/tions). 
 But none of this is really new. McCloud notices this move in the sequel to 
Understanding Comics – Reinventing Comics: How Imagination and Technology 
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are Revolutionizing an Art Form. After all, what I’m suggesting is how comics work as 
a form that can teach us how to work imaginatively with technology by inventing a way 
of thinking about comics as a form of thought rather than as a unique medium. For this 
re-invention, McCloud asks that we begin to think of comics as multimedia instead 
of thinking about “comics and multimedia in collaboration,” which he explains 
would be merely transfer the printed page into digital environments (Reinventing 
208). At the heart of this manner of thinking is the ability to consider the “ideas 
that traditional media harbor” escaping “the shells of the technologies that brought 
them into being, until the irreducible essence of each has emerged” so that “new 
forms [can] grow in their new environments. Comics is such an idea, and most of 
its checkered history has been the shell” (Reinventing 233). And it is this idea 
that continues to be ignored in favor of rehashing the same old arguments about 
the uniqueness of the medium rather than thinking about the idea of a (new) 
comics form, a form that suggests a way of writing and thinking imaginatively 
with the logics of digital media (e.g., linking, hypermedia/tion, montage/collage, 
etc.), what Ulmer calls electracy – a method of learning closer to invention than 
authentication. Part of the goal for the remainder of this project will be to find ways 
in which we can think about how comics offer an imaginative way of thinking and 
writing in digital environments. 
Electracy, the early years: Nietzsche doing graphic design.
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sifting through the mADness: 
writing imAginAtively
“if it doesn’t come bursting out of you/in spite of everything,/
don’t do it. unless it comes unmasked out of your/heart and 
your mind and your mouth/and your gut,/ don’t do it.”
~ Charles Bukowski, “so you want to be a writer?”
Fluidity and play guide this inventive process at the intersections of comics and cinema as an additional way of thinking about the image/text relationship 
and the relationship between print and digital writing. Hyperrhetoric, as Hawk 
describes it, entails an element of playful inventiveness with a re-arrangement 
of memory toward transformative production. Hawk tells us that a component of 
hyperrhetoric is to give an example since this method attempts to blur the line 
between theory and practice. For our purposes, an example presents itself in 
Marcel Duchamp’s remix L.H.O.O.Q. An initial “reading” could suggest that this 
re/viewing of Leonardo de Vinci’s21 Mona Lisa is a single artwork that stands on 
its own. However, we know that Duchamp was questioning the meaning of Art by 
drawing/painting in a mustache and goatee. In this instance, Duchamp’s piece also 
comments on the work of art, which, if his writings are an indication, he would 
say is never finished – similarly, a saying from composition courses puts this 
point explicitly: “the essay is not finished, but it is due.” However, for institutional 
writing, due, more often than not, means complete.
 Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. has become an accepted work of Art, and one 
that rhetoric/composition scholars, when looking to art for guidance, see as an 
inspiration or as a model of what the rhetorical turn to the figural might look like. 
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L.H.O.O.Q. resonates with current popular art trends toward remix, in the sense 
that it inserts a discrepancy and interrupts the expectations of spectators, at least 
when it was first made public. However, this remix does not only use the montage/
collage techniques found in cinema and music, but superimposes one image over 
another to create something new. Let me provide a manifestation of playful work 
using a now-antiquated technology: the overhead projector. On this projector we 
have a duplicate of de Vinci’s Mona Lisa shown on the screen behind us. 
 
 
Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa and Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q.
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A traditional art-criticism course, like the one I took while an undergraduate, 
would begin by contextualizing the image and providing some description and/or 
interpretation of the image – the slight, coy smile indicates a hidden secret. But 
this is not a traditional course. In this course, we have two blank transparencies. 
The first includes a mustache and a goatee that, when placed over our copy, mimics 
Duchamp’s remix – Mona Lisa has a mustache and goatee. We let this sit; we 
discuss the painting and what we would add. On the second transparency, students 
have decided that they would like to dye her hair pink and stretch her ear-piercings 
to a double-zero gauge (about an inch in diameter). We lay this transparency over 
Duchamp’s rendering of the Mona Lisa. What we have now resembles something 
akin to a portrait of a “punk” created through a playful approach to art, to writing 
and the figural while performing a critique from within the medium:22 
Re/Mix of Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q.
It’s time to move past Duchamp’s 
critique of art. See Kaprow’s essay, 
“Doctor MD” (Essays 127-129).
7
7
Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
 Still, the fear that this approach becomes “art for art’s sake” cannot be 
ignored since in most traditional writing courses “writing for writing’s sake” 
seems to be a common perception among writing students. For the writing 
classroom that continues to focus on traditional academic essays, a practice 
still common in most writing instruction, rhetoric and composition has little 
(obvious) personal and professional relevance and does not (always) address 
the changing environments in which writing takes place. The research paper 
assignment is due and therefore complete. Conversely, many (theorists) have 
recognized that writing takes many forms and is a cyclical process of theory/
practice. To write a research paper by trilogy (“thesis, antithesis, synthesis”) 
serves as a way to continue the method of acceptable/accepted writing (topoi), 
of argument, and modes of writing that do not account for alternate forms of 
writing open by new media. Re-imagined, writing might look like Duchamp’s 
L.H.O.O.Q. continued with a superimposition: invention accompanied by a sense 
of play, like the playful revisions of both Mona Lisa’s portraits. 
 Allan Kaprow argues for such an approach 
to “art” when he left the happenings behind,
calling it unart (see my chapter 3), which would 
step toward laughter23 by avoiding “all esthetic 
roles, give up all references to being artists of 
any kind whatever24 [and existing] only fleetingly 
as the nonartist, for when the profession of
art is discarded, the art category is meaningless,
or at least antique” (103-104). Discarding 
art as a category has been a motivation for the 
work that comics ‘artists’ have been developing 
since becoming disillusioned with the formal 
It’s time to move past 
Duchamp’s critique of art. 
It’s time to move past Duchamp’s 
critique of art. See Kaprow’s essay, 
“Doctor MD” (Essays 127-129).
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elements involved while learning to become artists – and so they’ve become 
unartists unconcerned with aesthetic roles and categories. As it applies to rhetoric/
composition, James Kochalka offers us a clue to how comics (as a form) conduct 
this work when he explains that “art is not a way of conveying information, it’s 
a way of understanding information. That is, creating art is a means we have of 
making sense of the world, focusing to make it clearer, not a way of communicating 
some understanding of the world that we already hold” (Cute 121), and it should 
“be accompanied by a sense of play,” which “is a heightened state of imaginative 
awareness that allows us to enter new realms of discovery […]. Play is our most 
important way of processing the information of experience […]. Play and art are the 
same thing!” (Cute 100-102; emphasis added). Here, Kochalka sees comics (form) 
as a way to address the “constant blinking techno vibrations that we bombard our 
senses” with in order to tune us in “with the cacophony of the instant” (Cute 40), by 
“feeling the rhythm within the cacophony” (Cute 41) and writing within that state.
 To re-begin, Spiegelman was able to make sense of his experiences on the day 
the WTC was attacked as he wrote/drew In the Shadow of No Towers. However, 
he may hesitate to say that that work accurately portrays how he felt and how 
he has continued to make sense of the attacks. Writing and art became ways of 
making sense of those events, but one that continues every time he remembers 
and re-arranges that event. In the Shadow of No Towers might look much different 
if Spiegelman were to attempt it a decade later instead of the three years he took 
to complete the project following the attacks. Spiegelman’s approach to comics 
presents a way of thinking and writing strangely by engaging (all) the available 
means of production. Comics can re-orient us to the division between image/text 
(and comics/cinema), all the while making differences apparent and inventive. 
Such an approach proposes an inventive view of comics that takes into account 
the superimposition of the figural and the textual toward postmodern writing 
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practices similar to the one that Italo Calvino describes “as the tendency to make 
ironic use of the stock images of the mass [new/digital] media, or to inject the taste 
for the marvelous inherited from literary tradition into narrative mechanisms 
that accentuate its alienation” (Six Memos 95); this (non)method corresponds “to 
what in philosophy is nonsystematic thought, which proceeds by aphorisms, by 
sudden, discontinuous flashes of light” (Six Memos 118). Calvino identifies this 
position as one involving internal memory, a sort of ‘mental cinema’25 at work 
in comics. He even works hyperrhetorically, inventing through difference in the 
midst of both image and text. Writing of his ‘reading’ as a small child, he refers 
to the images in comics that spurred stories before he could read the text. Even 
when he learned to read, “the advantage was minimal,” often “stabs in the dark [at 
meaning] like my own” (Six Memos 93) – a claim that breaks away from traditional 
views of comics as merely ‘visual novels.’  Instead, he adopted an “occupation of 
daydreaming within the pictures” (Six Memos 93-94) that allowed for “a process of 
abstraction, condensation, and interiorization of sense experience”26 (Six Memos 
95) – an associational logic of assembling fragmentary thoughts in new formations. 
Pedagogically, Calvino’s (non)method parallels Hawk’s hyperrhetorical method, 
invented for the occasion with unpredictable outcomes, and returning us to a 
sophistic ethos (Haynes) that would have us write as Plato’s sophist speaks: as 
Sophist(ic)s, as Strangers.
 Haynes appraises this pedagogical footpath as 
“[t]eaching the value of exploring something in the abstract, without practical 
purpose or intention, would return composition to its sophistic ethos (I 
dare not say roots). In other words, finding new touchstones means leaving 
touchstones behind. It mean plumbing the depths of abstraction. It means ob/
literating the ground” (“Writing Offshore” 715).  
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Sophistic ethos in this sense would unhinge itself from institutional grounds (with 
the various connotations, including the physical space and justification – “on these 
grounds, I argue”). When pedagogy becomes postpedagogy, it returns itself to its 
mobile (ped: foot – walking) origins by extracting itself from the fixed space/place 
of institutions. The term itself comes to us from the Greek word paidagogeo, where 
agogos means ‘to lead,’ and comes to the Greeks from the Sanskrit word ajati, 
meaning ‘drives, moving, active.’ In other words, postpedagogy walks the walk, 
talks the talk, and writes writing. It would be sophist(ic) in the Socratic sense: 
walking alongside each other as whatever singularities in order ‘to be such that it 
always matters’.27
chapter 3
art Interrupted
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Art interrupteD1
 
“…Surrealism saw in it the means of obtaining, most often 
under conditions of complete relaxation of the mind rather 
than complete concentration, certain incandescent flashes 
linking two elements of reality belonging to categories that 
are so far removed from each other that reason would fail to 
connect them and that require a momentary suspension of the 
critical attitude in order for them to be brought together.”
~ Andre Breton, “On Surrealism in its Living Works”
 
There may be no better “art” to illustrate our Stranger’s (comic/s) writing than Surrealism, a ‘movement’ whose participants took it upon themselves to 
speak without an authoritative voice, bearing witness to the strange occurrence 
of everyday life with the chance logic of dream-work.2  Beyond the denotative link 
between the two terms, the Stranger and Surrealism share a common bond in 
their desires to let the imagination run free, to manifest the un-manifested, as 
exemplified by Andre Breton’s perpetual revisions of a “Manifesto of Surrealism” 
(cf. Manifestos of Surrealism). The chance logics of this dream-work remain 
uncommon practice with new media, a part of how technology has been affecting 
the ways in which we think despite the moves we’ve been making toward 
‘multimodal’ composition. A new way of thinking about how to compose with the 
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available means new media provide presents itself in Blanchot’s view of surrealism, 
and specifically with how it connects with Kaprow’s (non)method called unart and 
its connection to Dick Higgins’ idiom of intermedia. To begin, Blanchot’s view of 
surrealism:
The surrealist experience [expérience] is the experience of experience, 
whether it seeks itself in a theoretical or practical form: an experience that 
deranges and deranges itself, disarranges as it unfolds and, in unfolding, 
interrupts itself. It is in this that surrealism – poetry itself – is the experience 
of thought itself. (Infinite 412)
The interruption Blanchot brings up here has to do with interrupting the totality 
of thought similar to the interruption of myths, as detailed by Jean-Luc Nancy, 
spoken and written as singularities exposing the limits of such totalities (The 
Inoperative Community). Surrealism, like the means offered in new media, 
attempts to affirm the experience of thought as life rather than as institutional. 
For example, Breton’s manifestations of surrealism were in continual flux having 
“nothing to do with any aesthetic criterion” (Manifestos 297), a move that Kaprow 
terms unart to indicate a move away from institutional perspectives on art. As 
Kaprow writes, the unartist “is the offspring of high art who has left home” (Essays 
230), and as such is engaged in the interruption of Art and the categories therein. 
I tend to sympathize with Kaprow’s unart due to its (indirect) link to rhetorical 
theory concerning writing with new media, and its reliance on what can now be 
called common art theories and practices – something I have also been guilty of 
proposing when speaking of comics.
 However, what comics suggests take a much different route, one much more 
closely related to unart than to art. As I’ll explain, like surrealism, unart has no 
8
4
Art Interrupted
concern for art categories or ‘aesthetic criteria’ of any sort, and those individuals 
we call ‘comics artists’ have (perhaps unknowingly) engaged in the unarting of art. 
One example comes from Chris Ware, a ‘comics artist’ famed for his experimental 
graphic novel Jimmy Corrigan: The Smartest Kid on Earth, among other works. 
Speaking of his personal and professional relationship to art (in third person), 
he taps into a common perspective among many of today’s well-known ‘comics 
artists’: “Though admittedly trained as an ‘artist,’ he never felt entirely at home 
in the generally approved setting, fashion, and didactic charter of that particular 
industry” (Acme Novelty Library 17, copyright page). Like Kaprow, Ware feels 
much more ‘at home’ in the strangeness of everyday life, in the surreal experience 
of thought itself, as it happens. However, in order to avoid a syllogistic fallacy – (1) 
Ware was disillusioned with his training as an ‘artist’; (2) Ware is a ‘comics artist’; 
(3) All ‘Comics artist’ are disillusioned with their training as ‘artists’ – this chapter 
works toward the view of a ‘comics form’ whose idiom (‘school of art’) is unart rather 
than Art – and therefore closer to the work rhetoric and composition engages with 
in terms of new media and multimedia. Toward this goal, I begin with an example 
coming out of Spiegelman’s alternative comics magazine RAW called The Narrative 
Corpse (TNC), a project that attempted to enact a surrealist parlor game – les corps 
exquisite – through comics.
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the nArrAtive corpse: it’s Alive! it’s Alive!3  
“The surreal may well seek to constitute for itself imaginary 
objects, indicate itself in the margins, discover itself close 
to the unwonted through what is stunning and fascinating. 
These indications still have no more than a distancing value: 
reminders of the unseemly whose law is not only to disorder 
the order of the appropriate, but also to be unable to suit itself, 
concern itself, or conform to itself by assuming a form.”
~ Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation
Over the course of five years, 69 ‘comics artists’ collaborated on TNC in response to a prompt by Spiegelman asking all involved to break out of their routine 
methods of producing comics. This experimental practice asked that artists draw 
three comics panels building on the previous three panels, but without seeing 
any of the panels that came beforehand. The project, as Spiegelman4 conceived of 
it, aimed to break “free from the constraints of rational thought” (2), a common 
trait among ‘comics artists.’ By emulating,5 and transforming, this surrealist 
parlor game,6 Spiegelman and friends extend Breton’s ‘surrealist manifestos’ into 
a method of invention that relies on chance arrangements, but with one rule: the 
main protagonist, a stick figure with a black head, will unify the narrative. But 
if we understand this stick figure as a metaphor for comics, what we find is a 
stranger’s work with a strange logic, the sort of logic that Derrida explains can be 
seen “as if […] the stranger could save the master and liberate the power of his 
host; it’s as if the master, qua master, were prisoner to his place and his power, of 
his ipseity, of his subjectivity (his subjectivity is hostage)” (Of Hospitality 123). By 
requiring each ‘comics artist’ to use the stick figure, he [the stick figure] works as 
a way to implore each of his hosts – which Derrida also translates as ‘strangers’ 
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– to work beyond their normal context(s) – building a full narrative through an 
uninterrupted progression (‘sequential art’). 
 What is particularly interesting about this practice, and how Spiegelman 
conceives it, is that this method attempts to break apart tendencies to work toward 
some aim that would limit what can be thought and written; in its place, the game 
unfolds as an interruption of a totalizing narrative by singular ‘voices.’ Brian 
Boyd, commenting on TNC, explains this method as a practice of “chance instead 
of design, caprice instead of rationality, crazy disjunction instead of continuity” 
(“Art and Evolution” 35) in which Spiegelman “deliberately chooses to entangle 
and interrogate intention when he denies the contributors […] access to any shared 
aim” (“Art and Evolution” 53). Surrealism appeals to Spiegelman for its strange 
way of writing, an attunement to the strange part of everyday life that allows 
writers and artists to release themselves from what Ware sees as the paradox of 
comics’ history of Art, including misdirected attempts to “insert comics into that 
dominant narrative” (Roeder, “Chris Ware” 65). Comics in general, and TNC in 
particular, are particularly interesting for their lack of concern for that dominant 
narrative – this lack of concern does not mean that they directly confront Art 
(history), but that they are much more like refugees from reason and Art. The 
surrealist approach to comics presented in TNC illustrates how this strange form 
of writing may be manifested under the conditions of a relaxed imagination (cf. 
Breton, Manifestos). 
 When thought of as a game, the narrative corpse gestures7 toward a manner 
of thinking and writing that attempts to strip itself of the rational and narrative 
logic of sequence and linearity – we can see this in Spiegelman’s editing notes that 
the editors of the work “ eventually cut the Savage Pencil strand after Jayr Pulga’s 
panels (which do not end the story on page 19), and used the Mark Beyer panels, 
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which followed those, to start our story” (2) – to point to other processes involved 
in writing strangely. In the first manifestation of Surrealism, Breton explains the 
purpose as an imaginative way of working that “offers me some intimation of what 
can be, and this is enough to remove to some slight degree the terrible injunction; 
enough, too, to allow me to devote myself to it without fear of making a mistake” 
(Manifestos 5). This last claim (‘without fear of making a mistake’) resonates with 
the guiding idea we find in the narrative corpse game, but that also appears in the 
work of ‘comics artists’ in general – this lack of fear also being a lack of concern 
for the demands of Art disciplines and their values.8  While it may seem odd that 
comics become linked with a now-recognized art movement, at least when viewing 
comics as a move away from art as such, this strangeness dissipates when we 
look to the underlying motivations of surrealist works to be surprised with the 
unexpected, which is another way of saying to proceed with a ‘playful imagination.’ 
Dali Atomicus by Salvador Dali (1948)
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 Much like the surrealist concern for life over art, comics’ move away from 
Art is much more attuned to Kaprow’s call for artists to unart themselves, “to 
give up any references to being artists of any kind whatever” (103), a task that 
has been underway within comics and surrealism since their inceptions, but 
one that has been absent from many of the avant-garde theories in rhetoric and 
composition concerning multimedia writing – a problematic term in itself. Unart 
and its association with Dick Higgins’ concept of intermedia seems to be much more 
attuned to the work of rhetoric and composition for reasons that should become 
apparent throughout this chapter. Like ‘comics artists’ – those trained as artists, 
but who have left their ‘homes’ – the practice of unarting ourselves asks us to blur 
the boundaries between art and life by working 
in the “playground for experimental art [called]
ordinary life” in such a way that it does not 
“possess a secret artistry in deep disguise,” 
but is found in “not knowing what to call it at 
any time” (Kaprow, Essays 248-249). The experience 
of this surrealist work, as Blanchot describes it, 
is the experience of thought itself as the productive 
force of imagination,9 a method of chance. Comics 
fit Kaprow’s unart remarkably well considering the lack of a fixed definition 
of what constitutes a comic, but also because it offers up a form of proceeding  
with the chance operations – most visible in TNC –  always already present in 
everyday life. And for  rhetoric and composition, comics offer a way of thinking 
about how to proceed in developing a strange and  imaginative writing with/in new 
media (digital)  environments as avant-garde artists proceed to  something else when a 
form of Art becomes fixed,  especially considering our lack of formal Art training. 
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 But this lack of training in Art has not stopped rhetorical theories and 
practices from incorporating these alternate methods and processes of writing 
into what is now being called postpedagogy – in essence, a pedagogy with avant-
garde sensibilities. What we can learn from the methods of the avant-garde 
methods taking hold in rhetoric and composition is a desire to attend to daily life 
in the sense of Kaprow’s unart10 and in Lyotard’s desire for a writing stripped of 
determining criteria. Unart would interrupt rhetoric and composition’s use of Art 
to move closer to the sort of ‘art’ that Nietzsche petitions for in The Gay Science: 
“if we convalescents still need art, it is another kind of art – a mocking, light, 
fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a pure flame, licks 
into unclouded skies! […] Oh, how we now learn to forget well, and to be good at 
not knowing, as artists” (37) so that we may become “the poets of our life – first 
of all in the smallest, most everyday matters” (240). Stripped of the categorical 
identifications with other ‘arts,’ the comics form presents us with this other kind 
of art, this unart, precisely because the ‘artists’ who have taken up the form were 
more concerned with ‘ordinary life’ than with the training they received in the 
categories of Art. To put it briefly, when unartists leave their ‘homes,’ they leave 
in order to walk through life as strangers, writing and producing imaginative 
artifacts that may or may not be ‘art’ – there’s no way to know since the criteria 
for making such judgments have not yet been formed. As it relates to comics, TNC 
demonstrates the versatility of comics and ‘artists’ that have left their homes in 
order to produce artifacts whose identity as art is uncertain due to its surreality 
(its strangeness). In what remains of this chapter, I work to explicate the ways 
in which the unart of comics performs this strange writing and how it relates to 
writing (with) new media.
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 un/Arting comics
“Reality, however, is not story-shaped, and the eruptions 
of the odd into our lives are not story-shaped either. They 
do not end in entirely satisfactory ways. Recounting the 
strange is like telling one’s dreams: one can communicate 
the events of a dream but not the emotional content, the 
way that a dream can color one’s entire day.”
~ Neil Gaiman, “The Flints of Memory Lane”
Chris Ware once wrote: “Artists, it is well known, are strange people” (Acme Novelty Library 18). And there is no stranger artist than those who work with the comics 
form. I mean, what other sort of artist would take such a strange surreal parlor game 
as the exquisite corpse and try to make it stranger? Only a ‘comics artist’ attempting 
to break the form out of its complacency as a fixed medium could conceive of this a 
project, the experience of performing such a project extending beyond traditional 
conceptualizations of what it means to be a ‘comics artist.’ The link between a 
surrealism contented to do whatever it is that they ‘do’ and a comics form that engages 
in the experience of thought itself as it puts that thought to work in producing what 
could only be called a ‘mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled’ art gives rise to the 
view that  “‘their work is their reward,’ and that excessive capital pollutes its purity, or 
something like that” (Ware, Acme Novelty Library 18). But this ‘purity’ is only ‘pure’ to 
the extent that it is strange – the ‘something like that’ – and that this work, untroubled 
by excessive politics, allows the productive force called imagination (cf. Derrida, 
Archeology 76) to exceed a politics lacking in foresight. 
 Speaking of TNC, Brian Boyd acknowledges the strangeness of comics as a 
playful form and that “Spiegelman plays with multiple patterns, dramatic, visual, 
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verbal: with verbal allusion, and with repetition, anaphora, syntactic parallelism, 
metaphor, cliché, antithesis and pun” (“Art and Evolution” 47).11  Of the elements 
that Boyd notes in TNC, the most important one for addressing writing as 
strangely imaginative is the ‘pun,’ the joke or witticism that breaks from the 
patterns of sequentiality – beyond (conscious) reasoning12  – because it [the pun] 
incorporates each of the other elements. Gregory Ulmer explains it thus:
The pun, which simulates in writing the effect of intuition (the convergence of 
emotional sets), may be visual as well as verbal. As Ronald Schleiffer reminds 
us, the pun is one of the most basic linguistic units for creating redundancies, the 
condition that gives rise in experience to a feeling of eureka. (Heuretics 228)
For comics, the pun simulates the effect of intuition through the interrelatedness of the 
visual and verbal, and in writing this simulated-intuition the pun moves us into the 
practices of everyday life characterized as an imaginative ‘politics’ rather than as an 
‘art.’13  In addition to simulating in writing the effect of intuition, the pun functions as 
a device for interrupting the closure of linear (or sequentiality, if you prefer) reasoning 
by fragmenting the cohesive narration of the work.14 Like Allan Kaprow’s unart, the 
pun in comics works by a process where “we add, by imagination and interpretation, to 
what we do” to render “meaning” variable, unfixed, and inventive (Essays 239).
For example, the internet meme LOLcats 
has been popularized by its effective 
use of  the pun, including misspellings. 
Applying such a method to Rhetoric and 
Composition, and art could be shown 
by playing on Steve Katz’s name and his 
interest in the Rhetorics of Science. Like 
Schrodinger’s cat, you never know what you’ll 
see when you open up an article by Katz.
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 But this aspect of punning presents itself in more than just the works that 
‘comics artists’ produce; it also appears in the methods these strange writers take 
on in their daily lives. Ware details this post-process in a roundabout way when he 
writes of ‘comics artists’ in the third-person singular: 
…his job complete at one locale, he would immediately move on to the next 
outlet, asking only for a bit of bread, or a bowl of broth, or some such ‘non-
polluting’ recompense. Also, this artist could really have not charged much 
of anything at all, otherwise his work would not have been so faultlessly 
universal…. (Acme Novelty Library 18) 
Let me attempt clarity: the ‘faultless universality’ of the (art)work that the ‘comics 
artist’ produces is performed as life. And the performance of life here does not exist 
in a single medium, but with a variety of media – hence, ‘moving on to the next 
outlet.’ The interruption of ‘Art’ that ‘comics’ artists’ put into practice implies a lack 
of fixity in what constitutes writing, but also in the modes of imaginative production 
employed in making those artifacts. 
 At this point, the link between ‘comics artists’ to unartists opens up explicitly 
through the fleeting employ-ment of various media all at once. As Kaprow 
defines it, an unartist is “one who is engaged in changing jobs, in modernizing” 
(Essays 104), proceeding fluidly across – no! – between media (intermedia) with 
a “simultaneity of roles” that thinks “all at once, or nonhierarchically” as “the 
intermedialist does” naturally (Essays 105); the unartist’s approach to media – that 
is, digital technology – is that of the pun, of the playful use of technology. Like the 
comics artist, the intermedialist plays between established media, or art traditional 
disciplines, in order to suggest other ways of writing that remain unconcerned 
with formal categories of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ work. In doing away with 
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categories, unart also leads to a re-thinking of current trends toward multimodal 
composition, where “multi” indicates a combination of media (“mixed media”) rather 
than how we may play between media forms.
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 Writing for The Institute of the Future of the Book, Dan Visel presents the 
(unimaginative) problem of ‘multimedia’ composition:
“Multimedia” is something that comes up all the time when we’re talking 
about what computers do to reading. The concept is simple: you take a book 
& you add pictures and sound clips and movies. To me it’s always suggested 
an assemblage of different kinds of media with a rubber band – the computer 
program or the webpage – around them, an assemblage that usually doesn’t 
work as a whole because the elements comprising it are too disparate. 
(“multimedia vs intermedia”)
Let me rephrase Visel’s comments as it relates to this project: ‘mulitmedia’ does 
nothing to interrupt the categories constituting established media or art disciplines 
since it merely presents them in juxtaposition rather than integrating them in 
a Lyotardian approach to writing by superimposition. Instead, Visel suggests 
something more akin to the work that comics and unartists produce in the idiom of 
intermedia:
Dick Higgins’s (incomplete) intermedia 
chart. The “?”s imply that there is still a 
lot to learn about the unartists approach 
to working with new media to create 
innovative forms of  writing and ‘art.’
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[Dick] Higgins’s intermedia is a more appealing idea: something that falls 
in between forms is more likely to bear scrutiny as a unified object than a 
collection of objects. The simple equation text + pictures (the simplest and 
most common way we think about multimedia) is less interesting to me than 
a unified whole that falls between text and pictures. When you have text + 
pictures, it’s all too easy to criticize the text and pictures separately: this 
picture compared to all other possible pictures invariably suffered, just as 
this text compared to all other possible texts must suffer. Put in other terms, 
it’s a design failure. (“multimedia vs intermedia”)
To put it simply, the idiom of intermedia finds a correlation to the work that ‘comics 
artists’ find in their ways of fusing media into a whole that, through these links, 
interrupts understanding where a single medium seems to exist as an autonomous 
paradigm of possibilities. The conceptual fusing of two or more media into an 
intermedial work also implies the simultaneity of roles unartists engage when 
writing in imaginative ways – a writer is no longer one who only produces essays, 
but essays and images, (graphic) designs and (video) games, music and videos. Put 
in Visel’s ‘other terms,’ intermedia works to undo the design failures of ‘multimodal’ 
work that relies on fixed categories. In part, this is why the image/text binary – or 
better yet, reduction – of comics fails to emerge as anything more than another 
iteration of previously written texts. The idea of comics, at least as conceived in this 
project, can be better understood as the fusion of media into (strangely) imaginative 
works, especially if we can understand the post-process of a ‘comics artists’ as an 
oscillation between forms of media fused with a propensity for life rather than Art.
 Craig Saper’s framing of intermedia may better elucidate the relevance for 
rhetoric and composition, at least insofar as rhetoric has to do with ‘the available means,’ 
including the available means of interrupting persuasion. He writes: “[u]nlike all the 
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other arts, including film and literature, this new art, intensified by access to the 
Internet, is not defined by any medium’s form. It is not a thing like a painting, 
printed poem, or film. It is a situation: networked art” (Networked Art ix; emphasis 
added). While Saper is not directly speaking of intermedia, the situation of the 
work he presents as ‘networked art’ underlies an intermedial approach that echoes 
one of the guiding theories in Breton’s surrealism: “linking two elements of reality 
belonging to categories that are so far removed from each other that reason would 
fail to connect them” (Manifestos 302). Where reason fails, imagination succeeds. 
Like Lyotard’s phrases in dispute,15 intermedia acknowledges the need to link 
media, but how to link is contingent. This “how” is the home of reason, but the 
unartists usually referred to as ‘comics artists’ have left this home, preferring 
instead to add new links by an imaginative interpretation – what Friedrich Kittler 
calls post-hermeneutics.
The Philosoraptor, the philosophical genus 
of  the velociraptor (from such hits 
at Jurraisic Park (parts 1-3)), ponders 
questions concerning life, the universe, and 
everything (according to unsubstantiated 
rumors, Douglas Adams stole the title 
from the Philosophator). With his 
aggresive debate (argumentative) stlye, the 
Philosophator offers us quick rhetorical 
questions and answers. 
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post-hermeneutics
 
“Artists regularly cross the supposed boundaries between media 
and even the link of ‘appropriateness’ for art. Even museum art no 
longer attempts to encourage catharsis or transcendence, nor does 
it permit easy classification as painting, sculpture, or theater.”
~ Craig Saper, Networked Art
Rather than thinking as usual, the Stranger’s surrealist writing has no direct interest in producing a unified whole; thinking and writing strangely, the 
Stranger affirms a proliferation of meanings and understandings that may or 
may not be contradictory as thoughts ‘happen’ before he can think about them.16 
Blanchot puts it well:
Surrealism – “it should come as no surprise” – thus encounters writing, 
and through this encounter denies itself. But this is a writing of another 
kind. That the first “purely surrealist” attestation was produced in a kind 
of anonymous fashion through a double movement of writing that has no 
other aim than a freeing of the space (the magnetic field) that was affirmed 
by so-called automatic writing […]. Automatic writing, a writing freed from 
the logic of logos, refusing everything that puts it to work and that makes it 
available to a work, is the very proximity of thought […]. (Infinite 410)
Logos, in the way Blanchot uses the term, has to do with the logic of reason, of 
interpretations that propose a unified whole, while this other kind of writing, 
with its double movement, opens a space to affirm other, perhaps contradictory, 
interpretations that happen before they are able to be reasoned – that is, deduced 
or induced. This is an interpretation, a hermeneutics, of another kind. It is a 
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loosening of the constraints imposed by a hermeneutics that looks to systematize 
how interpretation proceeds,17 and in this loosening, a post-hermeneutics happens 
intuitively (e.g., as a pun, as an interruption).
 In the “Foreword” to Discourse Networks 1800/1900, David Wellbery 
summarizes Kittler’s post-hermeneutic readings as an abandonment of “the 
language game and form of life defined by the hermeneutic canons of justification 
and enters into domains of inquiry inaccessible to acts of appropriative 
understanding. Post-hermeneutic criticism, to put the matter briefly, stops making 
sense” (ix). Yet, in the interruption of making sense, post-hermeneutics opens the 
potentialities and possibilities in the sense of nonsense, at least in the sense that 
its logic knows no exclusion – it makes it own sense. That is, the sense of nonsense, 
like intuitive and imaginative work, keeps its manner of making sense mysterious 
– simultaneously unknown and strange.18 How this nonsense abandons the canons 
of justification – argumentation – can be found in the associational logics of puns 
that see methods of linking as always already contingent. In a nutshell, the post-
hermeneutic abandonment of the hermeneutic canons of justification emerges 
not as an elimination of interpretation – even if it were possible to do so19 – but 
as what, in Surrealism, Blanchot calls “a strange plurality” (Infinite 408), an 
affirmation perpetually plural and multiple” (Infinite 409). 
<
The Penrose Triangle would 
offer more possibilities than the 
Rhetorial Triangle. Sorry, Aristotle.
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 To a certain extent, post-hermeneutics correlates to what John Caputo calls 
“radical hermeneutics” in his book by the same name. The link I see between 
Caputo’s “radical hermeneutics” and Wellbery’s post-hermeneutics can elucidate 
the necessity of abandoning the justification-game in light of the “National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” report addressing the 
events of September 11, 2001. As Caputo writes, radical hermeneutics arises “at 
the point of the breakdown and loss of meaning, the withdrawal and dissemination 
of meaning” and it deals “with this loss of meaning by confronting the meaning of 
the loss, of the withdrawal, of the lethe itself” – here, Caputo defines lethe as “the 
concealed heart of a-letheia, the mystery which withdraws, which never hands 
itself over in a form we can trust” (Radical 271). If there is anything that “The 
9/11 Commission Report” teaches us, it is that we are in need of confronting the 
breakdowns and losses of meaning more than we are in need of confronting the 
stabilization of meaning in forms we cannot trust. In militaristic terms, we need 
to stop ‘sticking to our guns,’ to our firm convictions about meaning(s), and to the 
canons of justification, since that will only serve to put us in “greater danger” and 
threaten the play of imagination.
 By moving away from desires to justify and build meaning, post-hermeneutics 
encounter what Bill Readings, working out of Lyotard, calls a sublime politics that 
attempts “to subject politics to the radical indeterminacy” (“Sublime Politics” 411), 
that has us speak even though “we do not know exactly why or to whom” (“Sublime 
Politics” 420). This sublime politics would be akin to the needs for an imaginative 
politics, but one that would avoid its bureaucratization. The desire to bureaucratize 
the imagination would be more akin to ‘a politics of the sublime’ that “could only be 
terror” (Lyotard, Postmodern Explained 71). Politicizing the sublime, subjecting it 
to a uniform law, remains suspect in a sublime politics because such laws attempt 
to identify and define appropriat(iv)e understandings of totalizing thought, of a 
1
0
0
Art Interrupted
representative determinacy. Put another way, a sublime politics proposes that 
fixed rules and criteria (hermeneutics), and those who perpetuate them, are 
always suspect since any attempt to fix these rules and criteria can only lead to 
terror, “insofar as the political theorist, the state, or society claims to determine 
what justice is, to derive political prescriptions in reference to a describable 
state of affairs” (Readings, Introducing 113). In place of what Thomas Kent calls 
hermeneutical terror,20 a sublime politics dispenses with the desire for consensus 
(a ‘master narrative’) – a feature of argumentative writing – and espouses a post-
hermeneutics of dissensus, of strange pluralities and multiplicities of thought and 
meaning.
 To see how this works in relation to comics, as conceived in this project, 
the idiom – the term McCloud uses to indicate a “school of art” – of intermedia 
discussed earlier provides a clue. Higgins’ move toward intermedia and Kaprow’s 
toward unart highlight the move beyond hermeneutics in a way that can address 
the troubling ‘failure of imagination’ in today’s institutions and institutional 
practices. Like Readings and Kent, Higgins and Kaprow are more concerned 
with opening new media to realms of becoming (dissensus) rather than identity 
(consensus).21  By way of explanation, Higgins argues:
Through developing our own hermeneutic concepts, we can find ourselves 
in history and other areas of culture as well as art, can tune into the shifts 
to which we can become more sensitive by balancing our focus on our own 
horizons, those from the past and any others we can find in the middle. 
(Modernism 21; emphasis added)
Hermeneutics, in this sense, communicates dubiously. It is a process, a becoming 
of interpretation that communicates with the unknown by throwing a message out 
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into the void.22 The indeterminacy of this sort of process offers opportunities for 
imaginative inventions that open up in the production of its works. To be blunt, 
imagination is both the process by which these imaginative works emerge and the 
idiom of unart called intermedia.
 This is perhaps one of the least underdeveloped aspects of postmodernist 
writing – the role of imagination as sublime art, or unart. From Kant, Derrida lays 
out this claim emphatically: “the imagination was already in itself an ‘art,’ was 
art itself […]. It is art, certainly, but a ‘hidden art’ that cannot be ‘revealed to the 
eyes’” and it “is the freedom that reveals itself only in its works” even though they 
“do not exist within nature, but neither do they inhabit a world other than ours” 
(Writing and Difference 7). The place of this unart, if there is such a place, then 
reveals itself through associational logics that have always already abandoned 
the language-games of justification in favor of intuitive linkages that then become 
ways of writing and invention through assemblage – in some way associated with a 
rhetorical canon of organization, but without any intentions to develop a consensus 
concerning meaning. And with these assemblages, imagination reveals itself in the 
assemblages that would otherwise remain hidden by setting out to find meanings 
not found in the image itself.23
I found this fragment on a bathroom wall, 
a place where a variety of  different images 
and writings are assembled without regard 
for justification. A “form of  art” that has no 
concern for justification, but is thrown out 
into the void.
1
0
2
Art Interrupted
 How any of this relates to comics can be found in the work of another ‘comics artist’ 
involved in TNC: Robert Crumb. In an interview with Ted Widner for The Paris Review, 
Crumb illustrates how such a post-hermeneutic manner of writing may begin with “…an 
idea for a story based on one drawing in a sketchbook—sometimes a story, or a character, 
or an idea starts as a mood, an atmosphere, a feeling” that works itself out “intuitively” 
(“The Art of Comics” 55). And for those familiar with the documentary Crumb, we know 
that these moods, atmospheres, feelings happen while he wanders around Paris (and 
elsewhere) – à la Walter Benjamin24 – and attends to those elements of (daily) life that 
often go unnoticed. The stories he spins, the moods worked out intuitively, attempt to sort 
out the breakdowns of meaning through a strange and mysterious process that can only be 
figured out – revealed – through its works. In addition, since these works unfold  intuitively 
by way of a mood, an atmosphere, a feeling, they are not subjected to any hermeneutic 
paradigm; as such, they are also not determined to any specific medium, but allow the 
possibilities of working between media and hermeneutic paradigms since no need exists to 
“have a deep, profound meaning” (Crumb, “The Art of Comics” 55). As such, comics can be 
thought of as bricolage (cf. Derrida; Lévi-Strauss) – work produced with whatever happens 
to be at-hand and with indeterminate associational 
logics. In other words, a comic(s) form of writing, 
like that of post-hermeneutics, unart, and 
intermedia, emerges as a fragmentary writing 
that proceeds in a manner similar to the (strange) 
surrealist (non)method of automatic writing free 
from the logos of reason – an intuitive writing of 
the pun, of the interruption. An automatic 
writing that presents itself as a figmentation – a 
portmanteau of “figment” and “imagination” 
indicating a mere product-tion of imagination 
– as fragments of thought. It’s like an amusement park.
1
0
3
Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
frAgmentAry writing: writing of the figment(s)
“The imagination creates another nature, which has to do not with 
thinking by concept but with the derivatives connected with the 
concepts […] the constituent elements of which are not attributed 
to it logically, but are nevertheless ‘(aesthetic) attributes.’”
~ Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime
Fragmentary writing, as Blanchot characterizes it, is a game of chance. The parlor games that the surreal (un)artists referenced earlier – Breton, Crumb, 
Higgins, Kaprow, Spiegelman, and Ware – are found in interruptions that 
open themselves to pluralities of thought. The future of surrealism, as found in 
comics, approaches what Blanchot explains as an “exigency of plurality escaping 
unification and extending beyond the whole (while at the same time presupposing 
it, demanding its realization), untiringly maintaining, in the face of the Unique, 
contradiction and rupture” (Infinite 409). Dissensus rather than consensus: 
contradicting and rupturing the unification that, as Blanchot’s estimation of the 
disaster, ruins meaning while leaving it intact. The fragmentary, as seen here, 
plays a game without rules. The game: the interruption of the incessant, where 
affirming the interruption offers an opening that breaks from unity. So, when 
Blanchot writes that fragmentary writing is “risk itself” (Writing 21; 59), it’s a 
risk of a thought without unity or rules, thought estranged25 from the unity of 
appropriat(iv)e understanding(s) that it interrupts. Fragmentary writing, like 
surrealism, would then also “seek to constitute for itself imaginary objects, indicate 
itself in the margins” (Infinite 418-419). In other words, the risk of fragmentary 
writing is the opening of potentiality itself, the inherent possibility for its coming 
into being as presented through an intuitive post-process of figmentation.
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 Yet, it would be a mistake to think of fragmentary writing as a categorical 
genre of writing – Blanchot has no concern for categories of genres. Part of the 
risk involved in the fragmentary has to do with venturing into the unknown, the 
unimaginable that needs to be imagined, with ‘unworking’ the work of unification. 
Fragmentary writing, then, as Blanchot explains, can be thought of as “the insane 
game, the indeterminacy that lies between reason and unreason” (Infinite 424). 
Much like Kaprow’s unart, the unworking of the Work – the “absolute of voice and 
of writing” – encounters a “double game: necessity, chance” (Blanchot, Infinite 
428). To write this unworking would not be to fragment the Work – to critique the 
Work – but rather to address those aspects of the work that remain set aside in the 
demand for unity. The idea here has to do with thinking in terms of context rather 
than in terms of category, specifically where context escapes reproducibility, and 
instead offers “fragments for the future to puzzle over” (Beitchman, “Fragmentary 
Word” 59). It is this puzzlement that we need to foster through a writing of chance.
 We can see the fragmentary at work in TNC in each 3-panel set and through 
the stick figure – endearingly named “Sticky” – who appears in each set as a ‘spark’ for 
imaginative production. And it is this spark that correlates to what Breton saw as 
…the means of obtaining, most often under the conditions of a complete 
relaxation of the mind rather than complete concentration, certain 
incandescent flashes of linking two elements of reality belonging to categories 
that are so far removed from each other that reason would fail to connect 
them and that require a momentary suspension of the critical attitude in 
order for them to be brought together. (Manifestos 302; emphasis added)
These flash moments26 of linking ‘often’ take place within imaginative realms of thought 
that have no need for categories to explore the possibilities of linking.  For TNC, Sticky 
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works as the means for these flashes, a fragment that sparks each ‘comics artist’s’ 
imagination to produce another fragment in the margins of the whole.  For comics in 
general, the means that spark these flashes open up in moods, atmospheres and feelings of 
the unexpected and offered as exigencies27 for productions of the imagination. 
 Like Sticky, and TNC as a (non)whole, this fragmentary writing produces novelties – 
something new that excites imagination only for a short time – which Ware also recognizes 
as the roles of comics (novelties), as we see in his mock business: The Acme Novelty 
Library. As the play of novelties, fragmentary writing (as seen in comics) moves us toward 
unart and a process of un-arting ourselves as a play of limits that has no limitation (e.g., 
the limitation of argumentative writing). Speaking along similar lines of thought about 
art as Blanchot, Kaprow, and Lyotard, art historian/critic Jerzy Ludwinski explains that 
“novelty in art is the measure of the artist’s imagination” (Notes 110). But this measure is 
not in inches, feet, yards, or miles (or seconds, minutes, hours, days or years); rather, the 
measure is the one that Cynthia Haynes has told me about: it’s the length of string that 
depends upon the size of the package that needs to be wrapped. The form and style of this 
package has no bearing on the length of string since “it [the package] is a whole complex of 
artistic phenomenon seen in their variety” (Ludwinski, Notes 117). 
The webcomic XKCD offers a summary 
of  a possible ‘string theory.’
URL: http://xkcd.com/171/
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 Given as a gift, we open this package and discover its contents: comics. Opened, 
comics remain open: unart. For Ludwinski, “the art of the future [is] unexpectedly 
simple: art of the future [is] every art imaginable, both traditional and the most 
current art” (Notes 115). And Strangely enough, he discusses this ‘future’ in the “form 
of a comic strip” (Notes 115). Comics, as a gift, are given as a fragmentary forms 
hospitable to all of the varieties of artistic experience as they are presented through the 
imagination. While comics work with ‘every art imaginable,’ they have no commitment 
to any singe form, but are configured in a plurality of ‘fragmentations’ that play at the 
limits of art without limitation. This is, after all, how Spiegelman was able to make 
sense of the events of September 11, 2001 through comics. As he writes: 
Each of the strips was a condensed journal entry of my month in the shadow of 
no towers and I allowed the shape to be whatever it was going to take. But I did 
acknowledge that the work had urgency without thinking of the work as making any 
bid for posterity. The strips were made in the spirit of the work that takes place in 
the second part of the book, the early comics. They weren’t made for some ostensible 
future. They were made for a specific moment. (“A Novel Graphic” 110)
The specific moment, the exigency, presents itself as an unknown future that  
fragmentary writing allows us to discover, and the shape of the work cannot be 
known as a whole. For Spiegelman, the fragmentary appears when nothing is 
left to say, but that maintains an urgency for thinking in relation to the moment 
of thinking, allowing it to take form as needed – ‘without thinking in terms of 
posterity.’ The early comics he refers to, appearing in daily newspapers, were 
ephemeral artifacts offered as fragments, addressing the uncertainty of the future.
 In each moment, the fragmentary adapts itself as necessary to the available 
means, but without the intention of persuasion; rather, it interrupts persuasive 
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intentions. Blanchot put it best when he wrote that the “fragmentary expresses 
itself best […] in a language that does not recognize it. Fragmentary: meaning 
neither the fragment, part of the whole, nor the fragmentary in itself” (Step Not 
Beyond 43). After the whole (of art) has been written, the fragmentary takes place 
in the beyond (of art) – the (unexpectedly) simple form that integrates ‘any art 
imaginable.’ Comics, as such a form, present the fragmentary since the “terrible 
explosion took place” and “the model of art ceased to exist” (Ludwinski, Notes 90). 
But the explosion of the ‘model of art’ reveals something else: that there exists a 
plurality in art (sans art (unart)). In Blanchot’s words, the fragmentary “would 
never be ‘pure,’ but, on the contrary, profoundly altered, with an alteration that 
could not be defined (arrested) in regard to a norm” (Step Not Beyond 42). Writing, 
then, is not conferred a position of authority, but risks its own legitimacy in 
relation to the whole since it does not recognize the law (of art) – definition – as 
its guiding principle.28  Without a definition in regard to a norm, the fragmentary 
breaks from the whole of art by giving up those references in their entireties, and 
it “will need,” as Kaprow writes, “an updated language to refer to what is going 
on” (Essays 107) since the current language does not recognize the work of the 
fragmentary.29  Much like the readymade, the fragmentary abandons itself to the 
impossibility of conforming to the law and language of art.30
Banksy illustrates Sticky’s move away 
from “Art” authorities. 
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 This impossibility opens a space where the interruption of the unartist 
begins, imprinted with another way of thinking, writing, and producing art-ifacts. 
The unartist puts the fragmentary to work 
…as the seeking of a new form of writing that would render the finished work 
problematic. Problematic not because it refuses accomplishment, but because 
it explores with an inexorable rigor – beyond the conception of the work as 
something unified and closed upon itself, as organizing and dominating the 
values transmitted by a traditional already established and attained – the 
infinite space of the work, though with a new postulate: namely, that the 
relations of this space will not necessarily satisfy the concepts of unity, totality, 
or continuity. The problem the work of the fragment poses is a problem of 
extreme maturity: first of the artist, and also of society.” (Blanchot, Infinite 348)
A new form of writing sought in the unworking 31 posed by the fragmentary: 
intermedia. And it is this unworking that we see at work in TNC – particularly, 
the unworking of (comics) art as unified, total, and continuous, which indicates a 
move not only beyond Art, but also beyond the conception of the work of (comics) 
art as something closed upon itself. The rigorous exploration that characterizes 
the fragmentary, with an “I prefer not to” refusal of accomplishment, writing 
would no longer concern itself with argument, unity, or totality, approaches that 
close upon themselves. This writing would not be that of composing a work, but 
of the interruption of unworking composition (un/composing) that would render 
impossibilities possible.32
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un/composing (visuAl) rhetorics
 “To write is to produce the absence of the work (worklessness, 
unworking [désoeuvrement]). Or again: writing is the absence 
of the work as it produces itself through the work, traversing 
it throughout. Writing as unworking (in the active sense of 
the word) is the insane game, the indeterminacy that lies 
between reason and unreason.”
~ Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation 
Between reason and unreason is where we now find our Stranger, and his strange approach to writing that incorporates any and all of the available 
media, regardless of the traditional divisions separating those media. He begins 
by un/working writing through the performance of composing, begetting the 
infancy of writing as if it were only coming into being at the very moment of 
writing. In composing this work by a singular process of unworking, he can 
begin to make sense of all the nonsense surrounding him and his environment. 
His logos is not made in his own image since he does not yet know that image; 
it is through composing that image that he comes to discover his own fleeting 
place. It is in this image that we can begin to see the un/working of composition’s 
perspective of a given rhetorical situation.1  To un/compose would be to write 
without intention in order to subvert the bureaucratization of the imagination that 
writes by way of argument/ation. Carrying out one possibility at the expense of 
exploring others, as Kenneth Burke informs us, is to be positioned in the “realities 
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of a social texture, in all the complexity of language and habits, in the property 
relationships, the methods of government, production and distribution, and in the 
development of rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis” (Attitudes 225); as an 
alternate “formula,” Burke suggests that we use a conceptual methodology he calls 
“perspective by incongruity” (Attitudes 228).2  Through this methodology, we can 
begin to un/compose our approaches to doing the work of rhetoric and composition, 
or what Blanchot refers to as the unwork that takes place between reason and 
unreason.
 Building on the discussion of puns in the previous chapter, Burke describes 
his “perspective by incongruity” methodology as carrying “the same kind of 
enterprise in linking hitherto unlinked words by rational criteria instead of 
tonal criteria” (Attitudes 309). However, unlike Burke, the focus of this chapter 
addresses how this methodology can be extended to the figural and to composition’s 
turn toward intermedial composition. A key concept in Burke’s methodology is 
that of the casuistic stretch, of un/composing words (and now images) from their 
“‘constitutional’ setting” (Attitudes 309). Both of these concepts (when re-framed 
from Burke’s Chapter title “Dictionary of Pivotal Terms”) translate to ways of 
seeing strangely, and specifically to how the digital age has moved us into a theory 
of civic discourse that departs from common readings of Aristotle’s On Rhetoric. In 
essence, linking tones and words not normally linked presents us with something 
of a quandary—an uncertainty of how these strange links are produced and what 
they mean in whatever contexts they arise. It is this uncertainty of our Stranger(s)—
and their strange ways of seeing—that remains unknown, and that must remain in 
unknown if it is to confront the bureaucratization of the imagination, opening our 
archive(s) to the infinite possibilities of linking. Without such an archive, we 
subject ourselves to the sort of bureaucracy that will keep us from realizing our 
potential and the potentialities of knowing, doing, and making artifacts apart 
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from the “business as usual” model that remains central to contemporary civic 
discourse.3 
 How un/artists are connected to civic discourse can be found in some of the 
opening remarks that Aristotle makes in On Rhetoric: “…rhetoric is a certain 
kind of offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and of ethical studies (which is just to call 
politics)” (39). For the purposes of this chapter, offshoot is the key word, implying 
that a rhetorician has been trained in dialectical methods, and in theories and 
practices of ethics/politics, but has departed from those discourses. However, to 
draw a direct connection between rhetoric and persuasion may not be the best 
approach to thinking (and writing) in the polis. As an offshoot, rhetoric exceeds 
traditional argument (persuasion) and ethics/politics while engaging with each 
in other arenas and by other (available) means. The most significant element 
that makes un/artists offshoots is that they abandon the discourse (science) of 
civics in favor of taking an active part in creating a strange(r) citizenship that 
points out the incongruities they’ve observed in assembling their art/ifacts. These 
observations occur through one’s own devices regardless of conventional use, and 
suggest that there are other, imaginative ways of composing the polis. Aristotle 
echoes this point in Book 3 of On Rhetoric when he writes that to “deviate [from 
prevailing usage] makes language seem more elevated; for people feel the same in 
regard to word usage as they do in regard to strangers compared to citizens. As a 
result, one should make the language unfamiliar; for people are admirers of what 
is far off, and what is marvelous is sweet” (198). Where Aristotle’s citizen thinks 
that it “is strange if we think we do not have to obey laws whenever they are not 
rightly framed and those who made them erred” (Rhetoric 107), our Stranger has 
no qualms about disobeying these laws and working outside the law.4  Still, the 
Stranger need not always be strange; sometimes “truth” is stranger than fiction.5 
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strAnge figurAtions
 “The eye is ready for the pictorial gesture, prepared for 
what cannot be anticipated: the event. This is not because 
the gesture would erupt unexpectedly. On the contrary, it 
would have been expected and ardently wished for. But it is 
an event in that the subject giving birth to it does not know, 
cannot analyse and does not control.”
~Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Anamnesis of the Visible”
It is not my wish to con-figure or re-con-figure the un-working of composition and/or rhetoric; rather, I prefer to un/configure this work, exploring the meanings 
of the immediate without concern for reality.6  Lyotard tells us how avant-garde 
artists accomplish this goal in “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde”: “[t]he arts, 
whatever their materials, pressed forward by the aesthetics of the sublime in 
search of intense effects, can and must give up the imitation of models that are 
merely beautiful, and try out surprising, strange, shocking combinations” because 
this is what presents “evidence of (something) happening, rather than nothing” 
(Inhuman 100). Unlike other ‘figurative arts,’ this strange figuration implodes 
representative forms.7  Diane Davis echoes this point in Inessential Solidarity: “…
figuration gives world by giving meaning; it is the very condition for knowing, and 
without it, there would be no-thing, nothing to know and nothing to understand—
not even a ‘you’ or an ‘I’” (38). The meanings given by figuration, however, cannot 
always be analyzed or controlled; sometimes, these meanings are (too) strange to be 
known or understood through representative compositions. At these times, citizens 
become displaced by the strange, and become strangers who unwork familiar 
configurations lest they be left with no-thing, no options for composing those 
events that escape reason. The ability of unartists8 to present us with evidence 
that something is happening enacts the strange figuration necessary for an un/
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composing rhetoric that deviates from “politics as usual” (civic discourses). 
 Trying to figure out how to address a given (political) event occasionally 
requires a dis/figuration of common understandings so that others may become 
available. This is part of what Davis means when she writes that dis/figuration 
    (Inessential Solidarity 50)
As described here, dis/figuration sheds light on the strange figuration of un/
composing rhetorics with its disruptive change of direction that shocks. For Davis, 
there are two prominent responses to this shock: to speak or to kill.9 To kill would 
be the refusal to listen and to retain the complacency of the norm-al. On the other 
hand, to speak (that is, to write) un/composes the homogeneity embodied in the 
kill switch response.10  In its place, strange figurations produce “heterogeneous, 
disruptive, open, pleasurable, and political” works that “make meaning possible 
and our pleasure in it unpurloined” (Kelly, Imaging Desire 113).
 How these works come into being comprises the work of un/composing 
(visual) rhetorics performed by un/artists. The act of writing produces meaning, 
imaginative possibilities, and pleasure of working without the stress of some 
external appropriative understanding. The gift of writing, “by its detours, its 
decisions, and its interruptions, knows itself always responsible for a latent 
knowledge, as it knows itself responding to another possibility; a possibility that 
is the other of all knowledge and whose attraction carries the act of writing” 
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that introduces the un/artist to “the play of the absence of (the) work” (Blanchot, 
Infinite 421). This play: the absence of the game of argumentative writing where 
the unknown presents itself in the act of writing. The meaning that would then 
develop from these artifacts would not be one in which a reader/viewer critiques 
or analyzes, but would arise from the writing that those artifacts motivate—
to appropriate Burke’s phrasing, the importance of visual rhetorics is the un/
composing of motives and our quests for “perfection.” 
 Like Nietzsche, the un/artist and un/composing writer “deny that anything 
can be done perfectly as long as it is still done consciously” (Nietzsche, Portable 
581). By allowing the work to play out unconsciously in the act of writing, the idea 
that perfection is possible begins dismantling. The criterion for the un/composing 
work has no place in the Stranger’s process; rather, it enters the work within 
the play of composing the event. Strange figurations offer us the opportunity to 
escape “the nature of language as motive,” the “desire to name something by its 
‘proper’ name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways” that “is intrinsically 
‘perfectionist’” and that has made us “‘rotten’ with perfection” (Burke, Language 
16, 18). The idea of perfection is one in which we find the danger of violence (i.e., 
terrorism) and the (unimaginative) acts of compulsion carried out by conclusive-
reason. In the unconscious we are given a respite from the implications of 
perfection,11  and the corresponding motives of carrying them out. Without the 
demands for a conclusion found in the implications of perfection, an un/artist 
resists the temptation to (re)con-figure events with the criteria of perfection—
Burke calls this “the completely done” (Language 26) and associates it with Death. 
When all is said and done, our Stranger steps in and re-introduces us to (the 
unperfected) life. Nietzsche’s view of representation summarizes the importance 
of strange figurations for an un/composing (visual) rhetoric: “One is not finished 
with one’s passion because one represents it: rather, one is finished with it when 
1
2
3
Un/Composing (Visual) Rhetorics
one represents it” (Portable 458). To delay perfection, to instill the importance of 
delaying perfection: this is the play12 accomplished by speaking otherwise.
un/composing (in) the DigitAl event
“The future promise of digital aesthetics is its enhanced 
zone of ‘interactivity’ through which the users’ entry 
into the circuit of artistic presentation simulates 
or projects their own virtualizations, fantasies, and 
memories in consort with the artwork.”
~ Timothy Murray, Digital Baroque
Working out of Nietzsche’s “Morality as a Problem,” Avital Ronell writes that 
(“Nietzsche Loves You” 163)
For composition and rhetoric, the meanings that have been left in the cold, trickling 
down13 from our focus on Platonic and Aristotelian rhetorics (of persuasion) keeps 
us from engaging with the changing ways and means of production in the digital 
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age. To disrupt these rhetorics of perfecting an argument in an age when morality 
has become even more dangerous (e.g., fundamentalism, in all its forms, including 
terrorism) demands14 an experimental imagination rather than a bureaucratized 
imagination. Without the risk of disrupting this bureaucratization, we accept the 
sedimented concepts that atrophy the possibilities of social changes (e.g., civics), 
like the death found in perfecting an argument. What the digital opens for us is a 
way to diverge from these concepts by discovering—not necessarily synonymous 
with inventing—new ways of playing with meaning that do not require persuasive 
motivations. The ‘digital event’ indicates a way of linking “experimentation with 
the development of improv techniques,” where discovery is not simply “‘invention,’ 
but, under certain conditions, as a way of discovering what was already there,” 
inhabited in “an event, an experiment, a unique stage for representing discovery 
without invention” (Ronell, “Nietzsche Loves You” 174). In the digital event, we are 
called into the act of composing improvisationally.
 The improvisational event that takes place in digital spaces takes an 
alternate route from what continues to be taught in the composition classroom, 
first-year composition or otherwise. Blanchot describes the process of the latter as 
one where one writes “according to the rules of strict composition; then of a more 
complex demand: to write in a rigorously premeditated way in harmony with the 
control of the mind and to assure its full development” that attempts to “suppress 
chance” (Book to Come 225). The experimental imagination that Ronell sees as a 
key element of composing the former would constitute the un/composing of these 
strict rules (laws) of composition. Our Stranger, positioned between reason and 
unreason, has realized that controlling any composition subverts the vibrancy of 
chance and subdues it by claiming jurisdiction over the discovery of meaning(s). 
The digital offers us opportunities to compose by chance if we were only willing to 
be open to the logics already in play in those spaces15 instead of adhering to what 
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Blanchot might call ‘the book of the past.’
 In the book to come, we would see writers who, as Blanchot claims, become 
“involved in politics, with an energy that displeases the experts” and “he is not 
yet involved with politics but only with this new, difficult-to-see relationship 
that literature and language awaken in contact with public presence” (Book to 
Come 248). Those Strangers who compose would play with the (improvisational) 
logics awakening in digital spaces and engage in a performative civics instead of 
discourses concerning civics—that is, they actively play in this composing space 
without feeling the need to analyze or critique the artifacts they (and others) 
produce. While this may seem dis/connected to politics, it is precisely this lack of 
concern for political policy that opens the imagination to creative play and the 
unwork that can lead to discovery, postponing the kill switch response in the Work. 
You see, the digital event presents us with “the evidence of a particular silence 
[that] reaches us like a surprise that is not always a repose: a perceptible silence, 
sometimes masterly, sometimes proudly indifferent, sometimes agitated, animated 
and joyful”16 (Blanchot, Book to Come 220). And in this silence, we are given the 
opportunity to explore the potentialities of a silence that is not silent,17 but speaks 
beyond the capacity of words, of arguments, to (clearly) articulate. 
 This silence presents us with an absence of sense (as in, sensation) that
…opens another set of possibilities whereby imagination can be thought of 
as reordering the objects of sense, or taking them apart and imagining them 
in new combinations (such as centaurs) that do not themselves derive from 
sensory experience. It can thus become “creative,” and even visionary things 
forever closed to sense, as with the language of the mystic, who would express 
his intuitions in images meant to transcend imagery. (Burke, Rhetoric of 
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Motives 79)
In Burke’s ‘sense’ of the word, the ‘imagination’ would be a silent refusal to resolve 
arguments, and un/artists are thrown into the void of the digital.18 In this void 
we are abandoned by the rules19 of composition and the orderly arrangement of 
arguments meant to establish sensible meaning(s). The digital does not subscribe 
to the demands of the rhetorical tradition or composition; rather, those who espouse 
each are maintaining the criteria of earlier media because it’s all they know. In the 
digital void, “there is no longer law or duty” and “a good or bad conscience brings 
neither consolation nor remorse. In every age there has been implicitly recognized 
by those who have something to do with the strangeness of literary language an 
ambiguous status, a certain playfulness with regard to common laws” (Blanchot, 
Book to Come 28). Un/composing within the digital event is the recognition of such 
a strange playfulness (comical) for our age. However, like Blanchot’s writers of 
the book to come,20 un/artists are aware that they are not free of consequences, 
consequences that shut down imagination in favor of (irresponsible) patriotic acts. 
Un/composing the digital event: an invitation to imagine possibilities that oscillate 
between reason and unreason, and to accept the consequences for the resulting 
artifacts.
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Comic(al) Interventions into the Digital
“At electric speed, all forms are pushed 
to the limits of their potential.”
~ Marshall McLuhan, Laws of Media
Instead of adapting to the digital, the un/artists comics forms are “an active logos or utterance of the human mind or body that transforms the user and his 
ground” (McLuhan, Laws of Media 99).21 This active logos constitutes the putting-
into-action of civics rather than the more passive discourse approach that contents 
itself with writing policy and law. Additionally, as the human mind (imagination) 
transforms un/artists and their ground(s), evidence turns into an unreasonable 
request. McLuhan tells as much in Laws of Media:
Since electronic man lives in a world of simultaneous information, he finds 
himself increasingly excluded from this traditional (visual) world, in which 
space and reason seem to be uniform, connected and stable. Instead, Western 
(visual and left-hemisphere) man now finds himself habitually relating to 
information structures that are simultaneous, discontinuous, and dynamic. 
(102)  
In the void of the digital, the un/artist22 thrives in the simultaneity of forms and 
the ambiguity of the disconnected. The un/artist’s intervention into the digital is 
to discover some meaning in this ambiguity by relating to the information through 
imaginative approaches of linking forms and content rather than merely adapting 
tradition. But this intervention and discovery do not constitute a goal; un/artists 
have ambivalent relationships to digital work.23 
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 Ambivalence returns us to our Stranger’s position between reason and 
unreason, composing the uncertainty of the situation or event that has thrown him 
or her into the (digital) void. Blanchot helps us understand the political relevance 
of this work: “…the strangest demand: that through it speak that which is without 
power, that starting from that point speech show itself as the absence of power, 
this nakedness, powerlessness, but also impossibility, which is the first impulse 
of communication” (Book to Come 32). This form of communicative ambivalence 
disrupts the assertive power of arguments to propose uniform and stable solutions 
that inform the bureaucratization of the imagination. This sort of ambivalent 
intervention into the digital subverts the need for identification at the heart of 
argumentative theory; rather, an ambivalent composition—un/composition—is a 
complex search for alternate perspectives that “attempts to address the complexity 
of our current cultural situations” (Hawk, “Toward a Rhetoric” 149). Ambivalence, 
as it is used here, correlates to the Greek dissoi logoi approach of arguing both 
sides of a question; the difference is that an ambivalent approach to composition 
is not situated in terms of argument (and it has no question to answer), but as an 
approach to dis-covery. In other words, ambivalence has no opponent or opposing 
perspective; rather, it allows us to “grasp again in the literary work the place where 
language is still a relationship without power, a language of naked relation, foreign 
to all mastery and all servitude, a language that speaks only to whoever does not 
speak in order to possess and have power, to know and have, to become master 
and to master oneself” (Blanchot, Book to Come 33). At this point, comics enter to 
address the Stranger’s ambivalence: his mixed feelings (intuitions) take form in 
mixed media tangled up into an unfinished whole. The strange thoughts that arise 
in these comics un/compositions tap into the unknowable, but speak-able, moments.
 Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer explain how the comics form 
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slips into the space between reason and 
unreason in Between Witness and Testimony 
through an analysis of Art Spiegelman’s 
Maus. As they write, Spiegelman’s ‘text’ marks 
“a locus of meaning” as something that is not 
“resolvable or knowable. But it is 
transmissible; we can recognize—bear 
witness to—the horrors within 
representation itself” (73). Beyond 
Maus, comics artists are adept at signaling 
the moments that escape representation 
across various media seamlessly. It is this ability that allows them to speak the 
unrepresentable meanings of an event; they are witnesses capable of intervening 
in the ways we compose within a given space.24 And if we recognize the digital as a 
virtual space, a sort of single-panel that integrates a variety of media, the comics 
un/artist can teach us how to compose visually complex and seamless artifacts.25 
Hillary Chute recognizes the affordances of thinking about comics as “informed 
by postmodern politics” that “adopts a rhetoric of space—of location, multiplicity, 
borderlands, and […] boundary crossings” (342). Intervening in the digital by 
learning to be(come) a (comics) un/artist throws us into this space: the (rhetorical) 
void. Composing in this space demands that we bear witness to these media by 
attempting to transmit that which remains in the unresolvable locus of meaning 
called the digital. Without resolve, (comics) un/artists are the hospitable traitors 
of visual rhetoric(s) seeking only to gesture toward those unknowable parts within 
themselves, those parts that allow their imagination(s) to wander aimlessly, like 
a strange traveler interested only in discovering a refuge from the kill switch of 
argument.
chapter 5
traItorous hospItalIty: an aphorIstIc (composItIon) pedagogy
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trAitorous hospitAlity: An Aphoristic (composition) peDAgogy
 “The witness of the wrongs and the suffering engendered by 
thinking’s differend with what it does not manage to think, 
the witness, the writer, the megalopolis is quite happy to 
have him or her, his or her witnessing may come in useful. 
Attested, suffering and the untameable are as if already 
destroyed. I mean that in witnessing, one also exterminates. 
The witness is a traitor.”
~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Domus and the Megalopolis”
More than a witness, our Stranger is also a traitor who acts out of an undetermined love—of understanding, of just/ice, of individuals, of life! 
He needs no rule-of-law for the illusion of a stable domus1 since his sublime 
works arises outside of the law. Where the witness writes testimonies that “must 
provide […] a written record of the hesitations involved when bridging the gap 
between witness and testimony that in oral testimonies register as silence, the 
shrug, and the retreat into the litany of numbers” (Bernard-Donals 62), the traitor, 
which is similar to what Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer find in 
Art Spiegelman, “presents us with a means of defining witnessing in terms of 
a movement of meaning that resists knowing—a recognition of the swallowing 
up of the knowable, a recognition that is itself recognizable” (69). This is the 
strange traitor’s approach to writing in the age of new media: to move in the 
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abyss of meaning, not to resist knowing, but to explore the possibilities within 
the imagination.2 Paradoxically, this traitor appears in the work of the un/artist 
before the witness has been able to form (through his testimony); that is, before 
witnessing becomes possible, the traitor must produce a finished artifact. As an 
antecedent to the witnessing patriot,3 our traitor—like the comics un/artist—only 
witnesses what comes into being through his playful approach to imaginative 
productions. It is this attitude (of ambivalence) that opens the traitor’s domus to a 
hospitality for the most monstrous of thoughts that witnesses and patriots (in the 
bureaucratic sense) exclude from their compositions.
 Friedrich Nietzsche makes the distinction thus: 
All thought, poetry, painting, compositions, even buildings and sculptures, 
belong either to monological art or to art before witnesses. […] I do not know 
of any more profound difference in the whole orientation of an artist than 
this, whether he looks at his work in progress (at “himself”) from the point 
of view of the witness, or whether he “has forgotten the world,” which is the 
essential feature of all monological art: it is based on forgetting, it is the 
music of forgetting. (Gay Science 324)
It is this monological art that we find in the work of comics un/artists; they have no 
concern for their audience because they have forgotten the whole enterprise of art and 
the need to make a direct commentary on a given issue. I realize how odd a suggestion 
this may be, but when what we do must have a function in relation to others, we lose 
something of ourselves. Cultivating this forgetting in our pedagogical practices sows 
the seeds of creativity in students who “might perhaps eventually produce works that 
far excel [their] own judgment, so that [they] utter stupidities about [their works] and 
[themselves]” (Gay Science 327). These stupidities, exceeding judgments, open up 
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possibilities for the realization of the sublime works of the imagination.4 To produce 
something that exceeds judgment—and witnessing—is at the heart of monological art, 
and the creative work of the imagination. The traitorous hospitality of the Stranger, 
then, comes from the ability to forget the world and his relations to others—without 
such a perspective, un/artists remain constrained, and constrain their imaginations. 
After producing their artifacts, they let others—those who refuse to forget the world—
bear witness, exercising judgments or developing other criteria for judging the artifacts 
they produce. 
 Maurice Blanchot might refer to this sort of traitor as a “man without horizon” 
who does not affirm “himself on the basis of a horizon—in a sense a being without 
being, a presence without a present, thus foreign to everything visible and to 
everything invisible—he is what comes to me as speech when to speak is not to see” 
(Infinite 69). What he (indirectly) confronts is the “frightened, ignorant, and servile” 
that “are unable to fulfill their civic duties, having lost all sense of liberty” (Blanchot, 
Infinite 217-18). The concept of a being without being, however, seems rather confusing 
until we recognize that Blanchot uses this phrasing to indicate a being that remains 
separate from the existence of a given position,5 and retains the sense(s) of liberty—
in the sense of going beyond the boundaries of propriety—that allow this being to 
engage in an imaginative civics. In this sense, the traitor, like the (comics) un/artist, 
embodies the origin(s) of thought before a witness provides a testimony; in other 
words, the traitor explores that which does not yet have a being with ungrounded 
resiliency. And this is precisely what is needed when addressing the ways in which new 
media, or what is currently being called digital humanities, are engaging in political, 
cultural, and social issues of public policy and education.6 The concept of traitorous 
hospitality, as with un/art/ists, opens a space for an art that “cannot be, must not be, 
purely artistic” since “as soon as art becomes culture, is the means, the instrument of 
a culture, it can no longer belong to itself; it falls prey to travesties and servitudes: the 
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wheel of values and knowledge” (Blanchot, Friendship 28) that restricts imagination; 
for the digital humanities, this concept involves re/thinking, re/doing, and re/making 
the our ways of composing with new media.
A trAitorous (writing imAginAtion) 
“…imaginary is the reference to a man without myth, as is 
imaginary the reference to the man dispossessed of himself, 
free of all determination, deprived of all ‘value,’ and alienated 
to the point where he is nothing but the acting consciousness 
of this nothing, the essential man of point zero…”
~ Maurice Blanchot, Friendship
Where the witness composes “by testifying, by attempting to be faithful to what happened,” the traitor let’s himself “be led by the unknown that 
happened then, by what is unpredictable and invisible in the event” (Lyotard, 
“Anamnesis of the Visible 2” 22). In the unknown, there’s nothing to know, but we 
can discover this nothing through an imaginary stripped of the myth of the law, of 
the ‘law(s)’ of composition as determined by governing bodies.7 This would be akin 
to performing what Aristotle calls deliberative rhetoric that looks to (convalesce8) 
the future rather than epideictic rhetoric, which looks to the past and is at the 
heart of argumentative writing. The stakes of each are not the same; the witness’s 
argumentative writing takes place when one feels the work as indispensable, 
whereas traitor’s imaginary composition has no delusions of having satisfied 
the (unknown) demand of the lingering event. The traitor, as a digital un/artist, 
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resonates with Lyotard’s painter: “The painter is not someone who sees better than 
others, but one who no longer sees anything at all, and wants to see and make 
seen this nothing” (“Anamnesis of the Visible 2” 29). It is this ability to see nothing 
(and make seen this nothing) that we are called to by the imaginary—to dispense 
with our customary ways of witnessing and composing since these testimonies may 
betray the purposes with which they began. 
 Within digital environments, it is the un/artist’s fragmentary intervention that 
can help us to see this nothing. Marshall and Eric McLuhan explain as much in Laws 
of Media: “Without the artist’s intervention man merely adapts to his technologies 
and become their servo-mechanism” since “the role of art is to liberate man from 
the robot status imposed by ‘adjusting’ to technologies” (98). In other words, the 
traitorous un/artist is released from the value(s) of argumentative writing in order 
to begin again. This intervention opens an empty space where we may imagine what 
writing might be,9 what will have been writing in the digital age.10 There is a sort of 
ease in this type of composition, one that Bradley Dilger describes as a preference 
for “a simple, pragmatic approach which doesn’t involve the complication of complete 
understanding,” but involves “learning new technologies and questioning one’s 
relationship with technology” (“Ease and Electracy” 109-10). A relationship of ease 
with technology offers a sort of comfort and effortlessness necessary for the imaginative 
to flourish by releasing oneself from the complications of critique and/or procedure.11 
This, however, doesn’t mean that the compositions that arise out of this approach 
to technology are reductive, simplistic, or uncomplicated; rather, it means to write 
within a state of ease that can point un/artists (or have un/artists point us) toward 
those aspects of digital thought that remain hidden during our ‘adjustment period.’ 
For rhetoric and composition, one of the traitor’s approaches to writing in digital 
environments spawns an event: a writing process for the digital based on our ways of 
processing writing—the ease of writing spurred by an event that belongs only to itself.
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 An (everyday) event that belongs only to itself becomes suspect since it sits 
outside of the law of the whole. For Blanchot, it is this everyday ‘speech’ that is 
most difficult to find and, as such, “the everyday must be thought as the suspect 
(and oblique) that always escapes the clear decision of the law, even when the 
law seeks by way of suspicion to track down every indeterminate manner of 
being: everyday indifference. (The suspect: anyone and everyone, guilty of not 
being able to be guilty)” (Infinite 239). If, as the 9/11 Commission reports, what 
we need is a way to create opportunities for the imagination to flourish, it is 
through these indeterminate manners that remain suspect that we may find our 
way to composing as imaginative traitors, not through the law or an adherence to 
the law as such. As the antithesis of a patriot, the traitor places no value (in the 
Nietzschean sense) in the law or its justifications; rather, the traitor is guilty of 
nothing (thought of as the (immaterial) imaginary) and becomes dis/possessed of 
the law. But this law is not only imposed by the political and judicial (law); it also 
comes from oneself. To open students to the everyday, we need to also break down 
their defenses (make them uncomfortable, as Nietzsche says12), to be traitor-friends. 
 As traitor-friends, our pedagogical goals would have less to do with teaching 
some set material; we would be teaching students to be thinkers—and writers—that 
are self-observant. The major hindrance to the imagination has nothing to do with the 
law, but with the defenses that stop the thinking process. Nietzsche observes: 
Man is very well defended against himself, against being reconnoitered and 
besieged by himself, he is usually able to perceive of himself only his outer walls. 
The actual fortress is inaccessible, even invisible to him, unless his friends and 
enemies play the traitor and conduct him in by a secret path” (Human 179-80) 
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The role of this strange (comic) approach to writing has to do with finding these secret 
paths and breaking down the fortress-walls that impede the ability for the imagination 
write on those walls,13 and testing how well these walls (values/defenses) hold up 
against the hospitality of the (defenseless) traitor. In order to get to a place that 
allows us—students—to engage the imaginary with/in the digital, “we have to become 
traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals” (Nietzsche, Human 199) of 
composing criterion, especially when we are faced with the incongruous manners of un/
artists in these spaces.
DigitAl hospitAlity
“One recognizes those hearts which are capable of noble 
hospitality by the many draped windows and closed 
shutters: they keep their best rooms empty. Why? Because 
they expect guests with whom one does not ‘put up.’”
~ Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols
The digital presents us with an open space, a space that we may design for ourselves, and it invites us to reside in these rooms as guests, wanderers, 
nomads. What we find in the digital is the hospitality of an un/formed space 
that asks us to create our own forms of knowing, doing, and making imaginative 
artifacts. To think of the digital as this kind of hospitable friend would allow us 
to enter into “this relation without dependence [where] all of the simplicity of life 
enters, passes by way of recognition of the common strangeness that does not allow 
us to speak of our friends, but only to speak to them” (Blanchot, Friendship 291). 
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Speaking of the digital only distances us from the invitation it offers—by way of 
analysis, critique, and argument14—but in speaking to the digital, by accepting its 
invitation, what separates us from the it puts us in relation to the digital. In this 
relation to the digital, the traitor wanders through the digital void, connecting 
disparate elements without committing to a single relation; rather, the traitor 
develops a whatever15 relation to the digital, a relation that does not seek control to 
control thought, but unfolds through imaginative link(age)s. 
 Entering into the empty room(s) the digital offers us, we are given a chance 
to (eternally) return the favor by allowing the hospitality to remain a silent subject; 
to return the favor, we speak to the digital in our own ways without trying to re-
construct these rooms in the image of an/other, which is what we should aspire to 
in our class/rooms—not to put up with guests, but to offer them a place to write 
their own writing. Alexander Reid explains this as some of the affordances that 
new media provides: “Writing and new media offer means of pursuing the coming 
community and the university without conditions. […] One writes into a space of 
writing that is produced through writing, just as one thinks into a space of thought 
that is produced through thought” (Two Virtuals 194). Writing into these digital 
spaces without condition becomes an event that offers new possibilities for thinking 
and ways of writing, and this composes the digital’s hospitality, a hospitality that 
opens the digital to ways of thinking and forms of composing that helps us pursue 
the coming community.16 This sort of hospitality has the ability to put us at ease 
with one another and to open up the empty space where we can compose our 
hospitality. 
 To accept this hospitality, we also have to be hospitable to the ways in which 
the digital changes how we think. We cannot merely tolerate the digital, but we 
have to learn to love the digital as a friend who helps us to learn (to love) the 
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strange. In return, as Nietzsche writes of hospitality, “we are always rewarded for 
our good will, our patience, fair-mindedness, and gentleness with what is strange; 
gradually, it sheds its veil and turns out to be a new and indescribable beauty. That 
is its thanks for our hospitality. Even those who love themselves have learned it in 
this way” (Gay Science 262). In other words, the mutual hospitality of composing in 
the digital unveils itself in the play of learning to love the strangeness of the digital 
void (empty space) that puts us back into a relation that transforms each. Through 
these transformations we are given over to the strangeness of the imagination that 
de-familiarizes itself with the distance of human relations encapsulated in the 
witness’s testimony. Nietzsche makes a similar distinction regarding works of art: 
“All thought, poetry, painting, compositions, even buildings and sculptures, belong 
either to monological art or to art before witnesses” (Gay Science 324). The witness, 
then, would be an untimely figure in the digital age whose testimonies come 
only after the traitor’s playful compositions in (and of) the empty space of digital 
hospitality. 
 This hospitality is the condition for composing in a digital age: to think along 
a secret path that we can only discover by composing the events of our imagination. 
The traitor—as nomad, wanderer, stranger—creates a path to the unknown 
(compositions) since even the ‘less travelled’ paths have already been worn down. 
Inevitably, in treading a new path, we traitors will fall in(to) the digital void, and 
the imagination then “comes to help us fill the void in which we fall, by establishing 
a certain beginning, a certain starting point, that lead[s] us to hope for a certain 
point of arrival” (Blanchot, Friendship 207). Arriving at the digital, accepting its 
hospitality, the imagination takes us on a detour toward a relation of thinking 
(and writing) without dependence that characterizes the traitor not as an enemy, 
but as a friend that delivers17 us the gift of the empty space of the digital. This 
gift, however, remains obscure, “where rules abandon us, where morality is silent, 
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where there is no longer law or duty” (Blanchot, Book to Come 27-28). In thinking 
of the digital as a gift of an empty space that holds us in no obligation to write, or in 
how to write, we are afforded the possibility of (perpetually) re-beginning the call to 
compose: the thought of composition that does not close upon itself.18
Aphoristic composition
“Whatever its sophistication, style has always something 
crude about it: it is a form with no clear destination, the 
product of a thrust, not an intention, and, as it were, a 
vertical and lonely dimension of thought. […] Indifferent 
to society and transparent to it, a closed personal process, 
it is in no way the product of a choice or of a reflection on 
Literature. […] style resides outside art, that is, outside 
the pact which binds the writer to society.”
~ Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero
The time has come to re-think about the digital’s influence on composition and the ways we think. Friedrich Kittler provides us with one instance of 
how technology influences an individual’s compositions when he notices that 
Nietzsche’s writing changed “from arguments to aphorisms, from thoughts to puns, 
from rhetoric to telegram style” after purchasing (and writing with) a typewriter 
(Gramophone 203). This short, pithy, and un/artistic style of Nietzsche’s later 
writings offers us a way to think about and perform a pedagogy appropriate for 
new media, and that would allow us to overcome Literature as un/artists overcome 
art.19 The implication of Kittler’s statement is a common one: the technologies 
we interact with work-over the ways we think and write. In response to Kittler’s 
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observation, Nietzsche anachronistically answers: “it is my ambition to say in 
ten sentences what everyone else says in a book—what everyone else does not 
say in a book” (Portable 556). But our ambitions must go beyond Nietzsche if 
we are to address composition in digital environments; after all, in the digital 
age, we are moving far more quickly than Nietzsche did with a typewriter. If the 
goal is to inject imagination into the ways we compose within the digital void, 
we must recognize the ways our thoughts are being worked over, particularly 
the immediacy and surprise of our thinking. I propose the following ambition for 
digital composition: to “say” in 140 characters20 what Nietzsche wants to “say” in 
10 sentences. To compose in such a manner would be to develop our own joyful 
wisdom, our own gay science, where we become “the poets of our [lives]—first of 
all in the smallest, most everyday matters” (Nietzsche, Gay Science 240). To use a 
cheap analogy, this manner would have us write the gutters21 of our lives instead of 
moments consciously selected.
 Aphorisms are a part of everyday life. If we need evidence to justify this 
claim, we need only look to Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project, which Geoff Sirc 
refers to as “notational jottings” that are “a desperately important compositional 
skill” and which can be found in “interesting little bits of the everyday” (“Box Logic” 
122-23). Moreover, such a method of composing is open to experimental ways of 
thinking that typifies the digital humanities and their interdisciplinary approaches 
to the pedagogical event. To turn toward experimental approaches to the 
pedagogical event—based on un/art practices rather than process-oriented ones22—
enables a condition of tremulous excitement (a twitter) exposed in the surprise of an 
observation that sparks the deep thought of an aphorism’s pithiness—a terse form 
of writing achieved in a only a few words (or characters/images). The aphorism is 
an (experimental) art of exegesis that links thought to composition im-mediately 
and that refuses to be elaborated, but that invites traitorous thoughts to take up 
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residence in the yet unbuilt rooms of the digital. 
 Gilles Deleuze explains as much when he speaks of Nietzsche writing: “an 
aphorism is present as a fragment; it is the form of pluralist thought; in its content 
it claims to articulate and formulate a sense. The sense of a being, an action, a 
thing—these are the object of the aphorism. […] only the aphorism is capable of 
articulating sense, the aphorism is interpretation and the art of interpreting” 
(Nietzsche 31). Yet, this interpretation remains open to other interpretations; it 
is not the interpretation of rhetorical argument, but of ruminating within the 
space of pluralist thought presented in the digital, like the play of the un/artist, 
since it stands apart from any grand narrative; the aphorism presents us with 
the little narratives that Lyotard sees as the ambition of avant-garde art, and 
which Kaprow and Ludwinski extend in the move to un/art. As the thought of 
composition, aphorisms make sense and change senses in relation to the thought(s) 
they compose apart from the narratives in which they were built. For Nietzsche, 
the aphorism becomes a composition of the post-modern, interested in ruminating 
thought rather than the fully-formed and explicated forms of knowledge that 
restrict imagination.23 Composing aphoristically would then allow the thought 
of composition to become a form in and of itself, the composition of an ‘art’ of 
pluralistic interpretations (potentialities). 
 The potentialities of writing aphoristically return us (eternally?) to the 
possibility of writing strangely. Agamben explains the writing of this potentiality 
as a place where 
[t]he trace is nothing other than the most rigorous attempt to reconsider—
against the primacy of actuality and form—the Aristotlian paradox of 
potentiality, the gesture of the scribe who dips his pen in thought and writes 
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solely with his potentiality (not to write). The trace,24 writing ‘without 
presence or absence, without history, without cause, without arkhë, without 
telos,’ is not a form, nor is it the passage from potentiality to actuality; rather, 
it is a potentiality that is capable and that experiences itself, a writing tablet 
that suffers not the impression of a form but the imprint of its own passivity, 
its own formlessness. (Potentialities 216) 
Thinking in terms ‘characters’ rather than merely image and/or text offers a 
capability of experiencing the formlessness of such a writing, and it is one that 
is opened in the relation to the (traitorous) hospitality of the digital. In terms of 
digital composition, a character is a mark that marks the capability of composing 
aphoristically by imprinting a form that remains formless in its potentiality not 
to write (purely). In Derridean terms, a character corresponds to the written 
grapheme, not as its equivalent, but as an analogue whose reference opens a 
(third) relation that has no central argument—it has no center at all. The political 
significance of writing this third relation is how it is capable of addressing the 
points-of-contention in the ‘bureaucratization of the imagination’ by refusing to 
become bureaucratized (centered). 
 Extending Nietzsche’s ambition of writing aphoristically presents such a 
refusal; where the witness’s testimony (c)enters what can be said, the traitor’s 
aphoristic composition presents us with intuitions, movements of ‘writing’ where 
thought escapes bureaucratization (law). At certain moments, we must refuse to 
(c)enter testimonies and enter into “an infinite task that risks condemning the 
writer to a didactic, pedagogic role, and, in so doing, of excluding the demand [the 
(committed) writer)25] carries within him and that constrains him to lack a place, a 
name, a role, and an identity, that is, never yet to be a writer” (Political 118). The 
formlessness of aphorisms presents us with such a risk, a risk supplemented by the 
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hospitality of the digital, an invitation to compose ourselves into a space that lacks 
place—the ones we carry within ourselves and that open us into the potentialities 
of pluralist thought. Accepting the digital’s hospitality in our pedagogy would 
have us affirm the part(s) it takes in forming thought from the formlessness of the 
refusal to write purely.
A (comic) peDAgogy of (twittering) Aphorisms
“Philosophical writing is ahead of where it is supposed to be. 
Like a child, it is premature and insubstantial. We recommence, 
but we cannot rely on it getting to the thought itself, there, at 
the end. For the thought is here, muddled up in the unthought, 
trying to make sense of the impertinent chatter of childhood.”
~ Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Subject of the Course of Philosophy”
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introDuction enDnotes
1. A reference to Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-Street” and 
Maurice Blanchot’s reading of ‘Bartleby’ in The Writing of the Disaster (145), which 
appears in the form of aphorisms. 
2. Also see Cynthia Selfe’s article “The Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning: 
Aurality and Multimodal Composing.” She writes: The stakes for students are no less 
significant—they involve fundamental issues of rhetorical sovereignty3: the rights 
and responsibilities that students have to identify their own communicative needs 
and to represent their own identities, to select the right tools for the communicative 
contexts within which they operate, and to think critically and carefully about the 
meaning that they and others compose. When we insist on print as the primary, and 
most formally acceptable, modality for composing knowledge, we usurp these rights 
and responsibilities on several important intellectual and social dimensions, and, 
unwittingly, limit students’ sense of rhetorical agency to the bandwidth of our own 
interests and imaginations” (618). 
3. As Blanchot writes, “The disaster does not put me into question, but annuls the 
questions, makes it disappear – as if along with the question, “I” too disappeared in 
the disaster which never appears” (Writing 28). Questions, in this sense, assume and 
demand answers, reasons, justifications that take “place after having taken place” 
(Blanchot, Writing 28).
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4. See Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins and Stanley Aronowitz’s The Knowledge 
Factory for more detailed accounts of the problem facing universities focused on 
‘training’ students “in knowledges that constitute an occupation or a particular set of 
skills” (Aronowitz, Knowledge Factory 1). Instead, Readings conceives of the University 
as a space “where thought takes place beside thought, where thinking is a shared 
process without identity or unity. Thought beside itself perhaps. The University’s 
ruins offer us an institution in which the incomplete and interminable nature of the 
pedagogic relation can remind us that “thinking together” is a dissensual process” 
(University 192).
5. In Networked Art, Craig Saper begins with Barthes’ notion of “receivable texts,” claiming 
that this term alludes to “a network of relationships linked by sending and receiving texts 
in the mail or as a part of a network of participants” and which “suspends traditional 
norms of judgment” (4). 
6. “I will not say that the disaster is absolute; on the contrary, it disorients the absolute” 
(Blanchot, Writing 4).
7. Here, I take my cue from Geoffrey Sirc: ““[o]ur texts are conventional in every sense of 
the word; they write themselves. They are wholly determined by the texts that have 
gone before; a radical break with the conventions of a form or genre […] would perplex.” 
(English 10). Also, see Victor Vitanza’s article entitled “Abandoned to Writing: Notes 
Toward Several Provocations” for a radically passive performance. Vitanza writes:
“What writing or composition wants is a writer! To invite someone to become a 
writer! What rhetoric wants is a body that comes to expressing itselphs. A writer. 
A body filled with tics that cannot but (not) write! Twitchings. 
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“Writing, however, is not ||||||||||||||||| (barcodes) nor is it //////////// 
(slashing of value). Only writers spawned by institutions write in this manner!” 
8. Here, transvaluation refers to what that which has no pre-determined criteria and 
would be, in the Nietzschean sense, a valuation of love, which Nietzsche finds to go 
beyond good (acceptable) and evil (unacceptable) (cf. Beyond Good and Evil; The Will to 
Power: A Transvaluation of All Values).
9. See Byron Hawk’s A Counter-History of Composition (100-104).
10. In Internet Invention, Ulmer defines conductive logic thus: “Conductive logic subsumes 
the inductive, deductive, and abductive inferences of the interrogation. In conduction 
the inference path moves from material thing to another thing, from signifier to 
signifier, without recourse to the abstractions of rules” (156). To clarify Ulmer’s 
thinking, conductive logic can be figured as a pun, a logic similar to the one Derrida 
builds with his concepts of deconstruction and differance, a logic of wordplay that 
can also extend into image realms – an image spurs another image, perhaps directly 
related, perhaps indirectly related. Heuretics, according to Ulmer, “contributes to what 
Barthes referred to as ‘the return of the politician’—one who is concerned with how a 
work is made” (Heuretics 4), and it indicates a process of using “the method that I am 
inventing while I am inventing it” (Heuretics 17). Such a process does not determine 
‘the paths of inquiry,’ but ‘continually sets the inquiry in motion.’ 
11. This phrasing is a reference to Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community. He writes 
in a ‘chapter’ titled Bartleby: “The perfect act of writing comes not from a power to 
write, but from an impotence that turns back on itself and in this way comes to itself 
as a pure act […]. Bartleby, a scribe who does not simply cease writing, but ‘prefers 
not to,’ is the extreme image of this angel that writes nothing but its potentiality to 
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not-write” (37). Earlier, he explains ‘impotence’: “It is neither apathy nor promiscuity 
nor resignation. These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of 
the example, without being tied by any common property, by any identity, they are 
expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself, the sign ε. Tricksters 
or fakes, assistants or ‘toons, they are the exemplars of the coming community” 
(Coming 11). Quentin was a trickster for Bartholomae, one that performed his writing, 
turning back on himself (“I lose again”), and coming to himself through the Act of 
writing. It was his “Fuck You” essay (cf. Bartholomae, “The Tidy House” and Sirc’s 
English Composition) that brought Bartholomae to question the field of Basic Writing 
almost 20 years later. The essay comes too late for Bartholomae even as the realization 
of that essay came too soon (cf. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 81).
12. Later, I will refer to Warren Ellis’ Do Anything, where he quotes Harvey Pekar saying: 
“Comics are words and pictures. You can do anything with words and pictures” (5). 
On Stan Lee, apparently a postmodern writer/artist: “The artist would go away – with 
or without a supporting document, it seems – and draw out the story in pencil. Stan 
would then generate all the dialogue” (12). 
13. See Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (226) and Lyotard’s Lessons on the Analytic of the 
Sublime (6).
14. Nicholas Lemann explains why reason comprises so much risk in “Terrorism Studies: 
Social scientists do counterinsurgency”: 
In the world of terrorism studies, the rhetoric of righteousness gives way to 
equilibrium equations. Nobody is good and nobody is evil. Terrorists, even suicide 
bombers, are not psychotics or fanatics; they’re rational actors—that is, what they 
do is explicable in terms of their beliefs and desires—who respond to the set of 
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incentives that they find before them. The tools of analysis are realism, rational 
choice, game theory, decision theory: clinical and bloodless modes of thinking. (73).
 
In essence, Lemann argues that the tools of argumentation, Logic, Reason, and 
rationality are the same tools that allowed the justification of disastrous actions on 
September 11, 2001. Also, Lester Faigley’s writes in Fragments of Rationality: 
 
…a major source of contradictions in writing pedagogy results from the dogmatic 
teaching of a truncated conception of coherence, which supports bureaucratic 
rationality where reason is restricted to narrow channels of expertise and 
questions of ethics are suppressed. Even the champion of Enlightenment 
rationality, Jûrgen Habermas, critiques ‘instrumental rationality’ that supports 
bureaucracies by providing their justification and controlling mechanisms, and 
he argues instead for a ‘communicative rationality’ that would integrate the 
discourses of the arts, science, and morality. (133)
 
Given the subtitle of Faigley’s book (Postmodernity and the Subject of Composition), 
it appears that Rickert’s book (subtitle: Rhetoric, Zizek, and the Return of the 
Subject) works in a similar vein. Postpedagogy, perhaps, is a manifestation of the 
problematics Faigley detects in (composition) pedagogy – work that Rickert, among 
others, continuously attempt to flesh out, and the work that this project attempts to 
supplement. 
15. See Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism.” 
16. As Byron Hawk explains, “Potentiality is there first and then when it encounters the 
right circumstances, the right constellation of bodies and forces, it is put in motion and 
becomes possibility. In short, potentiality is the ‘condition for possibility” (282-83, n15). 
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17. Gilles Deleuze explains as much when he writes of Nietzsche’s ‘concept of genealogy’: 
“Evaluations, in essence, are not values but ways of being, modes of existence of those 
who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they 
judge” (1). 
18. As explained in the Glossary of Libidinal Economy:
The Great Ephemeral Skin: this is in many ways the more provocative figure 
in Libidinal Economy. It highlights the disruptive potential of the figure, a 
concern which occupied Lyotard […] Freud’s elaboration of the ‘dream-work’ 
(cf. The Interpretation of Dreams) provides Lyotard with an articulation of the 
connivance of the figural and the libidinal: the dream-work (condensation, 
displacement, secondary revision and considerations of representability) distorts 
figural materials (words, signs and ideas). In Discours, figure, Lyotard draws out 
the implications of the figural unconscious’ plastic invasion into the realm of the 
conceptual conscious, the result of which invasion is not merely to demonstrated 
the inevitable confusion of the two realms, but to highlight difference in their 
respective organizations. Whereas the conceptual relies on rigid opposition, the 
figural works differences: concepts, in other words, utilize negation (the ‘this’ 
and the ‘not-this’ in the language of Libidinal Economy), isolating unit(ie)s as 
opposed entities, whereas figural difference, like the unconscious whose work it is, 
knows no negation. […] The great ephemeral skin is the libidinal materialist (dis)
solution of figural difference and conceptual opposition as polymorphous (hence 
‘ephemeral’), material (hence ‘skin’) intensity. (Libidinal xiv)
19. Vitanza writes in “Abandoned to Writing: Notes Toward Several Provocations”: “’We’ 
may never write ‘writing,’ but ‘we’ must start letting writing write. Such a writing 
cannot, should not, take place, and will not, unless under the most radical, still 
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unthinkable, conditions…take place…in the university (or the schools). It is simply not 
safe for students to write ‘in’ or ‘at’ the university. Any university. What is taught at 
the university is not-writing.” 
20. Also, see Sharon Crowley’s Composition in the University: Historical and Polemical 
Essays, specifically Chapter 10 entitled “The Politics of Composition” where she writes: 
“No matter how nurturant the teacher, the so-called community classroom is rife with 
the ideological differences that students and teachers bring with them to class. These 
differences will inevitably be put on the table, as they might not be in a history or 
biology class, because liberal composition pedagogy insists that students’ identities 
are the subject of composition. Within the context of the universal requirement, which 
forces people to take and teach the class, this seems to me to be a recipe for pain” (227). 
In general, Crowley’s perspective reminds us that we are a highly political field, but 
that we rarely acknowledge the ideological differences in the classroom in hopes of 
‘keeping the peace.’ The problem here is that once students leave the classroom, they 
continue to maintain their identities, which is enforced when we require them to learn 
how to argue well instead of learning that arguments, and therefore identities, are 
contingent singularities, forcing a rethinking both of politics, self, and the act or event 
of writing. 
21. See Joshua C. Hilst’s forthcoming article in JAC, “Gutter Talk: An Other Idiom of 
Rhetoric.” 
22. Here, I use the word “abysmal” as an indication of the additional Catholic (church) 
meaning of ‘limbo,’ which refers to a border-space between Heaven and Hell (cf. 
Harper, “Online”). Could it be, perhaps, that this is the space that exists beyond good 
and evil? It certainly appears so considering the theoretical suggestions. Could that 
mean that, in part, Nietzsche would have liked to read some comics? And Lyotard? 
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What we do know, however, is that Roland Barthes thought comics has some 
theoretically interesting potentialities (see Chapter 1). 
23. Again, Lyotard finds this necessity in the work of Kant, whose discussion of the 
“sublime” in the “Appendix” of Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is akin to what is 
now being termed postpedagogy.
24. Kant links his idea of ‘free art’ with the field of rhetoric, claiming, “Rhetoric is the 
art of transacting a serious business of the understanding as if it were a free play 
of the imagination” (284) and that the rhetorician gives “an entertaining play of 
the imagination” (Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 185). In addition, U.S. 
Army Commander, Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus suggests that large-scale 
conventional tactics “may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN 
[counterinsurgency] operations” (ix) and that “successful counterinsurgency campaigns 
require a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders” 
(n.p.). If the work of rhetoric/composition is indeed to prepare students for academic 
and professional work, it stands to reason that successful students will be “flexible,” 
“adaptive,” and “astute” – that is, to be able to work beyond “conventional” practices 
in order to formulate the rules of the “unconventional” (cf. Petraeus; Lyotard, 
Postmodern).
25. A reference to the concluding lines of Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-
Street” (74). 
26. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes, “What is done out of love always occurs 
beyond good and evil” (Portable 444; aphorism 153). Quentin’s refusal to write purely 
could also be an Act of love in this sense…
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chApter one enDnotes
1. Ulmer has proposed “terms” for writing (with) new media, calling this a move ‘from literacy 
to electracy’ in Internet Invention. Electracy, according to Ulmer, “is to digital media what 
literacy is to print” (xi), and it “adds to orality and literacy the possibility of writing the 
unconscious (and hence of writing with what we do not know—with our stupidity and with 
our trust” (163). 
2. See Jean Baudrillard various works, but specifically Simulations.
3. In part, this series of divisions mimics Plato’s own series of dialogues in this sequence: 
The Sophist, The Statesman, and The Philosopher, where each of the dialogues 
correlates to each of the forms of imitation. In our own time, this estimation seems 
appropriate, if we consider current brands of sophistry as attempts to accurately 
represent knowledge in the service of professionalism and institutions, statesmen 
are commonly framed as deceptive in order to maintain their own will to power, and 
philosophers are excluded for attempting to think the unthought to cut through both, 
at least in Lyotard’s view of the philosopher. Plato’s The Philosopher was not written 
(or uncovered, whichever your preference), and there seems to be little corroborating 
evidence to assume a definition of the philosopher by Plato.
4. This would be analogous to Diane Davis’ feminism in the sense that it “anticipates 
laughing itself out of a job” (Breaking 208).
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5. Cf. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Paul Feyerabend’s 
Against Method for further explanation.
6. Lyotard vaguely observes that “it is reasonable to suppose that the proliferation 
of information-process machines is having, and will continue to have, as much of 
an effect on the circulation of learning as did advancements in human circulation 
(transportation systems) and alter, in the circulation of sounds and visual images 
(the media)” (4) at the outset of The Postmodern Condition. The vagueness in this 
statement suggests that Lyotard does not see technology negatively, but as a potential 
to provides ways of thinking systematically and non-systematically. That is, playing 
with these technologies can lead us to new ways of knowing (theoretical knowledge), 
doing (practical knowledge) and making (productive knowledge). 
7. As we learn from Kenneth Burke in Permanence and Change, and Victor Vitanza in 
“Seeing in Third Sophistic Ways,” among others, a way of seeing is also a way of not 
seeing. 
8. See Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism” for more on these techniques and how they 
relate to the current trends of art practices in composing otherwise. 
9. See Ulmer’s Teletheory, pp. 64-104.
10. Galloway concludes by saying: “People often ask me if I think protocol is good or bad. 
But I’m not sure this is the best question to ask. It is important to remember first 
that the technical is always political, that network architecture is politics. So protocol 
necessarily involves a complex interrelation of political questions, some progressive, 
some reactionary. In many ways protocol is a dramatic move forward, but in other 
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ways it reinstates systems of social and technical control that are deserving of critical 
analysis” (Protocol 245-46).
11. Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins effectively discusses and dismantles the criteria of 
excellence. 
12. See Gilles Deleuze’s The Fold, pp. 22, 66, 158, and 181. He writes: “Unfolding sometimes 
means that I am developing – that I am undoing – infinite tiny folds that are forever 
agitating the background, with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side whence forms 
appear […] I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, 
then I am forever perceiving within the folds” (93). 
13. The use of this term comes from Chris Ware’s The Acme Novelty Date Book, Volume One: “To 
create a fine line-up of brilliantly pro-duced and rendered moving comic pictures ~ all by the 
original creators” (41). 
14. Gregory Ulmer has worked to develop such a manner since as early as 1983 when his 
article “The Object of Post-Criticism” was released in Hal Foster’s Anti-Aesthetics. Ulmer 
then develops this method more fully in Teletheory and Heuretics, calling this additional 
logic “conduction.” However, the conductive reasoning that he describes is meant to deal 
directly with electronic (digital) media. Also, at the base of this term, as Ulmer writes, 
are “the features of the electronic terms (conduction and transduction)” (Teletheory 86). 
In trans-disciplinary and trans-medial fashion, I am using the term pro-duction as a way 
to address the gap that these ‘electronic terms’ exclude, specifically what Ulmer calls “a 
movement directly between things (unconscious thought), instead of “the established 
movements of inference between things and ideas (abduction, deduction, induction)” 
(Heuretics 127).
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15. See Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, pp. 229-230.
16. See Ulmer’s Applied Grammatology, pp. 78-79.
17. See also, Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism,” p. 86. 
18. Jeff Rice explains that this sort of work is already under way in popular culture when 
he writes that such work has “occurred without ‘further study’” (Rhetoric of Cool 144).
19. As Ulmer notes in Applied Grammatology and in “The Object of Post-Criticism,” post-
pedagogy supports the popularization of education already present in the digital 
technologies students use every day. The turn to the figural in composition studies is 
not an outright rejection of traditional forms of writing; instead, post-pedagogy aims to 
challenge the desire to fix meaning in order to explore what has been excluded. 
20. Similarly, in the introduction to Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900, David 
Wellerby refers to a practice called “post-hermeneutics” in which the interpretive 
methods called hermeneutics are supplemented with additional readings that push 
interpretation to its limits until it becomes generative. As it applies in Ulmer’s work, 
post-hermeneutics petitions us to see readymade objects as conceptual starting places 
that spur abstract, theoretical thinking and approaches to research. 
21. Also, these nomadic drifts share a kinship with Vitanza’s paganism in “Three 
Countertheses” – a process of continually finding new ways of understanding and 
making sense of the world around us. 
22. Warren Ellis, speaking of jazz musician Anthony Braxton, writes that Braxton “makes 
up a name for every new ‘style’ he creates – even though his honking free-jazz almost-
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musical experiments are so dissonant, random and alien as to be almost indivisible 
from each other” (Do Anything 15).
23. See Cynthia Haynes’ “Writing Offshore,” p. 715. Such a “condensation” leads Haynes’ 
to write: “Writing in the abstract also suggests learning the rhetorical device of brevity 
and the rhetorical power of the aphorism” (715).
24. Calvino speaks of this as a time of inspiration that sparked his desire for literature, but 
also has deep relevance to rhetoric and composition. Perhaps such a method could bridge 
the gap between the between the cultures of literature and composition that Peter Elbow 
so effectively traces out in his opinion piece “The Cultures of Literature and Composition: 
What Could Each Learn from the Other.” 
25. For more on Lyotard on Duchamp, see Lyotard’s Duchamp’s TRANS/formers. He 
(Lyotard) writes: “In what you say about Duchamp, the aim would be not to try to 
understand and to show what you’ve understood, but rather the opposite, to try not 
to understand and to show that you haven’t understood. No, not what you think, not 
a commentary on incomprehensibility in general or in particular, the seven hundred 
and twenty-eighth modern text on modernity as the experience of Nothing. No, to be 
good and conscientious and phrasey, to stick to the motif, to be technical if necessary, 
and at the same time to let the inconsistency of the commentary and its object be felt, 
by Yours Truly and Monsieur Marcel, and by the one with the other, but a conquered 
inconsistency, you see, not received in disappointment, not exhibited as a cardinal 
virtue of martyrdom, on the contrary, nonsense as the most precious treasure” (12). 
26. Christopher Bracken also discusses similar concepts in Magical Criticism: The 
Recourse of Savage Philosophy as the convocation of “forbidden possibilities of 
discourse” (1).
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chApter two enDnotes
1. See Maus I and Maus II.
2. Hawk builds on Gregory Ulmer’s work in Heuretics, a term that he uses to describe an/
other logic of invention that “appropriates the history of the avant-garde as a liberal 
mode of research and experimentation” (xii) and addresses what has been excluded 
from “a review of the history of the arts [indicating] that the criticism that has been 
written and the art works that have been created are only a fraction of the kinds of 
things that could have been developed” (3). A postmodern writer/artist, in writing what 
will have been, address the fragments left excluded.
3. In inventing a method while inventing it, the criteria for developing such a method 
would be formulated after the fact. 
4. This, of course, presents a paradox – in addressing its illegitimate position as a benefit, 
I could also be seen as attempting to legitimate comics in the service of institutions. 
However, as I will attempt to demonstrate, comics do not merely represent one form 
that needs be legitimated; rather, comics are in a position to explore a perpetual 
combination of media (both print and digital). 
5. See David Wellerby’s introduction to Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900.
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6. C ynthia Haynes currently has an article entitled “Post-Conflict Pedagogy,” slated to 
be published as a book chapter in Beyond Post-Process (eds. Sidney Dobrin, Jeff Rice, 
and Michael Vastola), that takes its task as destabilizing “the stabilizing momentum 
of any pedagogy that re-iterates conflict in the name of writing” (from the unpublished 
book proposal/abstract). What I see in a comics form is a way of enacting Haynes’ post-
conflict pedagogy within rhetoric’s and composition’s move toward new media and the 
figural.
7. Kenneth Burke explores the “paradox of substance” in Chapter 2 of A Grammar of Motives, 
titled “Antinomies of Definition,” explaining, “etymologically ‘substance’ is a scenic work. 
Literally, a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance would be something that stands beneath or 
supports the person or thing” (22). 
8. “Context” also comes from Burke’s discussion of sub-stance whose origins 
etymologically “refer to an attribute of a thing’s context, since that which supposrts 
or underlies a thing would be a part of thing’s context. And a thing’s context, being 
outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is not” (Grammar 23).
9. See also Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism and Applied Grammatology.
10. Trahair builds on Mary Lydon’s article “Veduta on Discours, figure” in Yale French 
Studies 99:
 
…discourse and figure are given together. Not sequentially, not in juxtaposition, 
but together at once, one on top of the other like two superimposed photographic 
images, or like the representations of the unconscious. This is a spatial 
relationship that language in its linearity does not permit, hence the imperative to 
write “Discours, figure,” where the comma […] represents graphically, but mutely, 
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as a pause, a blank, a hesitation, one might say, that which cannot be verbalized. 
(24)
 
Earlier she (Trahair) also writes of Discours, figure, when Lyotard distinguished 
between vision and seeing, that it “is not possible to establish a relationship of simple 
epistemological exteriority between the text and the image” (20). Comics present a 
way of thinking about this relationship, and a way of thinking about how other hybrid 
media – I use cinema as a synecdoche for digital media in this dissertation – may be 
thought of in a similar manner. 
11. See Gregory Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism,” p. 86. 
12. Pun intended. :)  
13. Barthes writes in “The Third Meaning” (where “meaning” is translated from the 
French sens, which means “meaning,” “sense,” “direction,” “tenor,” “wits,” among 
others) that the obtuse meaning indicates “a theory of the supplementary meaning” 
(55) and “what the obtuse meaning disturbs, sterilizes, is metalanguage (criticism)” 
(61); in doing so, it also disturbs attempts at mounting meta-narratives in favor of 
alternate directions spurring from sensation. Here we may find a link to Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition.
14. This phrasing of “fragmentary work” comes from Blanchot’s The Infinite Conversation. 
He writes that fragments are 
 
problematic not because [they] refuse accomplishment, but because it explores 
with an inexorable rigor – beyond the conception of the work as something unified 
and closed upon itself, as organizing and dominating the values transmitted by 
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a traditional already established and attained – the infinite space of the work, 
though with a new postulate: namely, that the relations of this space will not 
necessarily satisfy the concepts of unity, totality, or continuity. The problem the 
work of the fragment poses is a problem of extreme maturity: first of the artist, and 
also of society. (348)
 
If thought of in this way, the fragmentary writing that comics suggest would subvert 
Barthes’ claim that comics are “derisory, vulgar, foolish, dialogical forms of consumer 
subculture” (66n1), but rather, present a way of thinking and writing in their prime 
manifestations 
15. See McCloud’s Understanding Comics and Eisner’s Comics and Sequential Art.
16. Groensteen only acknowledges McCloud’s work twice in The System of Comics, even 
while his (Groensteen) project has a great deal in common with McCloud’s earlier 
analysis. Yet, McCloud appears to be a bit more flexible with his view of comics than 
Groensteen’s system allows for. 
17. In part, this conceptualization of montage appears a bit narrow. A more productive 
view of montage comes to use from Walter Benjamin in “The Author as Producer: “I am 
speaking of the process of montage: the element which is superimposed breaks into the 
situation on which it is imposed” (Reflections 234). Gregory Ulmer also discusses such a 
process in “The Object of Post-Criticism” that moves beyond critique into a productive 
process of in(ter)vention. 
18. In the second endnote, Hawk explains that he uses “’hir’ to denote a conflation between her 
and his. Aside from the practical reasons, it is also emblematic of the gender problematic I 
see in The Fifth Element” (89).
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19. Umberto Eco echoes a similar manner in “A Reading of Steve Canyon,” offering an 
active means of reading/visualizing comics as a collaborative moment of creation with 
and apart from the writer/artist. Eco describes an experiment at the end of this article 
that finds readings had inserted images that were not present in the original sequence 
– creating an alternate narrative. 
20. In Vitanza’s terms, this would be “a Rhetoric that not only is without the philosophical 
pretensions of adjudicating ‘philosophical knowledge claims’ but also (and more 
importantly) is without the philosophical-Rhetorical pretensions of adjudicating 
‘hermeneutical understandings.’ It is, in other words, not concerned either with 
attempting to resolve rhetorical, interpretive differences or with even accounting for 
them. Instead, it identifies, detonates, and exploits the differences” (“Critical Sub/
Versions” 42). 
21. Italo Calvino on da Vinci: “And not just in science but also in philosophy, he was 
confident he could communicate better by means of painting and drawing. Still he 
also felt an incessant need to write, to use writing to investigate the world in all its 
polymorphous manifestations and secrets, and also to give shape to his fantasies, 
emotions, and rancors – as when he inveighs against men of letters, who were able 
only to repeat what they had read in the books of others, unlike those who were among 
‘inventors and interpreters between nature and men’” (Six Memos 79).
22. See Ulmer’s “The Object of Post-Criticism” in which he looks to move beyond critique 
toward production. Post-criticism, then, would be “to think the consequences for critical 
representation of the new mechanical means of reproduction (film and magnetic tape – 
technologies which require collage/montage)” (91). 
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23. See Diane Davis’ Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter.
24. In The Coming Community, Giorgio Agamben writes of the term whatever: “Whatever is 
the figure of pure singularity. Whatever has no identity, it is not determinate with respect 
to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through 
its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities” (67), and that “Whatever is 
singularity insofar as it relates not (only) to the concept, but (also) to the idea” (76). Here, 
“whatever singularity” is that which has an “inessential commonality, a solidarity that 
in no way concerns an essence” (17-18). It should also be noted that his understanding 
of “whatever” does not indicate indifference, but is etymologically based on the Latin 
translation of “being such that it always matters” (1) – which is precisely what Kaprow 
looks for in unart.
25. Calvino: “In the cinema the image we see on the screen has also passed through the 
stage of a written text, has then been ‘visualized’ in the mind of the director, then 
physically reconstructed on the set, and finally fixed in the frames of the film itself. A 
film is therefore the outcome of a succession of phases, both material and otherwise, 
in the course of which the images acquire form. During this process, the ‘mental cinema’ 
of the imagination has a function no less important than that of the actual creation of the 
sequences as they will be recorded by the camera and then put together on the moviola. 
This mental cinema is always at work in each one of us, and it always has been, even 
before the invention of the cinema. Nor does it ever stop projecting images before our 
mind’s eye” (Six Memos 83).
26. This concept correlates to Cynthia Haynes’ desire for writing instruction to move away 
from ‘argument’ and toward more nomadic and inventive approaches in “Writing Offshore.” 
27. See Agamben’s The Coming Community, p. 1.
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chApter three enDnotes
1. The title is a reference to Jean-Luc Nancy’s “Myth Interrupted” in The Inoperative 
Community.
2. The phrase “dream-work” comes from Lyotard’s article “The Dream-Work Does Not 
Think” where he writes that the dream-work “does not think, calculate, or judge in any 
way at all; it restricts itself to giving things a new form” (Reader 20). Surrealism works 
with such logics and ‘restrictions.’ 
3. As a Frankenstein reference, this subtitle is very appropriate considering that the 
project is a mish-mash of parts from a variety of ‘comics artists.’ 
4. I work with Spiegelman’s work again, primarily because he has been (consistently 
recognized as) one of the leading avant-gardists working within comics.
5. See Gregory Ulmer’s Heuretics, p. 5.
6. Compare with Kenneth Burke’s “Unending Conversation” in The Philosophy of Literary 
Form 110-111.
7. Here, I use the word “gesture” as Giorgio Agamben does in Means Without Ends: 
“The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means 
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visible as such” (58). Spiegelman even addresses this in the introductory remarks 
when he acknowledges that the surrealist exercise was not very effective as a work in 
itself, but it worked well as an exercise in thinking about the process of making and 
experimenting with comics. 
8. See James Elkins’ Why Art Cannot be Taught and What Happened to Art Criticism.
9. See Derrida’s The Archeology of the Frivolous, p. 76.
10. This is also a key trajectory of Ulmer’s “Electracy” project. Jeff Rice and Marcel 
O’Gorman concisely explain the use of avant-garde art methods in new media practices 
in the “Introduction” to New Media/New Methods: The Academic Turn from Literacy 
to Electracy as “…about making methods and not art (as Greg Ulmer reminds his 
students on a regular basis)” since “avant-garde artists serve as ideal exemplars in the 
invention of new modes of discourse” (9). 
11. Boyd’s article is the only article that explores the importance of TNC for comics, at 
least that I could find. Also, to clarify his use of the word “pattern,” he writes: “If all art 
plays with pattern, the best art plays best with pattern” (“Art and Evolution” 47). 
12. See Ulmer, Heuretics, p. 228: “Chorography continues the speculative circulation 
of meaning through equivocal words but introduces a different style of linkage 
(hence a different ‘method’)—one that is ‘punceptual’ rather than conceptual—in 
which conduction (passing from thing to thing in the real, ‘external’ to my conscious 
reasoning) reorganizes abduction, deduction, and induction.” 
13. In Ulmer’s “method” CATTt, he defines the “t” (target) as “the immediate domain of 
application” in which “Breton also intended to change the status of art itself, constituting it as 
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a practice of daily life better characterized as ‘politics’ than ‘art’ (Heuretics 11). While Ulmer 
seems to be interested in ‘methods’ of how we may think of media processes, the methods I 
work with here have already been put into practice. 
14. For more on Puns, see Jonathan Culler’s edited collection On Puns: The Foundation of 
Letters. For a specific reference to my thinking on the pun as an interruption, see R. A. 
Shoaf’s article “The Play of Puns in Late Middle English Poetry: Concerning Juxtology” 
in Culler’s collection. 
15. This phrasing comes from Lyotard’s The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, but it is also a 
common phrase throughout his writings. Rather than quote a specific instance, I felt 
it more appropriate to paraphrase with references to his work on language games – 
hence, phrases.
16. See Readings’ The University in Ruins, p. 161.
17. See John Caputo’s More Radical Hermeneutics, p. 55.
18. For a most extensive discussion of sense and nonsense, see Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic 
of Sense.
19. See Diane Davis’ “Addressing Alterity” for a fuller discussion on this ‘impossibility.’ 
20. Thomas Kent’s phrase, hermeneutical terror, appears in his 1992 article entitled 
“Hermeneutical Terror and the Myth of Interpretive Consensus” in Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 25.2. Kent defines the phrase as “the silencing of voices with discourse 
communities through an appeal to interpretive consensus” (135). While argumentation 
does not necessarily require that ‘silencing of voices,’ many attempts to argue for a specific 
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point of view is done with creating a consensus – and we have seen the dangers of such 
interpretive consensuses with World War II and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
on the United States. 
21. See Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy, p. 19.
22. This sentence is a patchwork consisting of Blanchot and Lyotard. Blanchot writes: 
“Communication—to employ this dubious word—is communication with the unknown. 
But communicating with the unknown requires plurality” (Infinite 409). And Lyotard 
writes in “Tomb of the Intellectual” about “the responsibility of artists, writers, or 
philosophers”: “Their addressee is not the public and, I would say, is not even the 
‘community’ of artists, writers, and so forth. To tell the truth, they do not know who 
their addressee is, and this is what it is to be an artist, writer, and so forth: to throw a 
‘message’ out into the void” (Political 4).
23. In relation to ‘cartoons and comic strips,’ Barthes explains that the relay advances “the 
action by setting out, in the sequence of message, meanings that are not to be found in the 
image itself” (Image 41).
24. See The Arcades Projects where Benjamin collects fragments of writings and 
observations while wandering about Paris. 
25. Estrangement, as an interruption, Blanchot explains as a commitment “to unfolding in 
various modes of experience” (Blanchot, Infinite 128).
26. In Ulmer’s forthcoming book Avatar Emergency, he writes of “flash reason,” a concept 
intimately connected to Breton’s “incandescent flashes.” As Ulmer writes, flash reason 
is “a practice for deliberative reason, for public policy formation, making democratically 
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informed decisions in a moment, at light speed” (3). The role of comics, as a stranger sort of 
surrealism, takes on the role of such a practice. 
27. For more on this aspect of Surrealism, see David Cunningham’s “The Futures of 
Surrealism: Hegelianism, Romanticism, and the Avant-Garde,” where he writes of 
Blanchot’s view of Surrealism: “As such, surrealism, in its most radical manifestation as 
a temporal modality of experience, calls forth neither an immanent end nor a utopianist 
projection, but an ‘exigency’ that comes from the ‘unexpected’ itself. The future as 
‘unknown,’ ‘ever exterior to the horizon against which it seems to stand out’” (58). 
28. This sentence parallels a paragraph in Jean-Luc Nancy’s discussion of interrupted myths. He 
writes: “The gift or the right to speak (and to speak of gifts and rights) is no longer the same 
gift or the same right, and it is perhaps no longer either a gift or a right. No more is the mythic 
legitimacy that myth conferred upon its own narrator. Writing is seen rather as illegitimate, 
never authorized, risked, exposed to the limit. But this is not a complacent anarchy. For it is in 
this way that writing obeys the law—the law of community” (Inoperative 70).
29. De Duve offers an indication for why this is the case in Kant After Duchamp: “…art is 
not the order of seeing and knowing but rather of that of judging, not the order of the 
descriptive but of the prescriptive. Misinterpreted conditionally and immanently, the 
modern imperative prescribed: do whatever in art, but do it in art only” (347). 
30. For more on this claim, see de Duve’s Kant After Duchamp, where he writes that 
creativity “also abandons the thing to its absolute impossibility of being determined as 
underdetermined, that is, to its impossibility of conforming to the law of the necessity 
of a universal whatever. And it’s precisely thanks to this abandonment that the 
readymade—and not the readymades—conforms to the universal of this impossibility” 
(358-59). 
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31. Later in The Infinite Conversation, Blanchot writes that ‘the work of unworking’ 
is “a practice of life and of writing in which we thought we recognized one of the 
characteristic traits of the surrealist project” (417). 
32.  In Blanchot’s discussion of “interruption,” he summarizes his thinking similarly:
Let us go no further and summarize. We have, first of all, two important 
distinctions: one corresponding to a dialectical, the other to a non-dialectical 
exigency of speech: the pause permits exchange, the wait that measures infinite 
distance. But in waiting it is not simply the delicate rupture preparing the poetic 
act that declares itself, but also, and at the same time, other forms of arrest that 
are very profound, very perverse, more and more perverse, and always such that 
if one distinguishes them, the distinction does not avert but rather postulates 
ambiguity. We have “distinguished” in this way three of them: one wherein 
emptiness becomes work; another where in emptiness is fatigue, affliction; and 
the other, the ultimate, the hyperbolic, wherein worklessness (perhaps thought) 
indicates itself. To interrupt oneself for the sake of understanding. To understand 
in order to speak. Speaking, finally, only to interrupt oneself and to render possible 
the impossible interruption. (Infinite 79)
This impossible interruption would also be the interruption of art by unartists (or ‘comics 
artist’).
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chApter four enDnotes
1. Unlike Lloyd Bitzer’s article title “The Rhetorical Situation,” the focus of this 
Stranger’s does not deal with a question (cf. Bitzer, “Rhetorical Situation” 5-6), nor 
does he suggest that an answer is possible. Rather, he merely wants to discover 
the available means of being in the world, of living, and therefore, of writing with 
significance. 
2. Later in his discussion of “perspective by incongruity,” Burke also refers to this method 
as a “planned incongruity” (Attitudes 309). 
3. Here, I use the term civic discourse to mean an engagement in what Aristotle called 
deliberative rhetoric: “The important subjects on which people deliberate and on 
which deliberative orators give advice in public are mostly five in number, and 
these are finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the 
framing of laws” (Rhetoric 53). The role of the un/artist in civic discourse is to present 
artifacts that inform these deliberations, often indirectly. Additionally, it would also 
be necessary for these deliberators to engage in Burke’s “perspective by incongruity” 
methodology to link these artifacts to the topics being deliberated. 
4. Here we could also continue with a discussion of pirates and the ways in which 
they work outside of the law to enact some change in social, cultural, and political 
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proceedings that ignore their interests and input. Perhaps we could learn to un/
compose ourselves via Captain Jack Sparrow of the Black Pearl (cf. the Pirates of the 
Caribbean movies). Also, in Permanence and Change, Burke discusses the Nietzschean 
theories of decadence and eternal recurrence as devices for working outside the law, 
which he claims offers opportunities for “uniting under one head movements which 
were generally considered in complete isolation from one another” (89).  
5. This phrasing, in part, comes from Bad Religion’s song, “Stranger than Fiction,” from 
the album Stranger Than Fiction. 
6. Parts of this phrasing are reminiscent of Lyotard’s “Anamnesis of the Visible” (108). 
7. Lyotard makes a similar comment when discussing ‘landscape arts’ in “Scapeland”: 
“…the estrangement that landscape procures does not result from the transfer of a 
sensorial organization into another sensorium, such as the transfer of the fragrance of 
scents into the flagrance of colours or into the light of timbres. This estrangement is 
absolute; it is the implosion of forms themselves, and forms are mind” (Inhuman 189).
8. If it is not clear yet, I am using Allan Kaprow’s term un-artist from here on out as a 
reference to ‘comics artist’ since both share the common trait of leaving Art in favor 
of doing something more interesting (without the constraints of art-istic forms or 
conventions). 
9. In the second chapter (“Figuration”) of Inessential Solidarity, Davis includes a sub-
section called “To Speak or to Kill” where she explicates this in more detail.  
10.  A kill switch, in current technological cultures, refers to a system put in place to 
shut down an unwanted response (communication—usually between software and 
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hardware) that cannot be stopped in the normal manner. Kill switches usually shut 
down communication at all costs.  
11.  For more on this, see Burke’s Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 16-20.
12.  I use play rather than work purposefully here.
13.  This phrasing comes from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Administration’s (1980-
1988) economic policy of “trickle-down economics,” a concept that proposed a standard 
tax for all US citizens. Like this economic policy, persuasion provides those with the 
resources more opportunities for success than those without the resources.  
14.  Here, I use demand as a verb meaning to require some action in order to function 
effectively. 
15.  Gregory Ulmer discusses these logics in terms of linking and play throughout his  
work, particularly in Heuretics, Teletheory, and Internet Invention. 
16.  Blanchot makes this claim in reference to the plastic arts, but my claim is that it is 
also applicable to the un/artist imaginative play and the digital event.
17.  For more on silence, and an explication of rhetorics of silence, see Cheryl Glenn’s 
Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence.
18.  This sentence refers to the Bill Readings quote in the introduction (chapter 4 
description): Thought as an in(ter)vention that does “not resolve arguments; it does 
not provide a metalanguage that can translate all other idioms into its own so that 
their dispute can be settled, their claims arranged and evaluated on a homogenous 
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scale”; rather, comics would throw “those who participate in pedagogy back into a 
reflection upon the ungroundedness of their situation: their obligation to each other 
and to a name that hails them as addressees, before they can think about it” (Readings, 
University 161).
19.  In part, this phrasing comes from Nietzsche’s famous aphorism: “If you stare into the 
abyss long enough, the abyss stares back at you” (Beyond Good 89). 
20.  Blanchot writes that writers who play the strange game of literary language do not 
…have the right to escape the consequences. Whoever has killed out of passion 
cannot alter the passion by invoking it as an excuse. Whoever comes up against, 
when writing, a truth that writing could not address is perhaps irresponsible, but 
must answer all the more for this irresponsibility; he must answer for it without 
calling it into question, without betraying it—that is the very secret about himself: 
the innocence that saves him is not his own; it is that of the place he occupies, and 
occupies by mistake, and with which he does not coincide” (Book to Come 28).
 The digital is one of the places that un/artists occupy, and they do not coincide with it, 
which is why they write with all the means and media available to them: to discover 
this new game of literary language. 
21.  McLuhan makes this claim in reference to a tetrad form of the laws of media as he sees 
them. However, the artifacts we have seen composed in the early 21st century do not 
always adhere to these laws. 
22.  Recall my discussion of the un/artists in chapter 3—the connection to McLuhan’s 
electronic man should be clear. 
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23.  Blanchot makes a similar claim about the work of the writer in relation to the book to 
come: “The work demands much more: that one not worry about it, that one not seek it 
out as a goal, that one have with it the most profound relationship of carelessness and 
neglect” (Book to Come 30). Also, the term ambivalence here is being used in the sense 
of ‘uncertainty’ and  a mixture of ‘perspectives’ that have not yet been untangled. 
24.  Franny Howes sees this potential in comics when she explores a “multiplicity of visual 
rhetorical traditions,” claiming that such a theory offers ways of composing “across 
genre and form” that explores relationships “in a similar location, or within a similar 
culture or discourse community” (“Imagining a Multiplicity…”).  
25.  This addresse the problem that Jeff Rice sees for digital writing: “…the problem of 
digital writing is how to write visually in a complex but seamless fashion” (138).
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chApter five enDnotes
1.  Lyotard has a major influence on this chapter, and the framework for this chapter 
comes from his article “Domus and the Megalopolis” where he writes: “It is impossible 
to think or write without some façade of a house at least rising up, a phantom, to 
receive and to make a work of our peregrinations. Lost behind our thoughts, the domus 
is also a mirage in front, the impossible dwelling” (198). The one who writes in this 
illusion of a domus still rising is a (traitorous) stranger aware of the impossibility of 
completing this dwelling (references to Heidegger should not be lost here). 
2.   In “Book 5” of The Gay Science, Nietzsche has a similar view of the importance 
of ‘picking the stick up from the other end’ (to use a Vitanzian phrase) of what is 
generally accepted as “good”: “Even genius does not compensate for such a deficiency, 
however much it may deceive people about it. This becomes clear to anyone who 
has ever watched our most gifted painters and musicians from nearby. All of them, 
with scarcely any exception, know how to use cunning inventions of manners, of 
makeshift devices, and even of principles to give themselves after the event an artificial 
semblance of such probity, of such solidity of training and culture—without, of course, 
managing to deceive themselves, without silencing their own bad conscious. For you 
surely know that all great modern artists suffer from a guilty conscience” (323-24).  
3.   This is a reference to the USA PATRIOT Act—which stands for “Uniting and 
Strengthening American by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”—passed in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. One of the most important parts of this act, if 
you’ve read through it, is that it introduced “electronic communication” into the United 
States’ surveillance laws. We’ve all heard the criticisms—which are, at times, driven 
by paranoia—but it’s an important part of the ‘legality’ of composing within digital 
environments.  
 Blanchot defines patriotism as “the most prodigious power of integration, being 
that which, in the intimacy of thought, in everyday practice, in political movement, is 
at work to reconcile everything—works, men, classes—to prevent all class struggle, to 
found unity in the name of values that particularize (national particularism promoted 
as universal), and to set aside the necessary division of an infinite destruction” 
(Political 92)—World War II offers us one example of such a power that desired to 
reconcile everything. 
4.   This sublime work of the imagination seems akin to Sigmund Freud’s dream-work, 
and Lyotard’s further development of this concept throughout his works, particularly in 
The Libidinal Economy and “The Dream-Work Does Not Think” (which can be found in 
The Lyotard Reader, edited by Andrew E. Benjamin).
5.   For a further explanation of this concept, see Gerald L. Bruns’ book, Maurice 
Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy, pp. 138-39.
6.   Matthew Kirshenbaum situates digital humanities similarly in the context of 
scholarship: “Whatever else it might be then, the digital humanities today is about a 
scholarship (and a pedagogy) that is publicly visible in ways to which we are generally 
unaccustomed, a scholarship and pedagogy that are bound up with infrastructure 
in ways that are deeper and more explicit than we are generally accustomed to, a 
scholarship and pedagogy that are collaborative and depend on networks of people and 
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that live an active 24/7 life online” (“What is Digital Humanities…” 6). 
7.   This is a double reference to the Council of Writing Program Administrators and 
the political bodies that set policy for education, knowledge, and domestic and 
international relations.  
8.   This is a reference to Nietzsche’s call for “another kind of art” that relies on the ability 
to forget, to forget the past, to forget the world.  
9.   This is a reference to Roland Barthes’ Writing Degree Zero, which he offers us as “no 
more than an Introduction to what a History of Writing might be” (6). 
10.   This is an extension of Lyotard’s description of the postmodern in The Postmodern 
Condition cited/referenced earlier. 
11.   Dilger explains these concepts: “With comfort, the first widespread concept of ease 
relied on two other qualities: effortlessness, the reduction or elimination of physical 
labor and intensive activity; and perhaps the most important, transparency, or freedom 
from concern with complications or unnecessary attention to details and procedures” 
(“Ease and Electracy” 110). 
12.   Nietzsche notes in 1875: “To make the individual uncomfortable, that is my task” 
(Portable 50). 
13.   While not a direct reference, Cynthia Haynes speaks of a similar approach to Writing 
Center pedagogy in “’Hanging Your Alias on Their Scene’: Writing Centers, Graffiti, 
and Style.” As she writes: “graffiti serves as a sign for expressing anger without 
violence in assigned writing” (120). This, I think, is what composition/rhetoric should 
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aspire to in the digital age, writing on the networked walls. 
14.   Bruno Latour echoes a similar point in the first plank in his composition manifesto: 
“In a first meaning, compositionism could stand as an alternative to critique […]. With 
critique, you may debunk, reveal, unveil, but only as long as you establish, through this 
process of creative destruction, a privileged access to the world of reality beyond the 
veils of appearances. Critique, in other words, has all the limits of utopia: it relies on 
the certainty of the world beyond this world. By contrast, for compositionism, there is 
no world of beyond. It is all about immanence” (“An Attempt…” 475).
15.   The concept of whatever, as stated earlier, comes from Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming 
Community.  
16.   As stated in chapter 1, this way of composing, in Agamben’s view, is one that 
communicates “online the empty space of the example, without being tied to any 
common property, by any identity” (Coming 11).
17.   Etymologically, traitor stems from the Latin traditorem, literally meaning “one who 
delivers.” 
18.   Jean Baudrillard uses this phrasing when explicating the etymology of the term 
aphorism (as an aphorism): “‘Aphorizein’ (from which we get the word ‘aphorism’) 
means to retreat to such a distance that a horizon of thought is formed which never 
again closes on itself” (Cool Memories V 31).
19.   This is not to say the end of literature, but of another kind of literature resonating 
with Katherine Hayles’ Electronic Literature, and beyond. Barthes also comments on 
what may occur beyond Literature: “It is at this moment that the modes of writing 
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begin to multiply. Each one, henceforth, be it the highly wrought, populist, neutral 
or colloquial, sets itself up as the initial act whereby the writer acknowledges or 
repudiates his bourgeois condition. Each one is an attempt to find a solution to this 
Orphean problematics of modern Form: writers without Literature” (Writing Degree 
Zero 61).
20.   This is a direct reference to Twitter, a social networking platform that works with the 
Short Message System (SMS) for mobile technologies. While SMS limits messages to 
160 characters, Twitter shortened this limit to 140 so that “usernames” would be able 
to be included before the message. Also, a “character” in a digital environment would 
be the smallest “read-able” mark, not necessarily an alphabetic letter. 
21.   This term comes from McCloud’s Understanding Comics, but Hillary Chute’s 
description of gutters is more helpful in this context: “…gutters, the rich empty spaces 
between the selected moments that direct our interpretation” (“History and Graphic…” 
342). 
22.   In The Two Virtuals, Alexander Reid explains how this is possible with the advent of 
new media pedagogy: “New media pedagogy, because it still remains largely uncharted 
and undisciplined, offers a number of such experimental opportunities. […] though 
the means for teaching new media, and the particular contents of such courses, 
remain fairly open, such courses quickly become a site for re-enacting some of the 
oldest concerns in rhetorical instruction, particularly this concern that courses in new 
media sacrifice humanistic content in the name of career preparation. This concern is 
essentially a reincarnation of a debate between rhetoric as a set of skills and rhetoric/
philosophy as a mode of intellectual investigation that goes back to Plato’s arguments 
against rhetoric in Gorgias and Phaedrus” (170-71). 
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23.   At the end of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that the 
aphorism “is necessary above all to practice reading as an art in this way, something 
that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays—and therefore it will be some 
time before my writings are ‘readable’—something for which one has almost to be a cow 
and in any case not a ‘modern man’: rumination” (23).
24.   The ‘trace’ that Agamben refers to here is a reference to Jacques Derrida’s Of 
Grammatology: “The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the discourse 
that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did 
not disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the 
trace, which thus becomes the origin of the trace. From then on, to wrench the concept 
of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from 
an originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed 
speak of an originary trace. […] The (pure) trace is differance. It does not depend on 
any sensible plentitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the 
condition of such a plentitude.” (61-62). A character, in this sense, would be such an 
originary empirical mark for the condition of potentialities. 
25.   “The (committed) writer,” for Blanchot, saves “the place of the one who will come, to 
preserve absence from all usurpation” (Political 118). 
26.   Courtesy of @l_I__I_l (renamed). 
27.   Courtesy of @tw1tt3rart (renamed). Unless otherwise noted, these designs can be 
found on the individual artists’ pages on www.twitter.com. 
28.   Courtesy of @MargaR1da (renamed).  
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29.   Courtesy of @mightymegadon. 
30.   Courtesy of @TwitComicStrip. 
31.   Courtesy of @KatCutler. Very e.e. cummings, don’t you think? 
32.   Courtesy of @VisuellePoesie (renamed). 
33.   Courtesy of @hg47 (renamed). 
34.   Courtesy of @aggregart. 
35.   Courtesy of @followingfuture (renamed). 
36.   Courtesy of @aggregart (renamed, with a reference to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the 
Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer).
37.   Courtesy of @paintedtweets (renamed). 
38.   Courtesy of @140artist (renamed). 
39.   Courtesy of @hg47. 
40.   Courtesy of @MargaR1da. 
41.   Courtesy of @riv7art (renamed).
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